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Abstract 
 
Two assumptions are often made about the nature of the cognitive attitudes that allow 
us to engage with fiction and in pretence: the uniformity and the non-doxastic assump-
tions. The uniformity assumption tells us that both of these activities involve the same 
cognitive attitudes. The non-doxastic assumption tells us that these cognitive attitudes 
are not beliefs, but belief-like states that we can call belief-like imaginings. I will challenge 
both of these assumptions in this thesis. In the case of the uniformity assumption, I will 
draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary imaginative counterparts. I will 
argue that if a belief-like counterpart is involved in our engagement in pretence, it will 
be a voluntary counterpart, whereas an involuntary one will have to be associated with 
our engagement with fiction. Against the non-doxastic assumption, I will argue that we 
can explain our engagement with these activities by introducing beliefs with distinct 
contents. In the case of pretence, I will suggest that the relevant beliefs are of the form 
‘[I believe] I PRETEND that “p”’. In the case of fiction, I will argue that the relevant 
beliefs are of the form ‘I believe p [in the fiction]’. This will lead to us challenging the 
non-doxastic assumption on the grounds that belief-like imaginings are unnecessary for 
explaining how we are able to engage with fiction and in pretence. I will also offer some 
arguments for why belief-like imaginings might be insufficient for explaining how we are 
able to engage with fiction and in pretence. In particular, I will argue that belief-like 
imaginings do not do enough to explain how we recognise when someone else is engaging 
in pretence, and that they struggle to make sense of why our representations related to 
fiction and pretence exhibit what Walton calls ‘clustering’.  
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Introduction 
 
A young girl slowly toddles toward a miniature table, plastic teapot in hand. Upon reach-
ing the table, she sets the teapot down carefully, placing it alongside several plastic cups 
that rest atop plastic saucers. She then turns to the teddy bears and dolls sitting around 
the table and proceeds to ask each of them if they'd like some tea. She indicates that 
they've answered in the aﬃrmative, picks the teapot back up, and then walks around the 
table making as if to pour tea into their cups. Having served them all some ‘tea’, she sits 
back down and starts to act as if she were drinking from her own cup, then proceeds to 
hold conversations with the various toys. While this tea party is under way, her mother 
is sitting on a lounging chair nearby, Paul Beatty's Booker Prize-winning satire The 
Sellout in hand. In this book, she reads about events that have never happened and never 
will happen, and about characters who have never existed and never will exist, while her 
daughter continues to make as if to drink tea from an empty cup.  
This thesis investigates part of what’s going on in the head of individuals engaged in 
these two sorts of activities. One common view of the matter is that these two activities 
– childhood pretence and engaging with works of fiction – involve similar sorts of mental 
states. Most crucially, both are often thought to involve the imagination. Matravers notes 
in relation to a game where a child, Eric, pretends that nearby tree stumps are bears: 
It is diﬃcult to see how we could describe Eric’s situation as anything but him imag-
ining of himself that he is confronted by a bear. (Matravers 2013, pp. 11-12) 
 Everett says about engaging with fictions:  
It cannot reasonably be denied that our engagement with fiction involves some sort 
of imaginative exercise in which we imagine the world of the fiction, its protagonists, 
the events which befall them, and so on. (Everett 2013, p.6) 
If this is right, a crucial part of our explanation of what’s going on in the head of the 
young girl described above is that she imagines she is having a tea party. In the Sellout 
example, her mother is similarly imagining the various goings-on described in the novel. 
This leaves a question about what we mean when we say both activities involve the 
imagination. Walton (1990), who has been influential in drawing connections between 
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these two sorts of activities, argues that they both involve make-believe. In recent years, 
this has evolved into the idea that both these activities involve propositional imagination. 
A recent consensus has formed that propositional imaginings are what we can call an 
'imaginative counterpart' to belief: they are belief-like imaginings. If we accept this, then 
when we say that pretence and fiction involve imagination, this amounts to maintaining 
that they both involve belief-like imaginings. The child imagines in a belief-like way that 
she is at a tea party; that she is pouring tea for teddy; that teddy has drunk his tea and 
needs a top-up; and so on. The reader imagines in a belief-like way that the main char-
acter of The Sellout has reintroduced segregation to his hometown in California and is 
currently at the Supreme Court accused of having violated the 13th Amendment by 
owning slaves.  
I will develop my own contribution to this debate by calling this consensus view into 
question in two respects. Firstly, I will question whether belief-like imaginings are neces-
sary and suﬃcient for explaining these two human activities, thus disputing what we can 
call the non-doxastic assumption. Secondly, I will examine whether a single mental state 
can explain imaginative activities like supposition, fiction and pretence, and so will ques-
tion what we can call the uniformity assumption. I will argue that the cognitive attitudes 
involved in pretence and fiction are beliefs with distinct contents. I am going to propose 
that we can explain pretence by arguing that children can form meta-representational 
beliefs like '[I believe that] I PRETEND that "I am at a tea party"' (Leslie 1987, 1994). 
In the case of fiction, I am going to argue that we can make sense of our engagement by 
introducing beliefs subject to a fictional operator, such as ‘I believe that Harry Potter is 
a wizard [in the fiction]’ (Neill 1993, Tullmann 2016).  
Before setting out my argument structure, it will be helpful to note three things that 
I will not be arguing for in this thesis. Firstly, I am not going to claim that there is no 
imaginative counterpart to belief. I think there may well be a sort of counterpart to belief 
related to supposing that p or entertaining the proposition that p. Furthermore, this 
counterpart has also been said to play a role in human activities like modal reasoning 
and third person mindreading. Since we will not have the space to consider these sorts 
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of activities in any great detail, I cannot adjudicate whether we need to make this asso-
ciation. What I will hope to demonstrate, however, is that we should be sceptical of an 
approach where, having decided that belief-like imaginings exist, we then proceed to put 
these belief-like imaginings to work in explaining various human activities without careful 
consideration of the explanatory work they are supposed to be performing. I will advocate 
for deciding whether to introduce counterparts on a case-by-case basis, particularly bear-
ing in mind worries from philosophers like Kind (2013) about whether propositional im-
aginings are being made to bear a weight that cannot be borne by a single mental state.  
Secondly, my argument shouldn't be read as being equivalent to saying that the 
imagination is simply not involved in fiction and pretence. I am happy to allow that 
other kinds of imagining – such as forming mental images and imagining experiences – 
may be important for understanding pretence and fiction. As such, when I refer to en-
gagement with fiction and in pretence in this thesis, I will mostly mean this in the sense 
of our cognitive engagement. I am not presuming that settling on the right cognitive 
attitude will fully explain how we engage in these two activities. 
Finally, there is an open question about what my project entails for the way that we 
talk about the attitudes involved in our engagement with fiction and in pretence. One 
way of responding to my claims would be to hold that we should cease to speak of 
imagining that in the context of these activities. Another way of responding to my claims 
would be to see them as suggesting that we can still legitimately speak in this way, but 
that we shouldn’t take the notion of imagining that as implying that we are talking about 
a distinct attitude. On this approach, we should reinterpret what we mean when we talk 
about imagining that, at least in some instances. Not much turns on this, save the fact 
that if one wishes to continue to say that reading a novel or engaging in pretence involves 
the propositional imagination, I don't have to commit myself to saying this is a false 
claim, I only have to deny that this entails these activities involve a distinct belief-like 
attitude. 
 
Having made these preliminary remarks, we can now set out the structure of this thesis. 
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In chapter 1, I will argue that there are two notions of an imaginative counterpart 
that can be discerned in recent philosophical discussions of the imagination. The first 
notion is of voluntary states which we can enter into at will, and which bear some resem-
blance to other mental states. The second is that of involuntary states which also resem-
ble other mental states, but are entered into automatically when we engage with some-
thing that we recognise to be imaginary or fictional. Philosophical discussions of belief-
like imaginings often cut across this distinction and my central claim in this chapter will 
be that introducing one sort of counterpart does not necessarily justify the introduction 
of the other sort of counterpart. In explaining why this is so, I will propose four principles 
that we can use to justify the introduction of both sorts of counterpart. This will help to 
shape our subsequent discussions of whether a counterpart to belief should be introduced, 
and whether one is involved in our engagement with fiction and in pretence. 
In chapter 2, I will set out some diﬀerent ways that we can explain our ability to 
propositionally imagine: the ‘just belief’, distinct attitude, distinct content, and distinct 
attitude and distinct content views. I will accept that we may well need to introduce 
some sort of counterpart to belief that can be associated with notions like supposing, but 
I will also introduce some initial reasons for doubting that a single counterpart can do 
all the explanatory work when it comes to explaining how we engage with fiction and in 
pretence. In this way, we will introduce our challenge to the uniformity assumption. This 
will set-up a standoﬀ between distinct content and distinct attitude approaches when 
trying to make sense of our engagement with fiction and in pretence, which we will 
attempt to resolve in the remainder of the thesis.  
In chapter 3, I will criticise the best developed argument for why we should associate 
a belief-like attitude with our engagement in pretence, which is set out by Nichols and 
Stich (2000, 2003). This discussion will reveal that their theory has diﬃculty explaining 
why belief-like imaginings are sometimes processed diﬀerently as compared to beliefs. 
This is because they place great emphasis on the idea that belief-like imaginings and 
beliefs share a 'single code' – which entails that they should be processed by our cognitive 
mechanisms in ‘much the same way’. In light of this commitment, I will argue that their 
view struggles to explain clustering, the fact that our representations about fiction and 
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pretence are associated with only a single fiction or a single episode of pretence (unlike 
our beliefs, which aim to provide a uniform picture of the world). This will reveal an 
initial way in which a distinct attitude is insuﬃcient for explaining how we are able to 
engage in pretence and so will introduce our challenge to the non-doxastic assumption in 
the context of pretence. 
In chapter 4, we will consider how children recognise that someone else is pretending, 
and how they recognise what sort of actions count as appropriate pretend actions when 
they engage in pretence. Nichols and Stich’s account of pretence is a behavioural account, 
which means that they argue that young children understand pretence as a mere form of 
behaviour. I will argue that behavioural theories have diﬃculty explaining how children 
recognise the content of episodes of pretence, and this will reveal another way in which 
introducing a distinct attitude is insuﬃcient for explaining pretence. I will contend that 
we should instead adopt a distinct content mentalistic view, where we hold that children 
have some understanding of the mental states that motivate pretence behaviour and that 
engaging in pretence involves forming beliefs that you are pretending. In light of this, I 
will suggest that it is unnecessary to introduce a belief-like attitude to explain how we 
engage in pretence. We will thus conclude our challenge to the non-doxastic assumption 
when it comes to explaining our engagement in pretence. 
In chapter 5, we will turn to consider whether we should associate our engagement 
with fiction with a distinct belief-like attitude. We will begin by noting some diﬀerences 
between what an account of our engagement in pretence needs to explain as compared 
to our account of how we engage with fiction. This will reveal that we should reject the 
uniformity assumption, since, if a belief-like counterpart is involved in our engagement 
with fiction, it will be an involuntary counterpart. We will then consider several argu-
ments for why we might need to introduce this sort of involuntary distinct attitude into 
our account of how engage with fiction and will find them all wanting. As such, I will 
argue that we can make sense of our engagement with fiction by proposing that we simply 
form beliefs like ‘I believe p [in the fiction]’. This will entail that introducing a distinct 
belief-like attitude is unnecessary for explaining our engagement with fiction. I will also 
note that clustering remains unexplained by distinct attitude views, which suggests that 
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there is at least one respect in which a distinct belief-like attitude is insuﬃcient for 
making sense of our engagement with fiction. In light of this, we will reject the non-
doxastic assumption in the context of our engagement with fiction. 
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Chapter 1: Imaginative Counterparts 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will seek to clarify the notion of an imaginative counterpart by con-
sidering what an imaginative counterpart is supposed to be, and what is entailed by 
saying that one mental state is a counterpart to another. We will also consider what sorts 
of mental states have counterparts, and when we are justified in maintaining that a 
mental state has a counterpart. In so doing, I will oﬀer a novel theory of how to classify 
imaginative counterparts, and will set out some principles for when we should introduce 
them. 
In section 1.1, I will give an overview of some recent discussions about the 
imagination, and I will bring out the distinction between propositional and non-
propositional imaginings. I will note here that my arguments in this thesis will not rule 
out there being a role for non-propositional imaginings to play when it comes to 
explaining our engagement with fiction and in pretence. 
In section 1.2, we will begin our discussion of imaginative counterparts. Currie and 
Ravenscroft (2002, p. 11) explain the general idea of imaginative counterparts by telling 
us that ‘when a form of imagining … is X-like, … it has state X as its counterpart’ 
(emphasis in original). However, I will argue that this is overly simplistic, since there are 
at least two notions of imaginative counterparts at play in contemporary philosophical 
discussions of the imagination. The first are mental states that resemble, in some sense, 
another mental state, but are under the control of the will. Since these states are under 
the control of the will, we can call them voluntary counterparts. This sort of notion of a 
counterpart can be associated with simulation theory. The second sort of counterpart is 
less familiar, and is what we can call an involuntary counterpart. This is where a 
counterpart still resembles another mental state, but the counterpart is not under the 
control of the will. It is hard to find clear examples of this sort of counterpart, but they 
can be associated with Walton’s (1990) influential theory of fictional truth, and in 
particular his notion of ‘quasi emotions’ (Walton 1978). This distinction is important, 
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since while both simulation theorists and Walton are widely understood as introducing 
counterparts, it has not been widely remarked that the sorts of counterparts they 
introduce can be distinguished.   
To bring out the nature of these two counterparts, we will set out how simulation 
theorists justify the introduction of voluntary counterparts. I will contend that we can 
justify introducing these sorts of counterparts by arguing that one mental state resembles 
another mental state in introspective, functional and neurological respects but is under 
the control of the will. To give an example of when we might be justified in introducing 
this sort of counterpart, we will then consider whether seeing has a voluntary counterpart 
in section 1.3, and I will argue that we can justify this proposal by focusing on 
introspective, functional and neurological similarities between visualising and seeing. 
In section 1.4, we will consider the nature of involuntary counterparts. I will bring 
out the motivation for introducing this sort of counterpart by setting out Walton’s theory 
of fictional truth and how he allows for real feelings and actions to constitute fictional 
feelings and actions. We will then consider when we are justified in introducing this sort 
of counterpart in section 1.5 by examining whether seeing has an involuntary 
counterpart. I will suggest that in order to justify the introduction of an involuntary 
counterpart, we have to focus on specific human activities and consider whether either 
a) there are constraints on a genuine mental state being involved in this activity that 
necessitate the introduction of a counterpart; or b) there are puzzles that arise when 
making sense of this activity that are best explained by introducing a counterpart. 
Bearing these two issues in mind, I will suggest that we can potentially defend the 
introduction of an involuntary counterpart to seeing. 
Finally, in section 1.6 we will consider whether the emotions have either voluntary 
or involuntary counterparts. I will argue that they do not have voluntary counterparts, 
but may well have involuntary counterparts if we accept Walton’s arguments for 
introducing some ‘quasi emotions’.  
On the basis of these discussions, I will defend four claims about imaginative coun-
terparts: 
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1. There are (at least) two kinds of putative imaginative counterpart i) a state that 
is under the control of the will and resembles a genuine mental state in introspec-
tive, functional or neurological ways; and ii) a state that resembles another mental 
state, which we automatically enter into when we engage with something we 
recognise as being fictional or imaginary, and has fictional content 
 
2. Noting a mental state appears to have content that is recognised by the agent as 
fictional or imaginary is insuﬃcient for introducing a counterpart of type (ii). 
 
3. Instead, to justify the introduction of a counterpart of type (ii) we have to focus 
on specific human activities to see whether either a) constraints on a genuine 
mental state being involved in these activates necessitate the introduction of a 
counterpart; or b) puzzles that arise when making sense of these activities are 
best explained by introducing a counterpart. 
 
4. Justifying the introduction of a counterpart of type (i) does not justify the intro-
duction of a counterpart of type (ii) (and vice versa). 
 
These initial points are important, since I will argue in chapters 2 and 5 that philosophers 
describe belief-like imaginings in a way that cuts across my distinction between these 
two sorts of counterpart, with the counterpart involved in pretence resembling my first 
notion of a counterpart and the one involved in fiction resembling my second notion of a 
counterpart. In light of this, we must oﬀer separate justifications for associating a coun-
terpart to belief with these two activities. 
To begin, it will be helpful to say something about the more general notion of ‘im-
agination’ and to try and bring out what propositional imaginings are supposed to be.  
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1.1 Varieties of Imagination 
The imagination is often regarded as being central to our mental life, as well as one of 
more interesting and romantic parts of it. For example, laypeople and philosophers alike 
have suggested that the imagination plays a central role in the generation of artworks, 
and in ordinary language we revere those individuals who deploy their imagination to 
create works of art.1 We see some evidence for the importance of the imagination in the 
eyes of the folk in the way we use the word ‘imaginative’ to praise individuals: preferring 
the imaginative scientist or politician to the unimaginative. We also spend a lot of time 
engaging with what the might call the ‘imaginary’ worlds of novels, films, plays, video-
games, and so on. 
Somewhat less romantically, philosophers have argued that the imagination plays a 
role in allowing us to determine whether something is possible (Chalmers 2002 argues for 
a link between imagination, conceivability and possibility, for example) and in our coun-
terfactual and hypothetical reasoning (Williamson 2005, 2016). This places the imagina-
tion at the heart of a good deal of our philosophical reasoning, suggesting for example 
that it plays a key role in how we develop and engage with thought experiments – such 
as Mary in her black and white room – and with hypothetical arguments more generally. 
In the Mary case, it looks like we imagine what it would be like to step into a world of 
colour for the first time, and this imagining tells us whether she would learn anything 
new.2 In light of these sorts of connections, Williamson (2016, p. 115) suggests that the 
original evolutionary purpose of the imagination might have been to help our ancestors 
decide on what course of action to take when faced with obstacles like a river they were 
unsure whether they could safely cross. 
                                               
1 A recent summary of this link can be found in Wiltsher and Meskin (2016). I am not 
claiming here that all art creation necessarily involves the imagination. The point here is 
merely that it is often thought that art and imagination are intimately connected. 
2 A good introduction to debates about how much stock we should place in the imagination 
when thinking about what is possible can be found in the introduction to Gendler and 
Hawthorne (2002). 
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In making these introductory remarks, however, we see how diverse the uses of the 
word ‘imagination’ and its cognates like ‘imagines’ are. This reveals a diﬃculty with 
trying to explain what the imagination is, namely that it is not clear what sort of account 
we should seek. O’Shaughnessy (2000, p. 339-340) suggests that taking there to be a 
single mental activity of imagining is to ‘assume too much’ since this amounts to sug-
gesting that ‘there is some one thing that is the phenomenon of Imagining.’ For example, 
we could argue that to understand the imagination we need to understand a certain sort 
of mental state, activity, attitude, event or process of imagining.3 An explanation of what 
the imagination is would then take the form of an account of this sui generis mental 
state.  
One proposal we might be tempted by is the idea that imagining involves forming 
mental images. We could argue that to imagine something is to form a mental image of 
that something, and that explaining the nature of the imagination boils down to 
explaining the nature of this ability to form mental images. There has been a longstanding 
tendency in philosophy to associate the imagination with the formation of mental 
imagery.4 In Aristotle’s De Anima there is a relatively short discussion of the imagination, 
where he can be read as associating imagination simpliciter with the formation of mental 
images, proposing that imagination is ‘that in virtue of which an image occurs in us’ (De 
Anima iii 3, 428aa1-2).  
Another historical discussion of the imagination that associates it with mental im-
agery is found in Descartes’ Meditations. This focus is demonstrated by Descartes’ argu-
ment that we can understand the idea of a chiliagon (a 1000-sided shape) but cannot 
imagine one: 
[i]f I want to think of a chiliagon, although I understand that it is a figure consisting 
of a thousand sides just as well as I understand the triangle to be a three-sided figure, 
I do not in the same way imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they were 
                                               
3 This list is adapted from Kind (2016, p. 2). 
4 White (1990, Ch. 1-7) oﬀers a good historical analysis of this link, finding it in Aristotle, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hume among others. 
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present before me ... But suppose I am dealing with a pentagon: I can of course 
understand the figure of a pentagon, just as I can the figure of a chiliagon, without 
the help of the imagination; but I can also imagine a pentagon, by applying the mind’s 
eye to its five sides and the area contained within them. (Descartes 1642/1996 p. 50-
51) 
In this quotation, it looks like Descartes is thinking about imagination as essentially 
involving images, and claiming that we cannot form an image of a chiliagon. Part of the 
thought here might be that any image we form of a chiliagon cannot be distinct from, 
say, the image we would produce to represent a 999-sided shape or a 998-sided shape.5 
If we were to endorse this sort of view, then all human activities that involve the 
imagination will therefore involve the formation of mental imagery. If we return to some 
of my initial examples, reading a novel would necessarily involve forming mental images 
of the characters and events described therein; figuring out whether you can cross a river 
would necessarily involve forming an image of your attempted (or successful) crossing; 
and deciding whether Mary learns something outside her black and white room would 
necessarily involve forming an image of a girl leaving a black and white room.  
However, this does not look like the right way of capturing what we mean when we 
say these sorts of activities involve the imagination. One could read a novel without 
forming any mental images whatsoever, and if we think about visual fictions such as film 
or comics, engaging with these art forms doesn’t appear to involve the formation of 
mental images, since the fictional events are already depicted for us on screen or on the 
page. Likewise, we might think that we can decide what conclusion to draw from the 
Mary case without forming any images, or that we can decide whether we can cross a 
troublesome river without them. 
The diﬃculties that arise if we attempt to reduce the imagination to one sort of 
mental state become even more acute once we recognise the wide range of uses of the 
word ‘imagination’ and its cognates in ordinary language. Strawson notes that: 
                                               
5 McGinn (2005, p. 129) points out we can also question whether we could distinguish an 
actual 1000-sided shape from a 999-sided shape via ordinary visual perception. 
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The uses, and applications, of the terms ‘image’, ‘imagine’, ‘imagination’, and so forth 
make up a very diverse and scattered family. Even this image of a family seems too 
definite. It would be a matter of more than diﬃculty to identify and list the family's 
members, let alone their relations of parenthood and cousinhood (Strawson 1970, p. 
31) 
The most extensive recent taxonomy of the diﬀerent ways we use ‘imagination’ and its 
cognates comes from Stevenson (2002), who picks out twelve diﬀerent conceptions of 
imagination in philosophy and ordinary language, ranging from ‘the ability to entertain 
mental images’; to ‘the ability to think of something not presently perceived, but spatio‐
temporally real’; to ‘the ability to appreciate things that are expressive or revelatory of 
the meaning of human life.’ In spite of the wide variety of conceptions he picks out, 
Stevenson tells us his list is by no means exhaustive. Regardless, it is unlikely that any 
one mental state can explain these initial twelve conceptions. For example, the sort of 
mental state involved in the production of mental imagery is likely not the same as the 
one involved when we appreciate things ‘that are expressive … of the meaning of human 
life’. 
In light of the challenges that attend to oﬀering a general theory of imagination, 
recent philosophical discussions have tended to proceed by making some relevant distinc-
tions between diﬀerent aspects of the imagination rather than trying to oﬀer a broader 
theory of imagination.6 One notable example of this tendency is found in Walton’s Mi-
mesis as Make-Believe, perhaps the most influential work on the imagination in recent 
years. Walton concludes his starting discussion of the nature of imagination by asking: 
What is it to imagine? We have examined a number of dimensions along which im-
aginings can vary; shouldn't we now spell out what they have in common? —Yes, if 
we can. But I can't. (Walton 1990, p. 19), 
                                               
6 A potential exception is White who attempts to develop a theory of imagination that covers 
all uses of ‘imagination’ and its cognates in ordinary language and argues this should be 
an important goal of any successful theory of the imagination. As he puts the point: ‘I 
submit that any acceptable theory of imagination must account for all … common uses [of 
imagination and its cognates].’ (White 1990, p. 85)  
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Walton (1990, pp. 13-19) instead proceeds by making some relevant distinctions for his 
purposes, such as between occurrent and dispositional imaginings and solitary and social 
imaginings. For the purposes of this thesis, we will proceed by marking a distinction 
between propositional and non-propositional imaginings.  
A good way to introduce this distinction is by bringing out why philosophers have moved 
away from the view that imagining essentially involves the formation of mental images.7  
One reason to be sceptical of this approach is it looks like imaginings can take diﬀerent 
forms, and not all of these forms are essential imagistic in nature. For example, suppose 
someone asks you to imagine being on a beach in Spain. One way to do this would be to 
form a mental image of yourself siting on a beach in Spain, perhaps with a cocktail by 
your side and a book resting at your feet. But you could also imagine this without forming 
mental imagery, you could imagine that you are on a beach in Spain. In other words, 
you could imagine this propositionally, where this looks like it involves taking an attitude 
towards a particular propositional content. These sorts of imaginings are thus often called 
‘propositional’ imaginings.8 That being said, this does not mean that you think of yourself 
as merely taking an attitude towards a proposition when you imagine in this way. In-
stead, you are doing something like representing a state of aﬀairs in a manner that isn’t 
imagistic.  
                                               
7 Kind (2001) is a partial exception to this recent move away from imagery, and argues 
imagery is central to the imagination.  
8 In some recent discussions, these sorts of imaginings have also been called ‘attitude’ 
imaginings (Van Leeuwen 2013, 2014). I will be using propositional imaginings in this 
dissertation because I prefer the locution ‘propositionally imagines’ to ‘attitudinally 
imagines’ and because this is more commonly used by the philosophers we will be primarily 
discussing. The notion of attitude imaginings also leaves it ambiguous whether the content 
of the imagining in question is propositional or non-propositional. Grzankowski (2012) 
argues that we should pay more attention to ‘non-propositional’ attitudes, and if we make 
room for these sorts of attitudes in ordinary cognition it might also be possible for us to 
form non-propositional attitude imaginings. 
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This brings out the diﬀerence between propositional imaginings and one kind of non-
propositional imaginings, namely objectual imaginings (Yablo 1993, p. 27). A proposi-
tional imagining has a proposition as its content and involves a that-clause, whereas an 
objectual imagining has an object as its content. To make this a bit more explicit, the 
claim is that propositional imagining involves imagining that p, where ‘p’ is a proposition, 
whereas objectual imagining involves imagining O, where ‘O’ is an object. We can imag-
ine that there is a tree outside the window and we can imagine a tree outside the window.9 
With this distinction in hand, we can respond to Descartes’ scepticism about our 
ability to imagine a 1000-sided shape. We can argue that whilst we might not be able to 
objectually imagine a chiliagon (in the sense of forming a mental image of one that is 
suitably distinguishable from a 999-sided shape) we can nonetheless propositionally im-
agine one. We can imagine that there is a 1000-sided shape.  
That being said, it is debateable whether objectual imagining something always in-
volves forming a visual image of that something. For example, it looks like we can imagine 
the smell of a rose or the sounds of a symphony. One might prefer to describe these as 
something like property imaginings, but, nonetheless, we might be able to form objectual 
imaginings with an auditory or olfactory character. That is to say, that we are not nec-
essarily limited to solely being able to form objectual imaginings with a visual character 
(Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, pp. 11-12). Furthermore, one might wish to leave space in 
one’s account of objectual imaginings for the possibility of imagining abstract concepts, 
                                               
9 There is a sense in which we can say a proposition is the object of a propositional imagining. 
Crane (2012, p. 419) for examples draws on Prior (1971) and notes one sense of something 
being an object of thought: ‘When we believe or judge, what we believe or judge is 
sometimes called the object of our thought; normally these things are called ‘propositions’ 
and states of thinking them are now called propositional ‘attitudes’’.  Another way to mark 
the distinction that I am making here would be to say that propositional imaginings have 
a proposition of some sort as their object, whereas objectual imaginings have some sort of 
non-propositional object as their content.  
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such as justice and fairness, which will be hard to make sense of in terms of forming 
mental images.10 
Although, we can distinguish between these two diﬀerent kinds of imaginings, one 
might wonder if both stem from a common faculty. For example, McGinn suggests there 
is a common faculty that produces propositional imaginings and mental images. He begins 
by considering why we use imagination to refer to what look like two diﬀerent kinds of 
mental activity: 
Once this distinction is appreciated, it becomes a question why we use the word 
“imagination” in such an inclusive way: Is it ambiguous between sensory and [propo-
sitional] imagination? Does it just lump together unrelated mental operations? This 
is a reasonable question, but I think it has an answer—namely, the two types of 
imagination employ diﬀerent elements but involve the same faculty. Sensory imagi-
nation employs sensory elements, much as perception does—though, as we have ex-
tensively seen, these elements must not be conflated. [Propositional] imagination em-
ploys conceptual elements, much as thinking does: these elements are not intrinsically 
modality-specific, and combine to form propositional contents. What is in common is 
the general faculty that works on these elements—the imagination. It is essentially a 
creative combinatorial faculty that diﬀers from perception and from belief (as we shall 
see more fully in a moment). My point is just that the same faculty may operate on 
distinct types of elements; the identity consists in the same type of operation being 
performed by a structurally uniform faculty. (McGinn 2005, pp. 129-130)  
I will not take a stand on this faculty claim in this thesis. That being said, it strikes me 
that it is unclear exactly what is being claimed when we say these diﬀerent kinds of 
imagination are produced by a single faculty. For example, what does it mean for the 
same faculty to employ ‘diﬀerent elements’? There may be a compelling way of clarifying 
this faculty approach, but whether or not there is a faculty of imagination will not have 
any direct implications for my arguments in this thesis.11 
                                               
10 Indeed, some call objectual imaginings ‘imagistic’ imaginings, a locution I’ve avoided to 
allow for this possibility. Kind (2016, footnote 7) independently makes a similar point about 
the diﬀerence between ‘objectual’ and ‘imagistic’.  
11 The idea that there is a faculty of imagination occasionally receives implicit support in 
recent discussions. For example, Nichols (2004, p. 129) opens a discussion of how 
imagination relates to belief by saying ‘The imagination has always been one of the darker 
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A second important category of non-propositional imaginings is called ‘active’ 
imaginings (Gendler 2011). The motivation for introducing this class of imaginings is 
summed up by Walton (1997/2015, p. 274) when he notes that in addition to the sorts 
of imaginings we have talked about so far, we can also imagine ‘[d]oing things, 
experiencing things, feeling in certain ways’ (emphasis in original). This also relates to 
the idea of sympathetic imagination introduced by Nagel (1974), which he uses to refer 
to our ability to imagine experiences.12 On the basis of the arguments that will follow in 
this thesis, we will not rule out there being an important role to play for both objectual 
and active/sympathetic imaginings in our engagement with fiction, and perhaps also in 
pretence. 
Having made these initial remarks about the imagination and having attempted to 
mark out what philosophers have in mind when they refer to propositional imaginings, 
we should now turn to consider the notion of an imaginative counterpart in more detail. 
In recent years, a consensus view has emerged that holds propositional imaginings are 
best thought of as counterparts to belief. We can call these sorts of imaginings belief-like 
imaginings. Before we assess the arguments for this view, we should first formulate some 
general principles for when we should introduce imaginative counterparts and we should 
try to get clearer on exactly what imaginative counterparts are supposed to be. 
                                               
faculties of the human mind’ (emphasis mine). Weinberg and Meskin (2006b, p. 176) note 
‘The imagination, after all, is a faculty that creatures like us contingently possess and 
deploy in distinctive ways.’ (emphasis mine) 
12 This raises a question about whether this form of imagination can subsume propositional 
and objectual imaginings. We could argue that all mental imagery formation is a case of 
imagining seeing and that the same should be said for imagining smelling, or imagining 
hearing, and that as such objectual imaginings reduce to imagining various diﬀerent kinds 
of experiences. Likewise, we could argue that propositional imaginings reduce to imagining 
believing.  
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1.2 Voluntary Counterparts & Simulation Theory 
The first notion of a counterpart we can find in philosophical discussions amounts to 
something like the following: 
VC: A mental state that is under the control of the will and resembles another 
mental state in introspective, functional and neurological ways. 
Perhaps the most detailed accounts of how these sorts of counterparts behave and how 
we can defend their introduction can be found in the writings of simulation theorists. It 
will thus be helpful to begin our discussion of voluntary counterparts by reflecting on 
what simulation theory tells us about the nature of voluntary counterparts.  
Simulation theory is a theory that seeks to explain how we understand other minds13, 
and was first developed by Gordon (1986), Heal (1987) and Goldman (1989). The 
capacities that allow us to understand other minds are typically called our mindreading 
capacities. This refers to a wide range of human capacities. Ravenscroft (2017) suggests 
that the relevant capacities include: 
1. Our capacity to predict people’s future behaviour,  
2. Our capacity to ascribe mental states to other people and to ourselves,  
3. Our capacity to use these ascriptions to explain people’s past behaviour.14  
                                               
13 It can also be argued that mindreading is the process we use to read our own minds 
(Carruthers 2009a, 2009b). 
14 Barlassina and Gordon (2017), in a recent review article of simulation theory, summarise 
our mindreading abilities in a similar way, though allowing for some further capacities, 
suggesting that ‘The capacity for “mindreading” is … the capacity to represent, reason 
about, and respond to others’ mental states.’ Ravenscroft (2017) is also aware that a theory 
of mindreading may well need to explain things like our ability to ‘reason about, and 
respond to others’ mental states’, noting: ‘In addition to attributing mental states and 
predicting and explaining behavior, there is a wide range of closely related activities. … we 
not only seek to predict and explain people’s behavior, we also seek to predict and explain 
their mental states. … we speculate about, discuss, recall and evaluate both people’s mental 
states and their behavior. We also speculate about, discuss, recall and evaluate people’s 
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There have been various theories advanced to explain how we are able to ascribe mental 
states to others and predict and explain behaviour using these ascriptions. The two most 
prominent ways of explaining these abilities are the theory-theory and the aforementioned 
simulation theory.15  
Theory-theorists argue that we can ascribe mental states to others, as well as predict 
and explain their behaviour, because we possess a theory of mind, which contains infor-
mation about how desires and beliefs (and perhaps other mental states) interact to mo-
tivate behaviour. This theory of mind is usually said to be tacit, which means it is not 
immediately clear what sorts of propositions are supposed to make up the theory. Sug-
gested candidates are often elaborations of truisms, such as ‘people will perform actions 
to get what they want, ceteris paribus’, or ‘people believe what they see ceteris paribus’ 
(Botterill and Carruthers 1999, p. 77-78).16  
                                               
dispositions to behave in certain ways and to have certain mental states; that is, we 
consider their character traits.’ Ravenscroft goes on to point out these activities may be 
explained in terms of our mindreading abilities. However, he also notes that this is not 
guaranteed. For this reason, we will stick with the restrictive sense of mindreading here to 
avoid introducing unnecessary controversies about the scope of our mindreading abilities. 
15 Other approaches include the ‘intentional’ approach of Dennett (1987) and the 
‘interpretation’ approach of Davidson (1984). A good, albeit opinionated, summary of these 
views, along with their attendant diﬃculties, can be found in Goldman (2006a, Ch. 2-5). 
16 It is widely agreed that the relevant theory of mind must be tacit rather than explicit, but 
there is an important dispute about whether this theory of mind is learned or innate. 
According to one view, the so called 'Child Scientist' view, children are like little scientists, 
running around testing hypotheses about how other people behave. Eventually, this 
engagement with the world allows them to form a theory about how other minds work. 
This view is defended by Gopnik and various collaborators, e.g. Gopnik and Wellman 
(1994), Gopnik and Meltzoﬀ (1997). The innate view maintains that our theory of mind is 
innate, perhaps in a similar way to the way in which Chomsky (1965) takes our theory of 
grammar to be innate, or perhaps because we have an innate domain specific mindreading 
module. This view is defended by philosophers like Carruthers (1996) and psychologists 
like Leslie along with various collaborators (e.g. Leslie 1994, Leslie and Scholl 1999). The 
main point in favour of the innate view is that children develop their mindreading abilities 
along a set development timeline. It is often pointed out that one would expect 
discrepancies based on intelligence and other factors if children independently figure out 
how minds work. Against the innate view, usually there is a worry about the nature of 
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Simulation theorists argue that the theory-theory approach is wrongheaded and that 
mindreading is process-driven rather than theory-driven (Goldman 1989, p. 173). Defend-
ers of simulation theory argue that when we reason about how others will behave, or 
ascribe mental states to them, we simulate their decision-making processes, which is ac-
complished at least in part by simulating their mental states. If this is right, then being 
able to mindread means being able to engage in this sort of simulation process, and does 
not depend on possessing any sort of tacit theory of mind.  
To see why we can associate simulation theory with the idea of voluntary imaginative 
counterparts, it will be helpful to set out roughly how a simulation theorist will explain 
how I predict which sandwich a friend (we can call him Laurie) will buy when he goes 
into Pret a Manger. According to simulation theory to predict what sandwich Laurie will 
buy, I will make use of my own decision-making system, but will take this system oﬄine. 
This will mean that I input ‘oﬄine’ beliefs and desires into my decision-making system 
(often referred to as ‘simulated’ or ‘pretend’ beliefs and desires) that share the same 
content as Laurie’s beliefs and desires: for example, he might have a desire for a tuna 
sandwich and a belief he can get one at Pret. 
This means that instead of performing a series of actions, such as going to buy a 
tuna sandwich, you merely predict the action Laurie will perform: you output something 
like a simulated decision to buy a tuna sandwich. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, pp. 11-
23) refer to these oﬄine beliefs and desires as ‘belief-like’ and ‘desire-like’ imaginings and 
they are both supposed to be examples of voluntary counterparts. They are states that 
bear some relation to genuine beliefs and genuine desires, but nonetheless are not genuine 
beliefs and desires, and since we are able to engage our mindreading capacities at will, 
                                               
innate modules or the very possibility of innate capacities. Chiefly then, this debate turns 
on whether one finds it more implausible that we possess an innate theory of mind or that, 
in spite of developing their theory of mind independently, children still end up developing 
their mindreading capacities on a consistent developmental timeline. 
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we can also entertain belief-like and desire-like imaginings at will according to simulation 
theorists.17 
Since I will not be oﬀering a theory of mindreading in this thesis, we do not need to 
assess whether this oﬀers a plausible account of our mindreading capacities.18 Instead, we 
should look at how simulation theorists set out the nature of imaginative counterparts, 
since one can reject the tenets of simulation theory, whilst agreeing that we should in-
troduce a notion of voluntary imaginative counterparts. 
To explain our ability to generate these sorts of counterparts, Currie and Ravenscroft 
(2002, p. 9) introduce a capacity they call the ‘recreative’ imagination, a sort of imagi-
nation that allows us to ‘recreate’ ordinary mental states. This gives the question of what 
                                               
17 There is another sort of simulated state that some simulation theorists have drawn our 
attention to. Simulated beliefs and desires are examples of what we can call high-level 
simulated states. These are simulated states that are typically under control of the will, 
with us being consciously aware of them. Goldman (2006a, Ch. 6) argues there can also be 
low-level simulated states that are not supposed to be subject to the will and which we 
may not be consciously aware of. Goldman argues these low-level states are involved in 
motor simulation and emotion simulation. Goldman’s argument for introducing the idea of 
low level simulation trades on the importance of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons are 
neurons that have been found to fire both when performing a certain action and also when 
watching someone else perform a certain action. In the emotion case, there is evidence 
similar mirroring occurs (a helpful summary of this sort of research can be found in 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008). Whether the sorts of unconscious processes signified by 
these mirror neurons should be called simulation processes, and whether their products 
should be classified as imaginative counterparts is unclear. Spaulding (2012), for example, 
is sceptical that mirror neuron processes should be thought of as simulation. The distinction 
here isn't one we need to worry about since so far as I am aware no one has proposed 
putting belief-like imaginings into the low-level category. 
18 For example, there is a worry about how we decide which pretend beliefs and desires to 
input into our decision-making system (Goldie 2003, pp. 334-335). There are also worries 
about the so-called ‘threat of collapse’, the worry that simulation theory collapses into 
theory-theory, since we need to theorise that other people are relevantly similar to us 
(Jackson 1999). Bearing in mind these sorts of issues, many simulation theorists now 
embrace hybrid theories which allow for some role for simulation and some role for theory 
(such as Heal 2003 and Goldman 2006a). 
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makes one sort of state a voluntary counterpart to another, or to phrase this in Currie 
and Ravenscroft’s terminology, what makes one state a ‘recreation’ of another? 
We can begin by looking at what they tell us about how to answer this question: 
Imaginative projection involves the capacity to have, and in good measure to control 
the having of, states that are not perceptions or beliefs or decisions or experiences of 
movements of one's body, but which are in various ways like those states—like them 
in ways that enable the states possessed through imagination to mimic and, relative 
to certain purposes, to substitute for perceptions, beliefs, decisions, and experiences of 
movements. These are what we are calling states of recreative imagination. (emphasis 
mine) (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, p. 11) 
This brings out first of all the importance of the will when thinking about voluntary 
counterparts. As they put the point, it is important that we are able to ‘control’ our 
having of these counterparts. In light of this, they do not commit to every mental state 
having a counterpart. For example, they argue that the emotions do not have counter-
parts. I will say more about this issue in section 1.6 after we’ve introduced the notion of 
involuntary counterparts.  
Secondly, it is notable that they place emphasis of the notions of mimicry and 
substitution. What exactly does it mean for one state to mimic another and thus serve 
as a substitute? There are two sorts of answer we can give to this question. We can focus 
on the features of the supposed counterpart state in question and whether it resembles 
another mental state; or we can focus on the mechanisms involved in producing the 
supposed counterpart state to see whether they are the same as those involved in 
producing a genuine instance of that mental state. This approach amounts to interpreting 
mimicry as entailing the re-use of certain cognitive mechanisms (Hurley 2005 is the most 
prominent defender of this sort of approach). 
If we adopt the re-use approach, we will end up committed to connecting the notion 
of a voluntary counterpart to the specific claims of simulation theory, since we will asso-
ciate the notion of a voluntary counterpart with a general method or mechanism for 
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generating imaginative counterparts.19 This is because endorsing a re-use based account 
of counterparts will presumably involve us accepting that we have a general ability to 
take our ordinary cognitive mechanisms ‘oﬄine’. On the other hand, if we focus on re-
semblance, this provides us with a sketch of voluntary counterparts that we can make 
use of even if we reject the tenets of simulation theory. Indeed, the idea of a mental state 
that resembles another but is a counterpart which is under the control of the will is 
intuitive and we can accept that this sort of counterpart exists without committing our-
selves to introducing any specific mechanism or method by which these counterparts are 
generated.20  
That said, we need to be a bit more precise about what ‘resemblance’ means here, 
since everything resembles everything else in some trivial respects. To make this claim 
more specific, we can argue that to establish that one state is a counterpart to another 
in the voluntary sense, we need to consider whether the state in question is under the 
control of the will and also whether it shares with the target state: 
 
                                               
19 It’s worth noting that Goldman (2008) is sceptical of any approach that sets aside 
resemblance. For example, if I am looking at a coat hanger and at the same time my 
girlfriend is visualising a tree this would suggest her mental state is a simulation of mine, 
since it involves the re-use of her visual mechanism. This cannot be the right way of 
understanding what it would be for a state to be a counterpart to my seeing a coat hanger. 
Primarily, as Goldman would emphasise, this is because my girlfriend’s visualisation of a 
tree doesn't resemble the coat hanger in front of me in any meaningful sense. I’m not 
entirely convinced by this objection, since we can tighten up the notion of re-use so that it 
must be symmetrical rather than simply synchronous. That being said, I expect Goldman 
would object that this is just to smuggle in a reference to resemblance by introducing the 
idea of a ‘symmetrical’ process. 
20 To give some examples of philosophers who appear to endorse voluntary counterparts 
without necessarily committing to simulation theory, Budd (1989, Ch. 5) discusses 
something like the idea of voluntary imaginative counterparts in his discussion of mental 
imagery, calculation in the head, and inner speech, and Wollheim (1973) discusses 
something like the notion of voluntary counterparts when considering imaginative 
identification. 
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1. Introspective Features (e.g. phenomenology and how we self-identify the state in 
question: does it seem similar yet distinct from a genuine state) 
2. Functional Features (e.g. does the counterpart share some functional similarities 
with the target state?) 
3. Neurological Features (e.g. are similar brain areas involved in the imaginative 
activity in question as well as the genuine mental state?) 
 
To see how reflection on these features can justify the introduction of some voluntary 
counterparts, we will consider whether forming mental images can be thought of as a 
voluntary counterpart to seeing.  
 
1.3 Voluntary Imagining Seeing 
 
The suggestion that forming mental images – which we can call visualising – is some sort 
of counterpart to seeing is a fairly common one to find in philosophical discussions. For 
example, the relation between the two has been frequently remarked upon by philoso-
phers such as McGinn (2005, p. 7) and Martin (2002, p. 403). If visualising is a counter-
part to seeing, it will be a voluntary counterpart since our ability to form mental images 
is under the control of the will. While writing this sentence, I can choose to form a mental 
image of a dog, or a cat, or anything else I am able to represent imagistically, no matter 
how bizarre. However, the fact that this is a voluntary counterpart is not meant to 
suggest we freely choose to form every mental image we visualise. Sometimes we can 
form a mental image of something without having consciously decided to, and indeed 
even if we actively don’t want to. For example, a person who is feeling insecure about 
their romantic relationship with their partner might find themselves picturing them with 
another lover, even if they don’t want to form these images. The importance of the will 
here is that mental images are at least in principle under the control of the will. 
If the way I suggested we should characterise voluntary counterparts is correct, we 
should be able to justify maintaining that visualising is a voluntary counterpart to seeing 
by considering introspective, functional and neurological similarities between the two. 
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We noted above that it is a commonplace to accept that when someone forms a mental 
image of something this seems to have something in common with really seeing that 
something, and it is not implausible to suggest introspection reveals this similarity be-
tween seeing and visualising. That being said, seeing and visualising can also be intro-
spectively recognised as distinct. If we were generally unable to make the distinction 
between our mental images and genuine perceptions of the world, this could lead us to 
perform various inappropriate actions. If merely forming a mental image of a tiger looking 
hungrily in our direction was often mistaken for seeing an actual tiger this would lead to 
odd behaviours, such as trying to run away from a tiger when previously you were happily 
sitting on a train heading towards London.21  
To find some potential functional similarities between these two states, we can rely 
on armchair reflection and note that mental images can be helpful for guiding our behav-
iour in a similar way to actual seeing. If I am unsure whether to buy a new sofa for my 
living room, I can visualise placing the sofa in my room to see whether it will clash with 
the existing décor. I could also do this by actual placing the sofa in my room and looking 
at it. From a somewhat more scientific perspective, Goldman (2006a, p. 157) points out 
that a stock question in research on visualising is to ask people to count how many 
windows are in their living room by visualising their living room. This sort of task is 
performed just as well when we visualise our living room as compared to when we can 
actually see our living room, again implying a functional similarity between seeing and 
visualising. 
As for, neurological similarities, Goldman (2006a, pp. 151-157) helpfully summarises 
studies which show various areas of the brain are involved in both visual perception and 
the formation of mental images. To give one of his examples, he notes studies from 
Kanwisher et al. (1997) and O'Craven and Kanwisher (2000) that show the fusiform 
gyrus is activated when we see faces and when we visualise them. He also notes a study 
                                               
21 As with my point about the will, this is not to say we never make these sorts of mistakes. 
We might think this occurs in some forms of hallucination or delusion. 
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from Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1990) which shows that damage to lesions associ-
ated with the fusiform gyrus impairs both our ability to recognise faces and our ability 
to visualise faces. This suggests that there are important neurological similarities between 
at the very least seeing faces and visualising faces. 
This sort of ‘imagining seeing’ is thus a relatively uncontroversial example of a vol-
untary imaginative counterpart. This sort of imagining seeing is under the control of the 
will; we have introspective evidence that there are similarities but also diﬀerences be-
tween mental images and actual perception; there is evidence of some functional similar-
ities; and we have neurological evidence of some similarities.  
We will shortly consider whether belief has this sort of counterpart in chapter 2. 
Before we do this, however, we should turn to introduce my second notion of a counter-
part – involuntary counterparts. 
1.4 Involuntary Counterparts & Fictional Truth 
An involuntary counterpart can be characterised roughly along the following lines: 
IVC: A mental state that resembles another mental state, which we automatically 
enter into when we engage with something we recognise as being fictional or imagi-
nary, and has fictional content 
A first question to address is why we might want to separate out this sort of notion of a 
counterpart. As I noted in the introduction, one reason is that this notion seems to arise 
from Walton’s (1973, 1990) theory of fictional truth – which we will discuss shortly – but 
it has not been frequently remarked that this means that what Walton has in mind when 
he appears to introduce imaginative counterparts is somewhat diﬀerent to what simula-
tion theorists have in mind. A second way to bring out the motivation for introducing 
this notion of a counterpart is to note three claims about imaginative counterparts and 
engaging with fiction that we might take to be true, but which seem to be somewhat in 
tension with one another: 
 
1. Imaginative counterparts can in principle be wilfully entered into. 
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2. Engaging with fiction involves some imaginative counterpart states 
3. Our responses to fiction are somewhat involuntary.  
 
Some take this to suggest that in fact (2) is false, and that there are no imaginative 
counterparts involved in our engagement with fiction (Tullmann 2016, pp. 787-788). Oth-
ers argue that this entails that some voluntary counterparts are involved in our engage-
ment with fiction, but that these counterparts behave in an automatic way in this context 
(e.g. simulation theorists such as Currie and Ravenscroft 2002 and Goldman 2006b). I 
don’t think either of these responses to noting the automatic nature of some our responses 
to fiction is correct. Though I am sympathetic with Tullmann’s view, at least when it 
comes to the question of whether a counterpart to belief is involved in our engagement 
with fiction, I think we can at least in principle separate out voluntarily generated imag-
inative counterparts, such as those that might be involved in mindreading, from invol-
untary counterparts that we enter into automatically when we engage with something 
fictional. In other words, I don’t think we should simply accept (1) as true: there might 
be some imaginative counterparts that are not even in principle under the control of the 
will.22 
As with voluntary counterparts, an involuntary counterpart resembles another 
mental state in some respects, but unlike with voluntary counterparts, we cannot rely on 
mere introspection when it comes to establishing whether a state has this sort of 
counterpart. This is because these sorts of counterparts can sometimes be 
phenomenologically identical to the state they are supposed to be a counterpart to. 
                                               
22 Of course, we often voluntarily decide to engage with fictional or imaginary content. The 
point here is that some of our responses that follow this decision will not be voluntary: 
having decided to watch Amour I do not voluntarily start to cry or feel sad. We’ll discuss 
this further in section 1.6 where we will discuss whether emotions have imaginative 
counterparts. 
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Furthermore, because they are not subject to the will, we have no obvious introspective 
features we can reflect on to tell them apart from the state they are a counterpart to.23 
Instead, the first step to establishing whether a state has an involuntary imaginative 
counterpart is to consider whether we sometimes appear to enter into the state in 
question automatically when engaging with something we recognise to be fictional or 
imaginary. Following Walton (1990, pp. 35-43), we can understand ‘fictional’ here in a 
broad sense as relating to what we call fiction in ordinary language, but also potentially 
some other forms of representational activity, such as pretence and representational art.  
When we engage with things that we recognise as fictional, our mental states will 
often have fictional content.24 Fictional content is the sort of content our mental attitudes 
– imaginative counterparts or otherwise – have when directed towards fictional 
characters, events, and so on, which more generally we can call fictional entities. As such, 
I am accepting that fictional entities can be the intentional object of at least some of our 
mental states (Crane 2013, Tullmann 2016).25 This notion of fictional content allows us 
to clarify that when considering whether to introduce an involuntary counterpart, we 
shouldn’t think that we have some reason to introduce one whenever we enter into a 
state as a result of engaging with something we recognise as being fictional or imaginary. 
                                               
23 For example, Scruton (1974, p. 94) notes the importance of subjection to the will for 
distinguishing counterparts from genuine mental states: ‘There is a feature of both imagery 
and imagining which serves to distinguish them from many mental states. This is the 
feature of subjection to the will.’ 
24 ‘Content’ can be understood here as relating to potential propositional contents of our 
mental states and attitudes, and also non-propositional contents if one thinks, for the 
example, that the contents of perception are non-propositional (for a good discussion of 
this issue see Crane 2009). 
25 A slight complication arises when the intentional object in question is a real individual or 
place, etc., but as described in fiction. In light of this possibility, we can suggest that a 
mental state has fictional content when either its intentional object is a fictional entity, or 
when its intentional object is a real entity, but where we are supposed to take that entity 
to have qualities only ascribed to it in fiction (e.g. when we are reading the Sherlock Holmes 
novels, the intentional object of some of our thoughts will be London, but these novels 
ascribe properties to London, such as that there is a 221B Baker Street, that it does not 
have in reality). 
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The state in question must also have fictional content. If we didn’t make this addendum, 
then coming to believe that ‘Harry Potter is a novel’ upon reading the Harry Potter 
novels could be taken to imply that we might need to say this belief is in fact an 
involuntary counterpart to belief. 
One might also wonder why I added the requirement that the content in question 
has to be known to be fictional by the agent. This is to avoid reaching counter-intuitive 
conclusions in cases where, for example, one mistakenly regards the Harry Potter novels 
as non-fiction, and comes to form beliefs about wizards based on reading them. There is 
a sense in which we might want to say that at least some of these beliefs will have 
fictional content, if one allows that we can have beliefs or other attitudes with fictional 
content even if we don’t recognise it as being fictional content. The knowledge condition 
in this sketch of an involuntary counterpart helps to bring out that in this sort of case, 
you will take genuine attitudes towards this content. If you mistake Harry Potter for 
non-fiction, you will not form belief-like imaginings about wizards, you will just form 
mistaken or false beliefs about them. 
This leaves the question of how we can justify the introduction of this sort of coun-
terpart. As noted in the introduction, I take it that merely noting that a mental state is 
entered into as a result of engaging with something fictional or imaginary – and has 
fictional content – is insuﬃcient for justifying the introduction of this sort of counterpart. 
This is because it looks like some of our ordinary states can be entered into when we 
engage with something we recognise as being fictional and can have fictional intentional 
content (e.g. I can come to believe that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective [in the fiction]’ 
when I engage with the Sherlock Holmes novels). This is the second claim about imagi-
native counterparts that I will defend in this chapter 
Instead, in order to justify the introduction of an involuntary counterpart, we need 
to consider whether a) constraints on the mental state in question necessitate the intro-
duction of this sort of counterpart, or b) whether puzzles related to a particular human 
activity are best solved by introducing this sort of counterpart. This is my third claim 
about imaginative counterparts, and we will elaborate on this principle in sections 1.5 
and 1.6. 
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To try to find some examples of this sort of counterpart and to justify these two 
principles, it will be helpful to introduce Walton’s theory of fictional truth. His approach 
to understanding fictional truth leads to him introducing some imaginative counterparts 
that are involved when real world attitudes, feelings, and actions constitute fictional 
attitudes, feelings, and actions. This sort of idea captures part of my intuition behind the 
introduction of a class of involuntary counterparts, since this sort of transformation from 
the real to the fictional is often supposed to be automatic when we consume a work of 
fiction, but also doesn’t always entail the introduction of an imaginative counterpart. His 
theory also allows us to draw some initial parallels between fiction and pretence.  
We can introduce the idea of fictional truth by noting that we often make seemingly 
odd statements about fictional characters and other fictional entities that do not appear 
to be literally true, such as ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’. The diﬃculty here is that 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ looks to be an empty name: Sherlock Holmes does not exist, so there’s 
no object this sentence can refer to. Since this sentence appears to fail to refer, it looks 
like ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ is at best neither true nor false, and possibly just 
false (Friend 2007, p. 143).26 We could reply here that Sherlock Holmes is, in fact, an 
abstract object of some sort, but this will not immediately solve our mysteries here since 
it’s not clear how an abstract object can be a wizard. We will say a bit more about these 
issues related to referring to fictional characters and entities in chapter 5, since it can be 
argued that issues related to reference to the non-existent suggest we need to introduce 
belief-like imaginings into an account of how we engage with fiction. 
                                               
26 Which way we go here in part depends on one’s theory of reference when it comes to the 
nature of empty names (this grouping includes fictional characters, but also failed scientific 
posits such as Vulcan and other things we apparently refer to that don’t exist). On one 
view, if the name ‘Harry Potter’ fails to refer, then sentences using the name will simply 
lack truth value and so cannot be evaluated as true or false. This is, of course, a view 
associated with Russell (1905a, 1905b). It stands in contrast to another view that holds 
that, since the name fails to refer, sentences using it are straightforwardly false. This is 
associated with Frege’s (1948) view that fictional names lack reference but possess sense. 
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However, although we might be happy to accept that a sentence like ‘Sherlock 
Holmes is a wizard’ is false (or perhaps simply lacks a truth value), there is something 
intuitively right about the claim that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. If I found myself in 
a debate with a friend over whether Holmes was a detective or a wizard, I would insist 
that he is most assuredly a detective and I would be puzzled over why my friend has 
ended up thinking he is a wizard.  
Walton makes sense of this sort of issue by suggesting that statements like ‘Sherlock 
Holmes is a detective’ make claims about what is fictionally true (or fictional for short), 
rather than about what is literally true. To express the claim that a sentence is fictional 
he uses the notation *p* (Walton 1973), which amounts to something like ‘it is fictional 
that p’, ‘it is true in fiction that p’, ‘it is fictionally true that p’ and so on. That being 
said, this does not mean that Walton thinks we need to introduce a new ‘species’ of 
truth. Instead, Walton is arguing that when we make these sorts of claims, we are en-
gaging in a game of make-believe, where we pretend various things are true.  
If we embrace this make-believe view, then when we say that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective’ what we are actually saying is that it is fictional that Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective (*Sherlock Holmes is a detective*). This involves ‘pretending’ that the empty 
name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ has a referent and that sentences containing the name can be 
‘true’. As such, for Walton, strictly speaking these sorts of utterances are only meaningful 
within the scope of a game of make-believe.  
This introduces the question of what makes something fictionally true. Walton sug-
gests that what is fictionally true is determined by what we are prescribed to imagine by 
a given fiction (Walton 1990, p. 39).27 The Sherlock Holmes novels prescribe imagining 
that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, and so it is fictionally true that Sherlock Holmes is 
a detective in the fictional world of these novels. This thus helps to explain why we have 
                                               
27 Walton (1990, p. 21) is using ‘imagine’ as a placeholder here. As such, he should not be 
read as saying simply that what is fictionally true is what we are prescribed to imagine in 
a belief-like way: he has a richer notion of imagining in mind, which means we could also 
be prescribed to imagine seeing or doing things. 
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diﬀerent intuitions about the truth of ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ as compared to 
‘Sherlock Holmes is a wizard’. The former is something we are prescribed to imagine and 
is thus fictionally true, whereas the latter we are not prescribed to imagine. It is not up 
to us as mere readers what is true in the world of Sherlock Holmes.28 
In light of this point, Walton holds that something can be made fictional in part by 
facts about the actual world and the rules of the game of make-believe we are playing. 
As such, merely imagining something to be the case is often insuﬃcient for making that 
something fictional (Walton 1990, pp. 37-38).29 To clarify why this is so, it will be helpful 
to consider how Walton applies his theory of fictional truth to childhood pretence. 
Let’s return to the child in the introduction to this thesis, who was pretending to 
have a tea party. She may well make various statements during this episode of pretence 
that cannot be understood as expressing what is literally true. She might say, for example, 
that ‘there is a cup of tea in front of me’ or that ‘teddy drank the last cup of tea’. Once 
again, these claims appear to be literally false since there was no tea at her pretend party. 
Walton argues that these statements also make claims about what is fictionally the case, 
where the relevant fiction is the pretence episode instigated by the young girl.30 
In an episode of pretence like this, sometimes fictional truths are determined by 
things that don’t depend on the actions and knowledge of the pretenders. Walton illus-
trates this with the example of a game where children pretend every tree stump nearby 
is a bear. If there is a stump nearby that the children haven’t noticed, then it remains 
true that *there is a bear nearby*, even though none of the game’s participants are aware 
                                               
28 One could argue that we can imagine that Sherlock Holmes is a wizard with this in eﬀect 
creating our own fictional world in which this is fictionally true. The point here is that this 
won’t aﬀect what is true in the world of the novels. 
29 Only ‘often’ because one might think that in cases like daydreaming, one’s imaginings make 
things fictionally true merely by being imagined. For example, if I start daydreaming about 
going to a picnic and imagine eating a ham sandwich, this looks like it will make it 
fictionally true that I am eating a ham sandwich.  
30 This means Walton has a highly permissive notion of fiction, which is roughly equivalent 
to our ordinary language notion of a ‘representation’. Friend (2008, p. 154) argues we 
should think of Walton as having defined a special category of ‘Walt-Fictions’. 
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of this fictional truth (Walton, 1990, p. 37). In this game, participants are prescribed to 
imagine a bear whenever they see a stump, and therefore a bear’s presence in the game 
depends not on whether the children playing the game imagine a bear is present, but 
merely on whether a stump is present. The children’s knowledge of how many stumps 
are in their vicinity does not impinge on fictional truths about the number of bears 
nearby.31 In Walton’s terminology, this is because these stumps are ‘props’ that prescribe 
imaginings. In a similar vein, he argues that novels, plays, etc., are also props that pre-
scribe imaginings and this is partly why it is not up to us what is fictional true in them, 
since we do not determine what these props prescribe imagining.32 
This helps to reveal that the notion of ‘pretend’ in Walton’s theory is something of 
a term of art. Walton is not proposing that we consciously make a decision to pretend 
that sentences like ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ are true. The sort of game we engage 
in when we read the Sherlock Holmes novels is supposed to be an automatic response to 
reading them. One doesn’t have to make an active decision to engage in a game of make-
believe while reading a work of fiction, even if one may well voluntarily decide to engage 
with the fiction in question. To flag up this point, he marks a distinction between delib-
erate and spontaneous imaginings (Walton 1990, pp. 13-16), which captures part of what 
I have in mind when I refer to voluntary and involuntary counterparts. 
We can further associate involuntary counterparts with some of Walton’s ideas here 
by noting that in addition to statements of ‘fact’ about fictions, we can also make state-
ments involving propositional attitudes when we talk about our engagement with fiction. 
                                               
31 Though their awareness, or lack thereof, of nearby stumps will generate truths related to 
what it is fictional that they are aware of. 
32 Whilst what one is prescribed to imagine in games of pretence such as this bear game is 
usually fairly clear, it is not always so obvious how to set out what works of fiction prescribe 
imagining. Indeed, some fictions purposefully choose to be ambiguous, or contain partially 
unexplained plot points. An interesting recent example of this would be the third season 
of Mark Frost and David Lynch’s Twin Peaks where the show was ambiguous throughout 
as to what was happening and why. We can note in response that fictions allow for 
indeterminacy. An interesting discussion of this issue can be found in Woodward (2012). 
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For example, we could report our ‘beliefs’ and say something like ‘I believe Sherlock 
Holmes is a detective’, or we can report on our ‘emotions’, making claims like ‘I was 
scared when the alien (from Alien) came down from the vents’. 
Walton argues that these utterances also express what is fictional, rather than what 
is true. To make sense of how this could be so, Walton (1990, pp. 58-61) proposes that 
when we engage with fictions we create a ‘game world’, which consists of the work world 
of the fiction that we are engaging with and our own responses to the fiction (which are 
thus only fictional in the context of our specific game of make-believe). The work world 
can be thought of as ‘composed of those fictional truths that are fictional in all authorised 
game worlds’ (Meskin and Robson 2012, p. 209). The notion of ‘authorised’ here serves 
to rule out saying, for example, that if I engage with the Sherlock Holmes novels and 
decide to take it that Holmes is not a detective, this means ‘Holmes is a detective’ is not 
fictionally true in the work world. In taking it to be fictionally true that Holmes is not a 
detective, I create an unauthorised game world (Walton 1990, p. 60). 
To see how this works in practice, consider the movie Alien. Everyone who engages 
with this work is prescribed to imagine that the alien kills Parker and Lambert, so this 
is fictionally true in the work world of Alien. However, it is only in my specific engage-
ment with Alien that I am prescribed to imagine that I believe that the Alien killed 
Lambert and Parker, since ‘I’ do not feature in anyone else’s fictional engagement with 
the movie. This claim is thus only fictionally true in the game world I create when I 
engage with Alien.  
This introduces the question of what makes these sorts of attitude reports fictionally 
true. In these sorts of cases, Walton argues that our real-world attitudes, feelings, and 
actions constitute fictional attitudes, feelings, and actions (e.g., Walton 1990, 246-247). 
However, in some cases these real-world attitudes etc. will be genuine mental states, and 
in others, they will be mere counterparts. For example, if it is true that *I believe Sherlock 
Holmes is a detective* in the context of my engagement with the Sherlock Holmes novels, 
this could entail that this is made fictional because I genuinely believe *Sherlock Holmes 
is a detective* (I believe it is fictional that Sherlock Holmes is a detective) or it could 
mean that this is made fictional because in reality I have entered into some sort of 
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counterpart state to believing (I imagine in a belief-like way that Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective).33 
If step outside Walton’s framework, this helps to reveal that sometimes our ordinary 
attitudes appear to have fictional intentional content, and in some of these cases we will 
want to say this is because we have in fact entered into an imaginative counterpart state. 
As such, we need a way of figuring out when it will be fruitful to suppose an involuntary 
counterpart is involved in our engagement with the fictional or imaginary. I maintain 
that to justify the introduction of an involuntary counterpart, we need to note constraints 
on the genuine state in question or that puzzles arise if we don’t introduce an involuntary 
counterpart. To see how we might establish whether either of these conditions is in place, 
it will be helpful to discuss whether seeing has an involuntary counterpart. 
 
1.5 Involuntary Imagining Seeing 
 
Consider someone wandering around The Courtauld Gallery with a friend. They come 
across Manet’s wonderful A Bar at the Folies-Bergère and their friend asks what they 
see. They reply, ‘I can see various things: bottles of wine, a woman looking somewhat 
pensively away from my gaze and a trapeze artist’ (among other things, of course, bearing 
in mind the richness of this painting). Walton (1973, p. 284) points out that these claims 
about what the gallery goer can ‘see’ do not appear to be literally true, in much the same 
way statements we make about fiction or pretence don’t appear to be literally true. Our 
gallery goer is just looking at paint marks on a canvas, not wine bottles, a woman and a 
trapeze artist. 
The obvious point to make here is that they do not literally see these things, they 
merely see a representation of them. This raises the question of what it means for a 
                                               
33 By *I believe Sherlock Holmes is a detective*, I intend only to refer to cases where I am 
engaging with the Sherlock Holmes fictions and where for Walton this would be an accurate 
report of what is fictionally true of my engagement. If a fiction just happens to declare 
‘Jack Davis believes that Sherlock Holmes is a detective’, this, of course, does not entail 
that I am in a counterpart state to belief, nor that I have beliefs about Sherlock Holmes.  
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painting to represent or depict something. One suggestion might be that paintings 
resemble what they represent, but the notion of resemblance we would need to introduce 
here is hard to specify. For example, a two-dimensional configuration of paint on a canvas 
seems to bear little resemblance to a physical, three-dimensional woman standing at a 
three-dimensional bar.34 
Walton argues that when looking at paintings, we imagine seeing what they depict 
(1973, 2008). Our gallery goer is imagining seeing a woman standing at a bar when they 
look at A Bar at the Folies-Bergère. Walton makes the case for this by arguing that 
looking at paintings is another instance of a game of make-believe and so for him, paint-
ings are classified as fictions.  
He suggests that paintings prescribe us to imagine various things, and so when look-
ing at a painting it can be true that *I see a woman standing at a bar* if this is what we 
are prescribed to imagine by the painting (Walton 1973, p. 300). This introduces a further 
sense in which seeing can have an imaginative counterpart. If this is right, we can argue 
that there is an involuntary counterpart to seeing involved in our looking at paintings.  
If we put the idea here in Waltonian terms, this sort of imagining seeing somehow 
involves a real-world action (looking at a canvas) constituting a fictional action (seeing 
whatever is represented by the painting). Walton is proposing that it is made the case 
that our gallery goer *sees a woman standing at a bar* because seeing the canvas in 
question doubles in some sense as *seeing a woman standing at a bar* (Walton 1973, p. 
304). In more neutral terms, we could argue that the content of our ‘seeing’ is fictional 
content, since we recognise we do not literally see what the painting depicts and paintings 
can depict people and things that do not exist and which we know to not exist.35 Our 
                                               
34 Two more sophisticated attempts to develop a resemblance theory are oﬀered by Peacocke 
(1987) and Budd (1993), which are in turn criticised by Wollheim (1998).  
35 There is an interesting question here about whether there can be non-fictional painting. 
For example, is a portrait of a monarch a work of non-fiction? Even if this is so, this doesn’t 
pose a problem for Walton’s view since he can bring out that seeing a portrait of someone 
is not the same as literally seeing someone.  
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question then, is whether we are justified in introducing an involuntary counterpart to 
seeing to make sense of our experience of looking at paintings. 
We can note at the outset that Walton’s account of depiction is controversial, in 
part because theorists have been sceptical of the idea that our experience of paintings 
involves the imagination (e.g. Saville 1986, Wollheim 1991) As such, instead of introduc-
ing an imaginative counterpart here, we might think that a special sort of seeing is in-
volved when we look at paintings. Wollheim (1980, pp. 205-226) argues that we see things 
‘in’ paintings and introduces the notion of seeing-in, which is perhaps the most well-
known version of this sort of approach. This helps to bring out the importance of my 
second claim about imaginative counterparts: that merely noting that a mental state or 
attitude has been entered into as a result of engaging with something fictional or imagi-
nary and has fictional content does not per se justify introducing an involuntary coun-
terpart to that state. In the case of seeing, we can instead argue that we can in some 
sense have episodes of visual perception with fictional contents, albeit thanks to a special 
variety of seeing such as seeing-in. 
However, Walton can also be read as trying to introduce this counterpart with ref-
erence to the two ways I suggest in my third principle about counterparts: he notes 
constraints on seeing, and argues puzzles arise if we suppose genuine seeing is involved 
in our viewing of paintings. The constraint on genuine seeing seems to be that looking at 
a canvas which depicts a given scene is not an instance of literally seeing that scene. The 
puzzle is why we nonetheless describe ourselves as seeing things when we observe a paint-
ing. In response, we could attempt to solve this puzzle without introducing a counterpart 
to seeing, and we could argue that whilst there may be some sorts of constraints on 
ordinary seeing, these same constraints are not present when it comes to a special kind 
of seeing, such as seeing-in. 
For present purposes, we do not need to settle whether or not Walton is justified in 
introducing a notion of involuntary imagining seeing. This debate instead merely serves 
to clarify what considerations might be introduced when debating whether to introduce 
an involuntary counterpart. We can also make two broader points about imaginative 
counterparts in general based on this discussion. 
45 
Firstly, we can note some diﬀerences between Walton’s notion of imagining seeing 
and the one associated with visualising to bring out why I am separating out voluntary 
and involuntary counterparts. In section 1.3, I allowed for there being instances when 
voluntary counterparts sometimes behave automatically, such as if you form a mental 
image you don’t much want to form. The reason this doesn’t make involuntary counter-
parts reduce to voluntary counterparts is because involuntary counterparts are not even 
in principle subject to the will. In the case of imagining seeing in Walton’s sense, we 
cannot choose to imagine seeing something apart from what is depicted by the painting 
we are looking at. Furthermore, however we spell out the relevant sort of imagining 
seeing here, it cannot reduce to the formation of mental images since seeing what a 
painting depicts does not involve forming a mental image of its contents (Walton 1973, 
p. 286). 
Secondly, Walton’s account of imagining seeing demonstrates my fourth claim about 
counterparts, that accepting that a state has a voluntary counterpart does not mean we 
have to accept that the state also has an involuntary counterpart, and vice versa. For 
example, one could deny that forming mental images should be thought of as involving 
an imaginative counterpart, whilst accepting that one is involved in imagining seeing 
things in Walton’s sense. Indeed, many philosophers would likely accept the opposite of 
this, allowing that mental images are a counterpart to seeing, whilst denying that we 
need to introduce a counterpart to seeing in Walton’s sense. We can further justify and 
bring out the importance of this fourth claim by considering whether the emotions have 
imaginative counterparts.  
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1.6 Emotional Counterparts 
The emotions are intimately connected to the imagination. Harris (2000, p. 59) discusses 
the fact children appear to be scared of things they merely imagine, such as monsters.36 
Furthermore, entirely voluntary imaginings can lead to emotional responses. For exam-
ple, studies have suggested imagining things we have a phobia of can prompt fear re-
sponses (Lang et al. 1983) and if you imagine slowly drawing a knife across your hand 
this will likely result in a shudder of apprehension Murray (1995, p. 116). 
Carruthers, in a book review of Recreative Minds oﬀers a good summary of some of 
these connections: 
[i]magination can certainly evoke real emotions — imagined insults can make you 
angry; imagined danger can make you afraid; the death of a character in a novel or 
film can make you sad; and so forth. … imagined delicacies can make you hungry 
(wanting food), as imagined sex can make you sexy (wanting sexual relief). (Car-
ruthers 2003) 
In light of this connection between imagination and the emotions, many philosophers 
have been reluctant to introduce voluntary counterparts to the emotions. For example, 
as we noted previously, Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, Ch. 9) explicitly deny that we can 
‘recreate’ emotions. Part of the reason for this reluctance seems to be that imagining 
feeling sad, for example, will amount to your being really sad about what you imagine, 
rather than entering into a mere sadness-like state.37  
                                               
36 When these children are asked about the nature of these monsters, they reveal they 
understand the diﬀerence between real and imaginary monsters (Harris et al. 1991). 
Nonetheless, this doesn’t seem to make them any less scared. 
37 There are some exceptions to this position, for example Goldie (2005, p. 133) thinks that 
we need to introduce voluntary counterparts to the emotions along these lines to explain 
the idea of ‘imagining feeling’ suggesting: ‘[i]t seems possible for me, for example, to imagine 
something threatening, and to imagine feeling afraid of the threatening thing that I 
imagine, where the imagined fear is part of the content of what I imagine, and not a 
response to what I imagine.’  
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There is a more heated debate about whether at least some emotions might have 
involuntary counterparts. The quote from Carruthers illustrates that it is usually ac-
cepted that we can exhibit aﬀective responses to the events depicted in works of fiction. 
Radford (1975) argues that the fact we exhibit these sorts of emotional responses shows 
us to be irrational, since we ought not to exhibit aﬀective responses to merely fictional 
persons and events. We can call this the rationality worry. 
Radford’s initial paper has generated a great deal of discussion about a more general 
puzzle that is typically called the paradox of fiction, a puzzle that is supposed to arise 
because we accept something like the following three claims: 
1. We exhibit aﬀective responses to works of fiction. 
2. We do not believe that fictions depict real events and happenings. 
3. Our emotions are subject to a coordination condition (Gendler and Kovakovich 
2006, p. 241). In order to exhibit an aﬀective response towards something, we 
normally need to believe that the object of our response is real (e.g. it would be 
odd if I told my friend I’m upset because my older brother drank my last beer, 
when I don’t have an older brother and I’m aware of this fact). 
As such, this paradox introduces in addition to Radford’s rationality worry a causal 
worry about how emotional responses to works of fiction are generated, bearing in mind 
that we do not believe the events depicted or described in them to have actually hap-
pened. To illustrate this purported paradox, we can consider the opening montage of 
Pixar’s excellent Up. During this montage, we watch the development of the main char-
acter’s relationship with his eventual wife, followed by the hardships that beset their 
married life: their inability to have a child; their inability to travel; the way their savings 
also get eaten up by unexpected events. Near the end of the montage, we witness his 
wife’s untimely death just before they get to fulfil their life's dream to travel to South 
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America. At this point, whenever I watch the film I notice tears starting to form.38 A 
natural description would be that I’m feeling sad, and that I’m feeling sad because of the 
events depicted by the film. At the same time, I’m well aware that the events depicted 
aren’t real. I know this couple don’t exist and never have existed (and never will exist39). 
And yet, as if to fly in the face of the coordination condition, this knowledge does nothing 
to dry my tears nor does it serve to make me any less upset.40 
There have been too many responses to this paradox to try to discuss all of them. 
Solutions tend to either reject one (or more) of these three claims, or, in the case of 
Radford, to bite the bullet and argue that since all these claims are true, we are in fact 
behaving irrationally when we exhibit emotional responses towards fiction. For now, we 
need only consider how this paradox relates to the idea of involuntary counterparts, 
which can be seen by introducing Walton’s solution to this paradox.  
Walton (1978, 1990, pp. 195-204; 241-249) argues that we can make sense of the 
paradox of fiction by introducing the notion of quasi emotions, which are directed towards 
fictional characters and events. In so doing, Walton can be taken as oﬀering a clarification 
of claim (1), that we have emotional responses to fiction, and also as introducing a set of 
imaginative counterparts to the emotions.  
He motivates this proposal by introducing the example of a moviegoer named 
Charles, who is watching a horror film about a malevolent slime who is rampaging across 
                                               
38 A straw poll of some friends suggested this is not an uncommon response to this opening 
montage. Some mooted that this might be because it led to them reflecting on actual 
misfortunes and the vagaries of fate, but it looks like such further reflection isn’t necessary 
to feel an emotional response here. 
39 This claim is somewhat contentious depending on one’s understanding of possibility. An 
interesting discussion of this sort of issue arises in a debate between Kripke (1980, pp. 156-
158) and Dummett (1993) about whether unicorns might have existed in the actual world. 
For what's it's worth, I would side with Kripke that one cannot, on the grounds that there 
are no conditions a real-world animal could satisfy that would make it a unicorn. 
40 Harris (2000 p. 73) notes that sometimes noting something is merely fictional or imaginary 
can help on this score. We might try to alleviate our apparent fear of a horror movie 
monster by reminding ourselves we're only watching a movie and the monster cannot really 
threaten our safety. 
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the earth. Upon the climax of one of its rampages, the slime turns a single beady eye to 
the camera, as if to fix his glare directly on Charles, and then makes as if to head towards 
him. In response, Charles shrieks and clutches his seat tightly. After the film, Charles, 
self-reports that he was ‘terrified’ of the slime. Walton’s (1990, p. 196) starting question 
is whether we should take this claim at face value. 
We saw in our discussion of fictional truth that Walton maintains that many of our 
statements about fictions should be interpreted as claims about what is fictionally true. 
For example, if Charles said, ‘I saw the slime’ we should understand him as saying *I 
saw the slime* (it is fictionally true that I saw the slime). Walton suggests this is also 
true of Charles’s emotional report. When Charles says, ‘I felt terrified’ we should under-
stand him as saying *I felt terrified*. Charles is expressing what is make-believe rather 
than what is true: it is only fictional that he was terrified. However, as we noted earlier, 
this does not have to mean a counterpart to fear has made this fictionally true, it could 
be he genuinely fears the slime and this is what makes it fictional that he fears the slime.  
To make the case for Charles’ feelings amounting to mere quasi fear in reality, Wal-
ton notes that Charles’ responses to his ‘fear’ are somewhat odd. If he really feared 
impending slime attack, he would be motivated to flee the cinema, or to call the police, 
or to tell his loved ones to head for shelter, and so on. One explanation for his attenuated 
motivational response is that he doesn’t believe the slime actually threatens him or any-
one else (save the denizens of the fictional world of the film). As such, Walton suggests 
that it is made fictionally true that Charles fears the slime because in reality he feels 
‘quasi fear’: he has entered an involuntary counterpart state that resembles fear but lacks 
an appropriate connection to belief and motivation (Walton 1990, pp. 201-202). 
That being said, this does not mean Walton is arguing we simply do not exhibit 
emotional responses when engaging with fiction. For example, Walton tells us that: 
 It goes without saying that we are genuinely moved by novels and films and plays, 
that we respond to works of fiction with real emotion. … My … claim is only that our 
genuine emotional responses to works of fiction do not involve literally, fearing, griev-
ing for, admiring fictional characters. (Walton 1997/2015, p. 275)  
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As I read Walton, he is arguing that we do in fact exhibit some sorts of aﬀective responses 
to fictions – we undergo certain bodily reactions and so on – but these responses consti-
tute ‘mere’ quasi emotions because they arise from our engagement with fiction. Thinking 
about my tears in response to Up, we might say these are genuine tears but not manifes-
tations of genuine sadness: they are representative of my quasi sadness.  
That being said, it would be a mistake to regard quasi emotions as mere bodily 
reactions. For Walton, perhaps the most crucial issue is how to understand the object of 
our fiction-directed emotion: he is concerned with explaining why, for example, it looks 
like we describe ourselves as literally fearing fictional characters, bearing in mind it seems 
odd to fear something that cannot possibly threaten you. As such, Walton argues Charles 
doesn’t just fictionally fear simpliciter: he fictionally fears a specific fictional slime because 
he believes that make-believedly the slime in question is bearing down on him (Walton 
1978/2015, p. 260). As such, we can argue that being in a state of quasi fear involves 
having certain involuntary physiological reactions and certain beliefs about what is 
fictional. Genuine fear involves those same physiological reactions combined with beliefs 
about what is actually the case. In Walton’s terminology, this means that real world 
quasi-fear feelings can make it fictionally true that, for example, you fear a slime. In more 
neutral terms, when our fear appears to have a fictional intentional object, it can be 
argued that at least sometimes we have in fact entered into a state of quasi fear.  
The most important point here for present purposes is that quasi emotions are not 
supposed to be voluntary counterparts, since quasi emotions are not supposed to be 
subject to the will.41 If Walton is introducing a counterpart here, then quasi fear (and 
                                               
41 That being said, Walton (1997) draws a link between his account and simulation theory, 
which we might think implies some sort of connection between quasi emotions and the 
voluntary counterparts of simulation theory. However, his point is that quasi emotions 
might be informative as part of a wider simulation project when it comes to determining 
how you’d behave in a given situation. His example is of spelunking. While simulating 
working your way into the depths of a cave, you might have emotional responses (which 
he suggests are quasi emotions) that tell you how you’d behave if you really had to go 
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other potential quasi emotions42) are involuntary counterparts: they are automatic re-
sponses to engaging with something we recognise as being fictional.  
With the distinction between involuntary and voluntary counterparts in hand, we 
can respond to some common worries raised with Walton’s response to the paradox of 
fiction. Carroll for example, argues that: 
One reason to be suspicious of the notion that art-horror is a pretend emotion rather 
than a genuine emotion is that if it were a pretend emotion, one would think that it 
could be engaged at will. I could elect to remain unmoved by The Exorcist; I could 
refuse to make believe I was horrified. But I don’t think that that was really an option 
for those, like myself, who were overwhelmedly struck by it. (Carroll 1990, p. 74)  
This amounts to arguing that because quasi fear is a counterpart, it should be a state 
that we can enter into at will and thus that we should be able to elect to remain impassive 
when watching a scary movie like The Exorcist, which doesn't necessarily follow. If we 
allow for involuntary counterparts, then it is possible for quasi fear to be a sort of state 
that is not under the control of the will. 
That being said, the introduction of quasi emotions is controversial and we should 
look more closely at how we can justify their introduction. In line with my third principle, 
we need to ask whether there are a) constraints on some of our emotions which rule out 
their being involved in our engagement with fiction, or b) puzzles about our engagement 
with fiction that are best solved by introducing quasi emotions. 
Let’s begin by considering constraints. Walton allows that quasi fear can on 
introspection be phenomenologically identical to real fear. Why, then, do these bodily 
reactions not constitute full-blown fear? As we noted earlier, Walton argues that there is 
an intimate connection between our emotions, motivations, and beliefs. In the Charles 
example, he obviously does not believe that the slime actually threatens him. If he did 
                                               
spelunking. He does not think this means these quasi emotions are under the control of the 
will. 
42 Walton doesn’t argue every emotion has a quasi-version, which means it would be 
misleading to imply he thinks that every emotion has a counterpart. 
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fear an imminent attack, presumably he’d do more than just sit in his chair yelping. 
However, some philosophers are suspicious of taking this to justify the introduction of 
quasi emotions. For example, one might think that a state being properly described as 
‘fear’ depends not on the subject’s beliefs or motivations, but merely on the physiological 
reactions occurring in their body, a position historically associated with James (1884, p. 
190), who suggests ‘we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because 
we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or 
fearful’. If this sort of account of the emotions is correct, then quasi emotions may just 
be ordinary emotions by definition. I suspect that in response, Walton would focus our 
attention on the fact that our somewhat attenuated responses to fictional stimuli still 
imply that we don’t genuinely come to fear the fictional.  
However, even if one is sceptical about whether we need to introduce quasi emotions 
on the basis of constraints on feeling a genuine emotion, there remain many puzzling 
aspects to our emotional engagement with fiction that need to be explained aside from 
the paradox of fiction. For example, we need to explain why we sometimes choose to 
engage with fictions that we know will frighten us, or lead to other unpleasant emotional 
experiences.43 A philosopher who argues that genuine emotions are involved in our en-
gagement with fictions will still need to make sense of these sorts of puzzles, and Walton 
(1990, Ch. 7) uses his theory of quasi emotions to try to make sense of many of these 
issues. As such, a full discussion of whether we should introduce quasi emotions would 
need to reflect on whether we need to introduce them to make sense of at least some of 
the puzzles that arise when we reflect on our emotional engagement with fiction. 
To give one example of how we might justify the introduction of quasi emotions in 
this sort of way, we can note that Friend (2003, pp. 41-45) defends the introduction of 
quasi emotions by focusing on a puzzle that arises when we reflect on fictions that concern 
real individuals. In the film JFK, Oliver Stone presents Jim Garrison – a district attorney 
                                               
43 Carroll (1990) calls this first problem the ‘paradox of horror’. The more general problem is 
called the paradox of negative aﬀect by Smuts (2009). 
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who prosecuted the only trial related to JFK’s assassination – as an admirable individual 
trying to fight injustice and conspiracy. Friend notes that this means we might have 
positive emotional responses towards him and want him to succeed in his task in the 
fiction. However, at the same time, we can be aware that in real life Garrison ruined a 
man’s life when prosecuting this case, and as such have negative emotional feelings to-
wards him in reality. Friend argues that the best way to explain this is to maintain that 
we have genuine emotional responses towards the prosecutor in the actual world and 
quasi emotions towards the prosecutor in the fiction.44 
To make a broader point about involuntary counterparts, when determining whether 
to introduce an imaginative counterpart in the involuntary sense, we must consider 
whether introducing this sort of counterpart helps to make sense of puzzles related to 
human activities that seem to involve the imagination, or whether introducing a coun-
terpart simply creates new problems and exacerbates existing ones. We cannot justify the 
introduction of an involuntary counterpart solely by noting what looks to be an example 
of a genuine mental state that has fictional content. This is perhaps why some take an 
instinctive dislike towards the idea of quasi emotions: pre-philosophically it seems ac-
ceptable to say that we can exhibit genuine emotional reactions on the basis of engaging 
with a representation we know to be fictional.  
 
So far, we have seen that imaginative counterparts in both my first and second sense can 
be plausibly introduced for seeing, and one can be plausibly introduced in at least my 
second sense for emotion. However, we should not begin our discussion of whether belief 
has a counterpart by presuming that a principle like ‘X is a mental state, therefore X 
has an imaginative counterpart’ holds.  
                                               
44 One might worry here that the prosecutor in the fiction is not the same as the real 
prosecutor and so our emotions simply have diﬀerent intentional objects. Friend (2003, p. 
46-50) argues against this on the grounds that fictions often ask us to take things to be 
fictionally true of real individuals, places, and things. For example, it seems odd to say 
Sherlock Holmes novels are not really set in London but in some fictional place that 
resembles London. 
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In the case of voluntary counterparts, we have already seen that the emotions appear 
to give an example of a state that does not have this sort of counterpart, since we cannot 
enter into emotion-like states at will. In the case of involuntary counterparts, both the 
notion of quasi emotions and Walton’s notion of imagining seeing are controversial, and 
bearing this in mind, one could argue that I have failed to pick out a distinctive category 
of mental states. Instead, it could be argued that sometimes voluntary counterparts be-
have in an automatic way and that we do not need to introduce a second category of 
counterpart. 
I will return to this sort of concern in relation to belief-like imaginings at several 
junctures in this thesis. My main response is that if one wishes to broaden the functional 
role of a counterpart in this way, one will need to give positive reasons for doing so. We 
should be cautious of moving too quickly from establishing that a given state has a 
voluntary counterpart to arguing this counterpart is involved in a given human activity 
but behaves in an automatic manner. As we will see in chapter 2 and chapter 5, this 
means we have good reason to separate out the question of whether an imaginative coun-
terpart to belief is involved in our engagement with fiction from the question of whether 
belief has a voluntary counterpart. 
 Furthermore, there are some mental states and attitudes that do not look like they 
have counterparts in either the voluntary or involuntary sense, such as amusement. Both 
Walton (1994, pp. 43-44) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, pp. 189-191) agree that you 
can be genuinely amused by the merely fictional, so it looks like amusement having 
fictional content is unproblematic and we won’t need to introduce a counterpart to make 
sense of this.45  
                                               
45 I address this point at greater length in my MPhil dissertation (Davis 2015, pp. 31-37). 
One might object that there is something puzzling about your amusement being caused by 
something merely fictional because fictional entities lack the requisite causal powers. In this 
way, we might think we need to introduce an involuntary counterpart to amusement to 
explain this causal gap. I think this is mistaken because this simply serves to increase 
puzzles in this area, and we can equally explain this causal gap by suggesting the literal 
cause of your amusement is a story or narrative rather than a fictional individual.  
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Conclusion  
We have seen that deciding whether our ability to propositionally imagine involves a 
counterpart to belief relates to a wider question about what sorts of mental states have 
imaginative counterparts. In sections 1.2 and 1.4, we saw that there are two notions of 
imaginative counterparts at play in contemporary philosophical discussions of the imag-
ination: one of a state that resembles another but is under the control of the will, and 
one that is a more automatic response to engaging with something fictional or imaginary.  
In sections 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 we attempted to clarify the nature of these counterparts 
by considering when we are justified in introducing them. We did this by considering 
whether seeing and the emotions have either voluntary or involuntary counterparts. On 
the basis of these discussions, I argued for four claims. Firstly, I suggested that we can 
justify introducing a voluntary counterpart by reflecting on whether a state is similar to 
another state in introspective, functional and neurological ways. Secondly, I argued that 
we cannot justify the introduction of an involuntary counterpart by merely noting that 
we can enter into a given mental state as a result of engaging with fiction. Thirdly, in 
order to justify introducing an involuntary counterpart, we need to consider whether 
there are constraints on the state in question, or puzzles that arise when we reflect on a 
particular human activity if we do not introduce this sort of counterpart. Finally, we saw 
that we can deny that a state has one sort of counterpart, but accept that it has the 
other sort of counterpart. 
In the next chapter, we will see that some philosophical accounts of belief-like imag-
inings cut across my distinction between these two sorts of counterpart. I will argue that 
this gives us some reason for thinking that we should reject the uniformity assumption 
when it comes to explaining the attitude involved in our engagement with fiction and in 
pretence. 
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Chapter 2: Distinct Attitudes & Distinct Contents 
Introduction 
As we noted in the introduction, it is widely agreed that we have an ability to proposi-
tionally imagine things. In recent years, it has been popular to defend the idea that this 
ability involves taking a distinct attitude towards p. This attitude is said to be a coun-
terpart to belief, and so when it is said this attitude is involved in fiction and pretence, 
this amounts to accepting the non-doxastic assumption. Defenders of this view also tend 
to adopt the uniformity assumption, and argue that this single distinct attitude is in-
volved in a wide range of human activities, such as hypothetical reasoning, fiction, min-
dreading and pretence. However, this is not the only way we can explain our apparent 
ability to propositionally imagine things. Instead, what philosophers have called propo-
sitional imaginings could involve a variety of diﬀerent mental attitudes in diﬀerent con-
texts. 
To develop the arguments of this chapter, it will first be helpful to briefly set out 
four diﬀerent ways in which we might explain our ability to propositionally imagine 
things (though since we will question the uniformity assumption, they do not have to be 
taken as mutually exclusive). 
1. The Single Attitude Approach  
This sort of view holds that what we call propositional imaginings are in fact merely 
ordinary beliefs. This view is unpopular for two reasons. The first can be seen by return-
ing to the non-doxastic assumption that I mentioned in the introduction. It seems intui-
tive to think that there is at least some sort of belief-like attitude that we can take 
towards propositions: I can believe that I am on a beach; but I can also suppose that I 
am on a beach. The second can be seen by reflecting on the uniformity assumption that 
I mentioned in the introduction. If we argue that engaging in pretence and with fiction 
just involves simple beliefs, then this suggests that children and consumers of fiction face 
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cognitive confusion (e.g. children might come to believe that they are dogs during pre-
tence, consumers of fiction might come to believe that monsters are real).  
2. The Distinct Attitude Approach 
These theories tell us that the propositional imagination is underpinned by a distinct 
attitude. Propositionally imagining p is held to be an attitude distinct from believing that 
p, but is an attitude which shares some similarities with belief. It is therefore an imagi-
native counterpart to believing. 
3. The Distinct Content Approach 
This sort of view holds that at least some of the states that we call propositional imag-
inings are in fact beliefs with special contents. There are at least three versions of this 
approach in the existing literature on imagination, pretence and fiction. The first is de-
veloped by Langland-Hassan, who argues that propositional imaginings are counterfac-
tual beliefs. The second is developed by Leslie, who suggests that beliefs of the form ‘I 
PRETEND that “I am a dog”’ are what explain childhood pretence. The third is the view 
that our cognitive attitude towards fiction is beliefs under the scope of a fictional opera-
tor. According to this view, if I indicate that I think it is fictionally true that ‘Harry 
Potter is a wizard’, this can be understood as me saying that ‘I believe Harry Potter is a 
wizard’ [in the fiction]. The most recent, and also sophisticated, defence of this view is 
oﬀered by Tullmann (2016), and several philosophers have defended this approach in 
relation to the paradox of fiction, suggesting that these sorts of beliefs are what lead to 
us exhibiting emotional responses (e.g. Neill 1993, Davies 2009). 
 
4. The Distinct Attitude and Distinct Content Approach 
 
This sort of approach would argue that propositionally imagining p sometimes involves 
both a distinct attitude and distinct contents. For example, we could argue that we take 
a non-doxastic belief-like attitude towards p, but that p is nonetheless subject to some 
sort of fictional operator. The main motivation for adopting this sort of view would be if 
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the distinct attitude and distinct content views both fail to explain a human activity that 
seems to involve our ability to propositionally imagine. However, if one of these views 
alone can do the requisite explanatory work, the appeal of this sort of conjoint view will 
be diminished. As such, I will not say much more about this approach in this thesis. That 
being said, some have suggested that this is how Leslie’s view of pretence should be 
understood (e.g. Currie 1998, p. 41), and I will argue against developing Leslie’s view in 
this way in chapter 4.46 
 
These diﬀerent approaches to understanding the propositional imagination relate to a 
distinction between force and content associated with Frege. This is roughly a distinction 
between the attitude we take towards a given content, and the content itself. The con-
sensus view holds that we need to introduce the notion of an ‘imaginative force’ to explain 
what it is to propositionally imagine something. I am instead going to focus on the rele-
vance of content, and argue that a distinct content view oﬀers the best account of the 
attitude involved in fiction and pretence.  
We will begin in section 2.1 by considering whether belief has a voluntary counter-
part. I will argue that it plausibly does, and that this counterpart can be associated with 
                                               
46 There are at least two further accounts that we could discuss here. The first would be a 
really distinct attitude approach, where we argue that some propositional imaginings are 
not counterparts to belief or any other kind of mental state. The second would be to argue 
that imagining or believing p involves taking a further attitude towards p, such as judging 
that p is fictional or true. For example, the diﬀerence between imagination and belief could 
depend on whether we judge that a given representation concerns the real or fictional, or 
whether we apply a norm of truth to the representation (Shah and Velleman 2005). The 
first sort of approach is interesting but unhelpful in the context of fiction and pretence. 
The reason that philosophers have been drawn to the idea that the attitude involved in 
fiction and pretence is a counterpart to belief is because the cognitive attitude involved in 
them seems to resemble belief. The second is compellingly criticised by Sinhababu (2013, 
2016), and I share his concerns. As he rightly brings out, any purported further attitude 
or norm involved in belief could equally be applied to our imaginings. For example, one 
could apply a norm of truth to one’s imaginings but this wouldn’t make them into beliefs 
(Sinhababu 2013, pp. 155-157). 
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notions such as supposing. I will then bring out some of the initial reasons for why we 
might want to associate this attitude with fiction and pretence. 
In section 2.2, I will further bring out why philosophers have been drawn to the view 
that a counterpart to belief is involved in fiction and pretence, and thus to make the non-
doxastic assumption. This will be done by setting out why a simple belief account of 
pretence and fiction is problematic. The crucial diﬃculty with this approach is that if we 
literally believed the contents of fictions or of our episodes of pretence, this would lead 
to chaos in our representational systems. 
In section 2.3, I will set out two diﬀerent theories that seek to oﬀer detailed sketches 
of the nature of belief-like imaginings: simulation theory and the cognitive theory of 
Nichols and Stich. Both of these theories adopt the uniformity assumption, and having 
set out these theories, I will then bring out some initial reasons for why we might want 
to question this assumption. We will do this by reflecting on the diﬀerent ways that 
belief-like imaginings appear to behave when we engage in hypothetical reasoning as 
compared to when we engage with fiction or in pretence. 
In section 2.4, I will set out three distinct content approaches that seek to make 
sense of our engagement with fiction and in pretence: the counterfactual view of Lang-
land-Hassan (2012), the meta-representational view of Leslie (1987, 1994), and the fic-
tional operator view. For the most part, we will just set out these views without passing 
judgement, though I will take this opportunity to argue that Langland-Hassan’s view will 
struggle to make sense of how we engage with fiction. 
Finally, in section 2.5, I will consider whether we have any prima facie reasons to 
favour a distinct attitude view of fiction and pretence over a distinct content view and 
thus to embrace the non-doxastic assumption. We will do this by reflecting on whether 
introspective, functional or neurological issues suggest that belief is not the only cognitive 
attitude involved in our engagement with fiction and in pretence. I will argue that none 
of these considerations is compelling. This will set up a standoﬀ between the distinct 
content and distinct attitude views of fiction and pretence, which we will attempt to 
resolve in the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
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2.1 A Counterpart to Belief 
As we saw in the previous chapter, there are two notions of a counterpart at play in 
philosophical discussions of the imagination. The first is a mental state that is under the 
control of the will and bears some similarities to another mental state. The consensus 
view of the nature of propositional imaginings argues that they are a counterpart to belief 
in this sense. The consensus view maintains that the attitude underpinning the proposi-
tional imagination is under the control of the will and bears important similarities to 
belief, but has a distinct functional role and is a distinct attitude. Neurological and in-
trospective similarities are also referenced to justify this claim, as one would expect based 
on my sketch of this sort of voluntary counterpart.  
Broadly speaking I think this is right. That is, I think that there is some sort of 
imaginative counterpart to belief that we can enter into at will and so is a voluntary 
counterpart. There are various words we use in ordinary language to mark out this coun-
terpart. For example, we can speak of entertaining the proposition that p or supposing 
that p and thinking that p (in the sense of ‘thinking about X’, not taking something to 
be true).47 These sorts of attitudes can be distinguished from belief introspectively and 
functionally. It would be counter-intuitive, for example, to suggest that when I’m sitting 
at my desk and decide to entertain or suppose that p, this is in some sense just to believe 
that p, even if this belief has a special content. This sort of state also seems to bear some 
functional similarities to belief. For example, supposing looks to play a role in allowing 
                                               
47 One might worry here that these are three diﬀerent sorts of mental states. I would be 
willing to accept this and not much will turn on this point in the remainder of the thesis. 
My only claim here is that I’m happy to allow that these terms refer to an imaginative 
counterpart to belief. My scepticism relates to linking this sort of counterpart to pretence 
and fiction. One might also worry that these sorts of attitudes are in fact not counterparts 
to belief. Arcangeli (2014) argues that supposition should be thought of as a form of 
imagination that is an imaginative counterpart to acceptance. One could also think 
‘entertaining’ is a more basic sort of attitude than imagining, perhaps associated with a 
Fregean notion of ‘grasping a thought’ (Frege 1956). My point here is only that I do not 
want to rule out that these sorts of attitudes might be counterparts to belief. 
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us to engage with hypothetical arguments, since our suppositions can interact with our 
standing beliefs. If our suppositions didn’t bear some relation to our beliefs, this would 
raise serious questions about the reliability of our hypothetical reasoning. However, just 
because we can make sense of there being some sort of counterpart to belief involved in 
supposing and entertaining propositions, this does not mean that we must accept that 
this counterpart plays a crucial role in explaining how children can engage in pretence, 
or how we can engage with fiction.  
To bring out why the consensus view argues for this claim, we can note that there is 
widespread agreement among philosophers that there is an intimate link between imagi-
nation, fiction and pretence. One reason for endorsing there being this sort of connection 
is that we often associate fiction and imagination when discussing fiction in a non-philo-
sophical context, for example we might describe a work of fiction as stimulating the 
imagination in everyday conversation.48 The same is also true of pretence, and indeed in 
London there is an Institute of Imagination which focuses on the importance of ‘play’ 
among other aspects of childhood associated with the imagination, such as making and 
creating. However, while this might point towards there being a close connection between 
some sort of imaginative capacities and our engagement with fiction and in pretence, this 
sort of common-sense intuition does not reveal why philosophers have argued that belief-
like imaginings play an important role in our engagement with fiction and in pretence. 
We can note two things to bring out why philosophers have been keen to stress the 
importance of belief-like imaginings for engaging with fiction and pretence. The first is 
that, as we noted in section 1.1, we do not need to form non-propositional imaginings, 
such as mental images, to engage with works of fiction or in pretence. While watching a 
                                               
48 In a recent lecture, the author Neil Gaiman makes this link by suggesting: ‘When you 
watch TV or see a film, you are looking at things happening to other people. Prose fiction 
is something you build up from 26 letters and a handful of punctuation marks, and you, 
and you alone, using your imagination, create a world and people it and look out through 
other eyes. You get to feel things, visit places and worlds you would never otherwise know.’ 
(emphasis mine) (https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/oct/15/neil-gaiman-future-
libraries-reading-daydreaming) 
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film, I do not need to form mental images of the on-screen events in order to engage with 
the narrative, and while reading a novel I do not necessarily have to form mental images 
of the described events.49 In the case of pretence, if a child is pretending to be a dog, 
presumably they don’t necessarily have to form a mental image of a dog or of themselves 
as a dog.  
Secondly, as we saw in section 1.4, fictions contain (or imply) propositions that don’t 
appear to invite straightforward belief. Upon reading the Sherlock Holmes novels, the 
reader is not supposed to believe that it is literally true that there exists an individual 
called ‘Sherlock Holmes’ who is a detective. Instead, we are supposed to understand this 
as being fictionally true. Several philosophers have followed Walton in embracing the 
idea that a proposition is fictionally true if we are mandated or prescribed to imagine it 
(e.g. Currie 1990). Since this sort of imagination takes a fictionally true proposition as 
its content, the sort of imagination associated with fictional truth is standardly argued 
to be belief-like. Since Walton in turns associates his theory with pretence, we can also 
make the same point to defend associating pretence and belief-like imaginings. 
A further reason for why this consensus view has formed can be brought out by 
considering why a simple belief-based account of how we engage with fiction and in 
pretence will be diﬃcult to make work. 
2.2 A Single Attitude 
The simple belief proposal will face an immediate diﬃculty when we think about the role 
that propositional imaginings are supposed to play in making sense of childhood pretence. 
One thing we have to explain when oﬀering an account of pretence is how children are 
                                               
49 Of course, this is not to say that we never form mental images when engaging with fictions. 
The point here is that it seems coherent for a reader to read and understand a novel without 
forming any mental images. That said, a study by Brooks (1967), referenced by Matravers 
(2013, p. 72) suggests that readers have diﬃculty reading a text and visualising the events 
described in the text at the same time. 
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able to maintain what we can call ‘cognitive order’. We need to explain why forming 
representations related to their pretence doesn’t lead to chaos in their representational 
system. Leslie sets up this problem by asking: 
How is it possible for a child to think about a banana as if it were a telephone, a 
lump of plastic as if it were alive, or an empty dish as if it contained soap? If a 
representational system is developing, how can its semantic relations tolerate distor-
tion in these more or less arbitrary ways? Indeed, how is it possible that young chil-
dren can disregard or distort reality in any way and to any degree at all? Why does 
pretending not undermine their representational system and bring it crashing down? 
(Leslie 1987, p. 412) 
Consider a child pretending to be a dog, who is running around the house making barking 
noises. If their pretence is underpinned by the belief that they are a dog, it looks like this 
would lead to chaos in how they represent the world. Suddenly the child would either 
hold contradictory beliefs – that they were and were not a dog – or they would replace 
some existing beliefs about being a human with the belief that they were a dog.50  
As such, if we argue that propositional imaginings are beliefs and don’t give this 
claim any qualification, we will end up in a position where children straightforwardly 
believe that they are dogs, or that bananas are telephones, or that there is real tea in 
their cups, and so on. This is a counter-intuitive conclusion to find ourselves committed 
to. Indeed, empirical studies focused on children’s understanding of pretence demonstrate 
that from a young age, children are able to keep track of the distinction between the real 
and the imaginary, at least to some extent (Wellman and Estes, 1986, Estes, et al. 1989).  
A similar problem also arises when thinking about fictions. If moviegoers watching a 
dystopian movie like Children of Men really believed the events depicted on screen were 
                                               
50 Children can engage in pretence from a young age, and one might find it implausible that 
young children can have beliefs about being human that could be replaced by beliefs about 
being a dog. In terms of their internal representations, the relevant beliefs here might be 
demonstrative. The child used to believe that they are like that (human) and now believe 
that they are like this (a dog). 
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happening, they’d presumably become panicked about the fact that the human race ap-
peared doomed.51 Furthermore, the contents of some fictions straightforwardly conflict 
with our standing beliefs. Thankfully upon watching Scott Pilgrim we don’t start believ-
ing that videogame user-interface elements can occasionally pop up in reality.52 
We can modify the proposal that the sorts of propositional imaginings associated 
with fiction and pretence are just beliefs by suggesting that they are temporary beliefs. 
For example, the child pretending that they are a dog might temporarily believe that 
they are a dog during their game of pretence, rather than this ending up as a stable belief 
about the world. This relates to a proposal about how to make sense of our engagement 
with fiction that tells us we ‘suspend our disbelief’, an idea associated with Coleridge 
(1817). However, this sort of illusion based account of how we engage with fiction has 
been thoroughly, and compelling, critiqued by Schaper (1978) and Carroll (1990, pp. 63-
68).  
The crucial explanatory failing of these sorts of approaches is that they still leave us 
facing a disconnection between belief and behaviour. If a child ever came to believe they 
were a dog, it wouldn’t matter how temporary this belief was: they would surely do more 
than just wander around the house periodically making a ‘woof’ noise, and would likely 
engage in some dangerous behaviour suitable for dogs but not children, such as barking 
at dogs in the park or trying to chase them.  
The worry about our motivational responses to fictions also remains. As we suggested 
in section 1.6, if we temporarily believed in the existence of horror movie monsters, then 
instead of yelping or hiding behind the sofa, we would likely respond to horror films very 
diﬀerently. For example, we might call the police or try to immediately leave the cinema 
                                               
51 This film depicts a dystopian future where women are no longer able to become pregnant, 
leading to mass riots and widespread disorder. The protagonist is tasked with guiding the 
last pregnant women on Earth to a secret research facility where she will be protected from 
the outside world. 
52 For example, at one stage in the film the protagonist – Scott Pilgrim – ‘dies’ upon being 
stabbed by his recently acquired arch-nemesis. Thankfully, he finds a ‘1-up’ floating in 
space above him and upon grabbing it returns to life.  
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to flee from the monster’s advance. Introducing the notion of a temporary belief, or the 
suspension of disbelief, will still leave us without a satisfactory explanation of the sorts 
of attenuated behaviours people exhibit when engaging in pretence and with works of 
fiction. 
What we need here is an account of how children and adults can consistently separate 
out what they take to be true of a fiction or of an episode of pretence from what they 
straightforwardly believe to be true of the world. An account that reduces imaginings to 
beliefs simpliciter leaves it unclear how to make sense of this.53 
This means we are left with at least two sorts of approaches for responding to these 
diﬃculties. Firstly, we can take the consensus view and argue that a distinct attitude of 
belief-like imagination is involved in fiction and pretence. Secondly, we can argue that 
belief remains the relevant attitude, but that we need to give a diﬀerent specification of 
the content of the relevant beliefs. We will begin by considering how the former view has 
been developed. 
2.3 A Distinct Attitude 
There are two related theories about the nature of belief-like imaginings that associate 
them with fiction and pretence and argues that they are a voluntary counterpart. We 
hinted at the first one in chapter 1 when we noted that there is a notion of ‘simulated’ 
belief introduced by simulation theorists like Currie and Ravenscroft and Goldman. To 
defend the introduction of this notion, they bring out some functional similarities between 
                                               
53 Another, more sophisticated version, of the just belief view has been put forward by 
Schellenberg (2013). In her view, propositional imagination and belief are on a continuum. 
In eﬀect, this means that she argues for a widening of our conception of belief. Since my 
eventual view of fiction and pretence relies on beliefs with distinct contents and will not 
result in us reconfiguring our folk conception of belief, I will take it to be preferable to this 
revisionary account. Furthermore, the primary motivation for adopting this view is to 
explain certain aspects of imaginative immersion, and Liao and Doggett (2014) oﬀer 
convincing arguments for why this proposal is unnecessary for explaining these issues. 
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belief and what look to be belief-like imaginings. For example, Currie and Ravenscroft 
note some ways in which belief-like imaginings resemble beliefs (e.g. in how they preserve 
inferential links) and also note some diﬀerences (e.g. in how they don’t aim to reflect 
what’s true). In relation to the issue of inferences, they tell us that: 
What is sometimes called imagining-that is belief-like imagining. An important fea-
ture of beliefs is their occupation of characteristic inferential roles; believing some-
thing tends to lead to believing other things, depending on what else you already 
believe. Imagining that you are famous is belief-like partly because it mirrors the 
inferential role of the belief that you are. (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, p. 12) 
Goldman calls this sort of imagination ‘S-imagination’ (suppositional-imagination) and 
tell us that: 
S‐imagination is typically formulated with a ‘that’‐clause, ‘X imagines that p’, where 
p can refer, unrestrictedly, to any sort of state‐of‐aﬀairs. To S‐imagine that p is to 
entertain the hypothesis that p, to posit that p, to assume that p. Unlike some forms 
of imagination, S‐imagination has no sensory aspect; it is purely conceptual. (Gold-
man 2006b, p. 42) 
Goldman goes on helpfully to distinguish this sort of imagination from what he calls ‘E-
imagination’ (enactment-imagination): 
Enactment‐imagination is a matter of creating or trying to create in one's own mind 
a selected mental state, or at least a rough facsimile of such a state, through the 
faculty of imagination. Prime examples of E‐imagination include sensory forms of 
imagination, where one creates, through imagination, perception‐like states. Acts of 
visual and auditory imagination, which involve the production of vision‐like or hear-
ing‐like states, are familiar types of E‐imagination. Another type of E‐imagination is 
motor imagination, where one produces action‐directed representational states, with-
out intending to execute the selected action. The term ‘imagery’ is commonly applied 
to these cases; there is visual imagery, auditory imagery, and motor imagery. (Gold-
man 2006b, p. 42) 
Goldman also suggests that this means we might be able E-imagining believing, which 
may in turn mean that S-imagination reduces to E-imagination since we could argue 
that: 
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E‐imagination is the fundamental kind of imagination, and that S‐imagination is 
simply one species of it. … the species in which the mental state enacted is belief. 
Supposing that p is E‐imagining believing that p. (Goldman 2006b, p. 44) 
Goldman and Currie and Ravenscroft also both accept the uniformity assumption, and 
argue that these belief-like states allow us to engage in hypothetical reasoning and also 
play an important role in our engagement with fiction and in pretence.54 
The second theory that seeks to link belief-like imaginings to pretence and fiction 
was originally introduced by Nichols and Stich (2000, 2003), and christened the 
‘cognitive’ theory of propositional imagination by Nichols (2004, p. 129), who tells us 
that ‘Stephen Stich and I developed a cognitive theory of the imagination’.55 The theory 
has been elaborated by Nichols in various single-authored papers (2004, 2006) and has 
received some friendly emendations from Weinberg and Meskin (2006b). It has also been 
given several sympathetic amendments by philosophers such as Doggett and Egan (2007, 
2012) (who argue that someone adopting this approach should introduce something like 
the simulationist notion of desire-like imaginings into an account of fiction and pretence). 
Defenders of this sort of cognitive view also tend to endorse the uniformity assumption, 
and argue that these belief-like imaginings are involved in hypothetical reasoning, fiction 
and pretence, among other activities like mindreading.  
Nichols and Stich’s cognitive account of the propositional imagination is embedded 
in a commitment to representationalism and functionalism about the nature of the mind. 
In relation to representationalism, they hold that our beliefs and desires, (and perhaps 
other propositional attitudes we might think need to be accounted for in our cognitive 
architecture) are ‘representational states’. In relation to functionalism, they accept that 
                                               
54 Some further simulation defences of the uniformity assumption can be found in Currie 
(1995), which makes the case for associating this sort of simulated belief-like state with 
fiction and pretence, and Gordon and Baker (1994), which oﬀers a simulation based theory 
of pretence. 
55 The reader might at this point wonder why the term ‘cognitive’ is used since this is usually 
associated with beliefs, rather than imagination, in areas like meta-ethics. As Nichols and 
Stich use the term, it can be thought of as indicating that the theory concerns the psycho-
functional workings of the mind and the notion of a representational mental state. 
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for a mental state to be classified as a belief, as opposed to a desire, it must serve a 
particular functional role in our cognitive architecture. They illustrate this idea with the 
metaphor of ‘boxes’ that contain functionally distinct representations in the mind. They 
note that most philosophers would accept that the human mind contains a belief ‘box’ 
that contains our belief representations and a desire ‘box’ that contains our desire repre-
sentations, where the representations in these two boxes can be distinguished from one 
another with reference to their diﬀering functional roles.56 As they put the combination 
of these ideas:  
[t]o believe that Socrates was an Athenian is to have a representation token whose 
content is Socrates was an Athenian stored in one’s ‘Belief Box’, and to desire that 
it will be sunny tomorrow is to have a representation whose content is It will be 
sunny tomorrow stored in one’s ‘Desire Box’. (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 15). 
These boxes are then postulated to interact with other elements of our cognitive archi-
tecture, such as ‘inference mechanisms’ and ‘aﬀect generation systems’, with each box 
interacting with diﬀerent bits of mental architecture to reflect their diﬀering functional 
roles.57  
Nichols and Stich’s argue that in order to account for our ability to propositionally 
imagine, we need to introduce a further box, which we can call the imagination box.58 
                                               
56 A philosopher may reject this metaphor of boxes as explanatorily unhelpful, but the point 
here is most philosophers would accept that we should distinguish between beliefs and 
desires, and it is not an uncommon approach to make this distinction with reference to 
their functional roles. 
57 This talk of boxes is not supposed to imply that our beliefs or desires will turn out to have 
a single location in a neural map of the brain. Weinberg and Meskin (2006b, p. 179) make 
this explicit, telling us that ‘[o]ur talk of ‘boxes’ … should not be assumed to have 
neurophysiological implications’ in the course of their development of Nichols and Stich’s 
theory. Boxes are merely supposed to separate out aspects of our mental life by functional 
role, without making any claims about what realises these functional roles at a neural level. 
Indeed, it is perhaps more plausible to propose that several cognitive mechanisms underpin 
what Nichols and Stich label the ‘aﬀect generation systems’ and ‘decision making systems’. 
58 This box has been given a variety of names. Nichols and Stich (2000, 2003) call this box 
the ‘possible worlds’ box or PWB for short (due to its supposed involvement in thinking 
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The imagination box is distinct from the belief and desire boxes since the representations 
contained within the imagination box have a distinct functional role.  
As they put the point: 
[the imagination box] contains representation tokens. However, the functional role of 
these tokens – their pattern of interaction with other components of the mind – is 
quite diﬀerent from the functional role of either beliefs or desires. Their job is … to 
represent what the world would be like given some set of assumptions that we may 
neither believe to be true nor want to be true. (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 28) 
This amounts to something similar to the notion of belief-like imaginings introduced by 
simulation theorists, but contains no commitment to there being other sorts of imagina-
tive counterparts, or to a broad notion of simulated mental states. This distinction be-
tween the two approaches is highlighted by Goldman where he notes (in relation to the 
issue of how imagination is involved in our engagement with fiction): 
[t]here is a substantial diﬀerence between the view that S‐imagination covers all im-
portant uses of imagination in the consumption of fiction and the view that E‐imag-
ination (even in its non‐suppositional variants) is essential to the consumption and 
appreciation of fiction. (Goldman 2006b, p. 44) 
One way to read this sentence, is that Goldman understands the cognitive view as arguing 
that the only kind of imagination relevant to human activities like engagement with 
fiction is belief-like imagination. He then argues that this is misguided since we need to 
also allow for a variety of counterpart states to play a role here, such as desire-like 
imaginings. On the other hand, desire-like imaginings are explicitly rejected in various 
articles and books by cognitive theorists, such as Nichols and Stich (2003) and Weinberg 
(2013).  
The main diﬀerence between the two views can be seen by returning to the idea of 
boxes. The simulation theorist can be understood as saying that there are no special 
                                               
about hypothetical and counterfactual situations), and Nichols (2004) calls it the ‘pretence’ 
box (due to its role in allowing us to engage in pretence). I am choosing to use the name 
‘imagination box’ that was introduced by Doggett and Liao (2014) since this best captures 
the wide role this box is supposed to play in our mental life.  
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imagination boxes, instead we have a general ability to take our ordinary boxes ‘oﬄine’. 
Nichols and Stich and their followers do not commit themselves to a general ability to 
take boxes oﬄine, and so they just introduce belief-like imaginings without committing 
to there being any further imaginative counterparts. If the simulation theorist did this, 
they would end up introducing a wide variety of new cognitive boxes when instead they 
can propose a general process that allows us to take our existing boxes oﬄine. 
Nichols (2006, p. 459) highlights this consensus about the existence of a distinct 
attitude that underpins the propositional imagination, and suggests that this proposal is 
‘perhaps the most productive idea about the imagination that anyone has ever had’. I 
will not challenge Nichols’s claim about the emergence of this consensus, and he is right 
to say that this idea has been productive. Philosophers have suggested that these sorts 
of belief-like imaginings play a key role in a wide range of human activities, such as 
mindreading, pretend play, engagement with fiction, counterfactual reasoning and modal 
reasoning, and a unified account of these activities would constitute major philosophical 
progress if it were widely accepted.  
In light of the explanatory promise of this way of thinking about the propositional 
imagination, Weinberg and Meskin (2006b, p. 177) suggest that we should shift our 
methodology for thinking about these human activities away from a ‘paradox and anal-
ysis’ model towards a ‘phenomenon and explanation’ model, where we make sense of 
their curious features within the framework of Nichols and Stich’s approach to the imag-
ination. They argue that we should do this since: 
[w]hen philosophers confront a puzzling set of propositions, their traditional approach 
is to look for a way to reconfigure the concepts deployed in the propositions, casting 
about for formulations that look suﬃciently natural and motivated from the perspec-
tives of metaphysics and folk psychology, and which dissolve the apparent contradic-
tion. We advocate instead that the puzzling propositions be treated merely as initial 
descriptions of a set of phenomena for which the philosopher must now seek a good 
explanation. (Weinberg and Meskin 2006, p. 177) 
They demonstrate this by considering the paradox of fiction. We saw in chapter 1 that 
this arises from our acceptance of three claims: 
1. We exhibit aﬀective responses to works of fiction. 
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2. We do not believe that fictions depict real events and happenings. 
3. Our emotions are subject to a coordination condition (Gendler and Kovakovich 
2005, p. 241). In order to exhibit an aﬀective response towards something, we 
normally need to believe it is real. 
We noted earlier that most attempts at resolving this paradox proceed by clarifying one 
of these three claims (e.g. Walton’s quasi emotion solution works by oﬀering a clarifica-
tion of the first claim). With the cognitive theory of imagination in place, Weinberg and 
Meskin (2003, 2006, pp. 183-184) argue that we should view this paradox as a phenome-
non for the cognitive theory to account for, rather than a puzzle to be gerrymandered 
away by sharp philosophical distinctions about the nature of the emotions. On the cog-
nitive view, since imaginings are belief-like, this means that they can activate our aﬀec-
tive systems in a similar way to beliefs. They argue this will provide us with the philo-
sophical tools needed to resolve the paradox since: 
[t]he functional similarity but non-identity between believing and imagining helps 
explain … the ambiguous nature of fiction-driven aﬀect. To the extent that we focus 
on the fact that many ordinary emotional responses are caused by beliefs, but aﬀective 
responses to fiction are caused by distinct cognitive states (i.e. imaginings), and more-
over, that belief-caused aﬀect may interact with our motivational and action-produc-
tion systems in a way that imagination-caused aﬀect may not—to the extent that we 
focus on such diﬀerences, we will tend to resist characterizing the latter as full-fledged 
emotions. But to the extent that we focus on the functional similarity between belief 
and imagination, as well as the phenomenological and biological similarities between 
fictive and non-fictive aﬀect, we will be pulled towards assimilating fictionally driven 
aﬀect to the general category of the emotions. (Weinberg and Meskin 2006b, p. 184) 
This application of the cognitive theory highlights one of the key merits of Nichols and 
Stich’s approach: in order to explain the diﬀerent functional roles of beliefs and belief-
like imaginings they set out, in detail, the supposed similarities between them, along with 
their diﬀerences. In chapter 3, we will consider the specific claims of Nichols and Stich’s 
cognitive theory to see whether it oﬀers a good explanation of how children are able to 
engage in pretence. For now, we will consider whether we should challenge the general 
idea that the propositional imagination is underpinned by a single distinct attitude of 
voluntary belief-like imagining. 
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At this stage in the discussion, it might look like this distinct attitude approach to 
the propositional imagination is remarkably anodyne. Surely it is just obvious that im-
agining that p involves taking a distinct attitude towards p, one might think, and our 
interest should be in setting out how this attitude behaves rather than in debating its 
existence. Indeed, I even said in section 2.1 that I am happy to allow that there is some 
sort of distinct attitude of entertaining, supposing or thinking that p that can be under-
stood as being a voluntary counterpart to belief. In response to this sort of point, we 
should note that the reason for this view appearing uncontroversial is that most philos-
ophers will want to endorse something like the following claim: 
PA: Propositional imagining p involves taking some sort of propositional attitude 
towards p 
PA is hard to deny as presented: prima facie it seems right that our ability to proposi-
tionally imagine things involves taking some sort of propositional attitude towards p. 
The consensus view, however, goes beyond PA in what it says about the psychological 
states that grant us our ability to propositionally imagine things. The consensus view 
also maintains that the attitude PA refers to is best thought of a distinct cognitive 
attitude which is a counterpart to belief, and that this particular attitude plays a role in 
a wide range of human activities. As such, the theorists we’ve discussed so far would 
endorse a more specific claim about the propositional imagination: 
BA: Propositionally imagining p involves taking a distinct belief-like attitude towards 
p 
PA is a mere platitude since it amounts to saying that humans have the ability to prop-
ositionally imagine things, and that this ability involves some sort of propositional atti-
tude. It is not quite so clear why we ought to assent to BA and accept that this ability 
is explained by a single attitude which is a counterpart to belief. It is not clear, in other 
words, why we should accept the uniformity assumption and the non-doxastic assump-
tion. 
We can introduce a worry about accepting the uniformity assumption by reflecting 
on some remarks made by Kind (2013) about why it might be problematic to place too 
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much explanatory weight on the shoulders of a single imaginative attitude. Kind notes 
that belief-like imaginings59 have been suggested to perform very diﬀerent roles in 
mindreading, engagement with fiction, pretend play and hypothetical/modal reasoning. 
She suggests that even if we allow for belief-like imaginings to have a broad functional 
role, it will be diﬃcult to give a plausible sketch of the nature of this sort of attitude.  
For example, Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, p. 35) identify belief-like imaginings as 
the attitude involved in supposing something to be the case, noting that ‘On our view … 
supposition is belief-like imagining’.60 However, ordinarily we don’t think mere supposing 
or entertaining is enough to generate emotional responses, yet we do seem to exhibit 
aﬀective responses to works of fiction and games of pretend (e.g. we don’t shed tears over 
Mary’s predicament when she is locked in a black and white room, but we may well shed 
tears when watching The Room).61 In light of this, Kind suggests that: 
[t]he mere act of imagining is not enough to produce aﬀect; rather, we must be em-
ploying some particular kind of imagining when we emotionally engage with fiction. 
… In short, we … see that there is nothing about the imagination itself that allows it 
to play all the diﬀerent explanatory roles that it has been assigned. (Kind 2013, p. 
14) 
                                               
59 Kind refers to imaginings simpliciter but her examples concern the sorts of human activities 
philosophers like Nichols and Stich would associate with belief-like imaginings. 
60 Weinberg and Meskin (2006b, pp. 191-199) oﬀer a somewhat diﬀerent account of the 
relation between belief-like imagining and supposing. They note various diﬀerences between 
these states, and argue suppositions are best thought of as a subset of belief-like imaginings, 
rather than making a simple identification between the two along the lines of Currie and 
Ravenscroft.  This raises the question of why they don’t think supposing is a distinct 
mental attitude from belief-like imaginings. Their argument on this score is complex, but 
it boils down to the idea that there is more in common between supposition and imaginings 
than between belief-like imaginings and belief, and the diﬀerences do not warrant saying 
there are two diﬀerent attitudes involved here. 
61 Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, pp. 33-38) respond by introducing desire-like imaginings, 
and argue that these imaginings are involved in our engagement with fiction but not 
hypothetical reasoning. A good response to these arguments can be found in Nichols 
(2004b) and Kind (2011) 
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We could bite the bullet here and oﬀer a series of complex disjuncts to explain the 
functional role of belief-like imaginings, such as allowing that they sometimes cause 
aﬀective responses and sometimes do not cause aﬀective responses, and so on. However, 
the more disjuncts we introduce, the more we risk defending the introduction of a 
gerrymandered mental state, whose complex specification is only justified by a desire for 
a unified account of activities like hypothetical reasoning, pretend play and our 
engagement with fiction. If we accept this sort of worry, then positing multiple attitudes 
that underpin the propositional imagination will be more plausible than introducing only 
one.62 
The theoretical importance of these discrepancies in how belief-like imaginings seem 
to behave comes to the fore when thinking about our engagement with fictions. As we 
noted in the previous chapter, when we read a novel, or watch a film, and so on, the 
cognitive attitudes we take towards the content of the work will be, to some extent, 
automatic and spontaneous. One doesn’t have to consciously make a decision to ‘imagine’ 
the contents of works of fiction. This opens up the possibility that if we introduce an 
imaginative counterpart to make sense of our engagement with fictions, it will be an 
involuntary counterpart. As such, in line with my fourth principle about counterparts, 
this suggests that we cannot take the fact we can associate a notion of belief-like imag-
inings with a notion of supposing as oﬀering some justification for associating a belief-
like attitude with our engagement with fiction. 
There is thus good reason to challenge the uniformity assumption and question 
whether there is a single attitude that can explain all the human activities in which 
philosophers have argued propositional imaginings play a role. We will now turn to con-
sider the potential merits of allowing for a role for beliefs with distinct contents in our 
                                               
62 Alternatively, we might think that it was a mistake to make room for a special category of 
propositional imaginings in the first place. For example, Kind (2013 p. 30) notes that 
philosophers don’t always regard the imagination as producing ‘states of fundamentally 
diﬀerent types’ when they discuss the distinction: ‘When philosophers distinguish 
propositional imaginings from objectual imaginings, they do not consider an imagining with 
propositional structure to be a substitute or pretend belief’.  
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engagement with fiction and pretence. As I said in the introduction, these views don’t 
have to be understood as arguing that propositional imaginings are not involved in these 
two activities. Instead, they can be understood as oﬀering an alternative explanation of 
what is going on internally when someone is engaging in what philosophers describe as 
propositional imagining. 
2.4 Distinct Contents 
2.4.1 Counterfactual Belief 
The first distinct content approach we will discuss is developed by Langland-Hassan 
(2012) to explain how children are able to engage in pretence. He argues that what 
philosophers have called ‘propositionally imagining’, at least in the context of pretence, 
amounts to asking oneself questions about what would happen if something was the case, 
then calling upon generalisations to answer this question. On the basis of these generali-
sations, we then form counterfactual beliefs. In light of this, he argues that no special 
attitude is needed to explain pretence: we just need to allow that children have an ability 
to call upon stored generalisations and form counterfactual beliefs. As he puts the point:  
My view, in a nutshell, is that imagining that p amounts to making judgments about 
what would likely happen if p, from retrieved beliefs in relevant generalizations; and, 
pretending that p is using such judgments to act in ways that would be appropriate 
if p. (Langland-Hassan 2012, p. 157) 
So according to Langland-Hassan, in order to pretend that they are a dog, a child will 
begin by asking (internally) ‘what would likely happen if I were a dog?’. They will then 
answer this question by calling upon generalisations related to dogs, such as that they 
bark and run around. Based on these generalisations, the child will form counterfactual 
beliefs such as ‘if I were a dog then I would run around barking’. To count as pretending 
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that p, this child has to perform certain actions on the basis of these counterfactual 
beliefs.63 
He goes on to argue that forming these sorts of counterfactual beliefs won’t involve 
entertaining the proposition that is supposed to be imagined by a pretender and so avoids 
the quarantining diﬃculties that we argued aﬄict simple belief accounts of pretence: 
[p]retending (and imagining) that the green cup is empty does not here involve en-
tertaining the proposition the green cup is empty. Nor does pretending (or imagining) 
that the other cup is full require entertaining the proposition the other cup is full. 
(Langland-Hassan 2012, p. 166) 
This is because if, for example, someone comes to believe that ‘If you had poured tea 
into both cups, they would both now be full’, this won’t involve entertaining a proposition 
such as ‘both cups are full’64, and so we can make sense of how the pretender keeps 
cognitive order since: 
[a]t no time during the pretense does the child entertain a representation with a 
content that conflicts with—or ‘‘duplicates’’—that of any of her beliefs. This means 
there is no proposition in need of quarantining. When the cups are initially ‘‘filled’’ 
during the pretense, the child does not need to infer (or believe) that the cups are 
full; rather, she needs to recognize that the experimenter is acting as if he is pouring 
tea, and to infer that if tea had been poured in the cups, they would now be full. 
(Langland-Hassan 2012, p. 166) 
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that children are capable of counterfactual reasoning 
from a young age (Gopnik 2009, pp. 23-34) so there is no prima facie reason to rule this 
                                               
63 This somewhat oversimplifies what Langland-Hassan takes pretending to be. In a later 
paper (Langland-Hassan 2014) he oﬀers a sophisticated attempt to define pretending, 
concluding ‘To pretend that p is to act with the intention of making some w function, at 
that moment, in z-like ways, in the furtherance of a Pretense Episode.’  
64 One might object here that forming this sort of counterfactual still involves entertaining 
the proposition ‘both cups are full’ in some sense. We can mark a distinction here between 
a thin notion of entertaining, where believing that not p also involves entertaining p, and 
a thick notion of entertaining where p is represented simpliciter. Langland-Hassan’s view 
is compatible with the former view, since entertaining p in this thin sense won’t lead to us 
being motivated to behave in p like ways whenever we believe that not p. 
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proposal out. Indeed, as Langland-Hassan points out, Nichols and Stich’s also argue that 
counterfactual beliefs are involved in pretence.65 He thus argues that his theory makes 
do with only a subset of the mechanisms they use to explain pretence and that their 
imagination box is thus a redundant posit (Langland-Hassan, pp. 157-158).  
One might wonder whether we should classify this theory as a distinct content view 
of what it is to propositionally imagine. On the one hand, this account relies on beliefs 
with conditional ‘if … then’ contents, and there is a sense in which this is a sort of distinct 
content. However, some of our everyday beliefs will also have ‘if … then’ counterfactual 
contents, since at least some of our everyday beliefs will be conditional. To justify clas-
sifying Langland-Hassan as oﬀering a distinct content theory, one could argue he’d also 
need to introduce some sort of content that only relates to pretence. For our purposes, I 
think it is more helpful to classify Langland-Hassan as a distinct content view because 
these counterfactual contents, though not specific to pretence, are diﬀerent from the 
simple sorts of beliefs we considered previously. Putting the view under this heading 
highlights that Langland-Hassan doesn’t think that the beliefs involved in pretence have 
simple contents like ‘I am a dog’. 
Regardless of whether one agrees with me on this classificatory issue, his view remains 
opposed to the distinct attitude approach, and is explicitly oﬀered as an alternative to 
Nichols and Stich’s theory of imagination. My main worry with this approach is that it 
struggles to explain pretence recognition (how children recognise others are pretending) 
and pretence motivation (how children figure out what pretend actions to perform). To 
explain these two issues, I will argue in chapter 4 that we instead need to embrace an 
alternative distinct content view put forward by Leslie. That said, I will make use of 
some insights from Langland-Hassan’s view to defend some of the worries critics of Leslie 
have raised about the possibility of believing at will. 
                                               
65 We will set out why in chapters 3. Roughly, because Nichols and Stich deny imaginings 
can directly motivate us, they think pretence also involves forming counterfactual beliefs 
like ‘if I were a dog, then I would bark’, which motivate pretend actions when combined 
with desires to act as-if this was true. 
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Before we move on to introduce Leslie’s view of pretence, it is worth briefly noting 
that this counterfactual theory will struggle to work as a theory of how we engage with 
fiction. Although Langland-Hassan doesn’t make the case for having oﬀered an account 
of how we engage with fiction, he does suggest his view might be able to serve as a general 
account of what is involved in propositionally imagining something (Langland-Hassan 
2016, footnote 9). Ferreira (2014, pp. 73-77) helps to bring out the diﬃculties of devel-
oping an account of how we engage with fiction that relies on counterfactuals by noting 
that the contents of fiction are often rich and can at least in theory be sparse. For an 
example of a rich fiction, consider this quote from The Remains of The Day: 
Lord Darlington wasn’t a bad man. He wasn’t a bad man at all. And at least he had 
the privilege of being able to say at the end of his life that he made his own mistakes. 
His lordship was a courageous man. He chose a certain path in life, it proved to be a 
misguided one, but there, he chose it, he can say that at least. As for myself, I cannot 
even claim that. You see, I trusted. I trusted in his lordship’s wisdom. All those years 
I served him, I trusted I was doing something worthwhile. I can’t even say I made 
my own mistakes. Really – one has to ask oneself – what dignity is there in that? 
It would be odd to suggest that we need to engage in some sort of counterfactual 
reasoning in order to engage with this section of text: all we need to do is read these 
English sentences and understand them. That being said, there are at least three diﬀerent 
ways we can seek to apply Langland-Hassan’s view to our engagement with fiction: 
1. We form counterfactuals which take the actual sentences of a novel (or lines of 
dialogue in a movie etc.) as antecedents. (E.g. when we read this passage we begin 
by forming a belief like ‘if Lord Darlington wasn’t a bad man then q’).  
2. We form counterfactuals about the fictional truths we are prescribed to imagine 
by fictions (e.g. when reading Pride and Prejudice we form beliefs like ‘if there 
were a woman named Elizabeth Bennet then q’) 
3. We form a single counterfactual that ranges over the entire reading of a text (e.g. 
when reading The Remains of the Day we form a belief like ‘If the utterances that 
make up this story reflected a genuine historical account then q’) 
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(1) and (2) look like they are badly placed to explain how we engage with fictions. In 
this case of (1), there is no reason to engage in counterfactual reasoning to understand 
sentences in a work of fiction: we simply need to read and understand the sentences in 
question. (2) looks like something we can do when engaging with a work of fiction. For 
example, we might do this to try and figure out what will happen next in a story, or why 
a certain event happened. Once again, however, this doesn’t seem to be a necessary 
element of engaging with fiction. (3) is somewhat more promising. The chief diﬃculty 
with this approach is that it would be hard to specify a single counterfactual that can 
explain how we engage with fictions. For example, the one I suggested in my phrasing of 
(3) presumes the fiction in question has a relatively truthful narrator. We would need 
further counterfactuals to account for unreliable or infelicitous narrators, such as Hum-
bert Humbert in Lolita. 
We might propose this means we need a disjunctive account of the relevant counter-
factuals, such as we either believe ‘if the utterances that make up this story reflected a 
genuine historical account then q’ or ‘if I have reason to doubt that the utterances that 
make us this story reflect a genuine historical account then q’. This will still be counter-
intuitive and we can bring out why by reflecting on what it is like to read Lolita. It 
gradually becomes clear as one reads Lolita that the narrator is unreliable: this is not 
explicitly announced at the start of the novel. This seems to imply that if this disjunctive 
counterfactual view is right, then the relevant counterfactual governing our engagement 
with a fiction will change as we come to realise that, for example Humbert is not to be 
trusted. This is a strange way to conceptualise what happens when one reads a novel 
with an unreliable narrator. It looks like we start to question the felicity of their utter-
ances as we are reading, rather than making some sort of global change to a counterfac-
tual we entertained to begin engaging with the work. Once again, it is more plausible to 
say we simply understand the sentences we are presented with, without them being sub-
ject to the scope of some sort of counterfactual. 
As for sparse fictions, Ferreira rightly notes one can write a fiction which consists of 
a single sentence, such as 'There once was a man who went to the moon', and it doesn’t 
look like engaging with a fiction made up of a single utterance like this one involves 
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reasoning counterfactually. One might ask oneself questions like ‘what would happen if 
there was a man who went to moon?’ but this isn’t necessary for engaging with this 
fiction. This would only be relevant if we were trying to reflect on possible entailments 
this utterance has, e.g. if we want to speculate how the man got to the moon, or why he 
went there: Is he an astronaut? Did he ride in a shuttle? Asking these sorts of questions 
and calling upon generalisations doesn't seem to be necessary for engaging with a sparse 
narrative fiction like this one, instead, we merely need to understand this single English 
sentence. 
This also further demonstrates why it will be diﬃcult to make a version of (3) work. 
When given a single proposition like this, what would the antecedent be for the counter-
factual governing our engagement with the fiction? If it is merely something like ‘if this 
utterance is true then q’, then this adds nothing to our understanding of the fiction. Why 
this is a strange proposal can be illustrated by comparing reading a fiction made up of a 
single sentence to reading the same sentence having found it written down somewhere 
(perhaps written on a bench). In the latter case, we will presumably just read the sentence 
and come to understand it. In the fiction case we might, perhaps, try to discern more 
meaning from the utterance, but this could also happen in an everyday context since we 
might wonder why someone has written down this esoteric remark. What is not obvious 
here is that there is any diﬀerence between how we read and understand a sentence like 
‘There once was a man who went to the moon’ when it is presented as a fiction as 
compared to reading it in any other sort of context.  
That being said, this does not rule out the possibility of accepting Langland-Hassan’s 
theory of pretence, since I’m willing to accept distinct explanations of how we engage in 
pretence and how we engage with fiction. The point here is only that his theory cannot 
serve as a general theory of every instance of what philosophers call propositional 
imaginings.  
 
2.4.2 Leslie & Meta-representations 
According to Leslie, the attitude that allows children to engage in pretence is belief 
with a proprietary structure. Firstly, these beliefs have contents which are what he calls 
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‘decoupled’: they are removed from ordinary belief processing.66 Secondly, they involve 
the mental state concept PRETEND67, a concept possessed by even very young children 
because it is supposed to be ‘innate’ in some sense (Leslie 1987, pp. 419-421. This is 
because Leslie views pretence as an early instance of theory of mind, which he also takes 
to be innate (Leslie 1987, pp. 421-423). As such, he is a theory-theorist about the nature 
of mindreading, and thinks we have an innate theory of mind module.  
If Leslie is right, this means that the representations that allow us to engage in 
pretence have a complex structure of the form: Agent – Informational Relation – ‘p’. The 
informational relation involved is supposed to be captured by the concept PRETEND 
and the quotation marks around ‘p’ represent the fact this proposition is decoupled. So, 
for example, a child pretending to be a dog will have a belief that looks something like ‘I 
– PRETEND – “that I am a dog”’, where these quotation marks represent the idea this 
proposition lacks its ordinary causal consequences, thus making sense of the issue we 
noted in section 2.2 about how children are able to keep track of the distinction between 
pretence and reality.  
However, we might think that we should interpret Leslie as oﬀering a distinct content 
and distinct attitude view, according to which engaging in pretence involves a) pretend-
ing that p (qua imagining that p) and b) believing you are pretending that p. I will argue 
in chapter 4 that we do not have to adopt this sort of view to explain pretence by making 
use of some of the considerations Langland-Hassan uses to justify his counterfactual the-
ory of imagination. 
Leslie originally called these sorts of beliefs ‘meta-representations’, but now some-
times calls then ‘M-Representations’ to avoid the connotation that children have the 
                                               
66 Nichols and Stich (2000, p. 141) argue that this aspect of Leslie’s theory merely makes it 
a ‘notational variant’ of their own.  
67 Capitals are the standard way of expressing that children possess this concept, and I will 
respect this way of signifying this. This is a technical notion and is not supposed to perfectly 
capture our everyday notion of pretending. 
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concept of a representation (Leslie and Thaiss 1992).68 Weisberg (2015, p. 5) helpfully 
explains that Leslie takes engaging in and recognising pretence to involve meta-represen-
tation because ‘it involves representing someone’s representation of a state of aﬀairs’. I 
will reflect on some worries about the sophistication this attributes to young children in 
chapter 4. 
 The key explanatory virtue of Leslie’s view is that it helps to explain how children 
are able to recognise pretence behaviours performed by others around the same time they 
begin to engage in such behaviours themselves, which is something that both the distinct 
attitude view and Langland-Hassan’s counterfactual distinct content view have diﬃculty 
explaining, an issue which will be the focus of chapter 4. Both these views are ‘behav-
ioural’ views of pretence and this means they argue that recognition of pretence in others 
will involve recognising others are engaging in certain sorts of behaviour. Leslie argues 
this is insuﬃcient for explaining how children are able to recognise pretence. I will argue 
this also shows belief-like imaginings are insuﬃcient for explaining how children are able 
to engage in pretence behaviour, and that once we suitably clarify Leslie’s view, they are 
also rendered unnecessary.  
 
2.4.3 Beliefs about Fiction 
The final distinct content view we will discuss argues that the attitude we take towards 
works of fiction is belief subject to a fictional operator, which we can also call (somewhat 
ambiguously) beliefs about fiction (where this is elliptical for something like beliefs about 
what is fictional, or beliefs about what is true in the fiction, and so on). On this approach, 
in some cases propositionally imagining p amounts to believing that p is fictional, pretend, 
make-believe or imaginary. To use Walton’s notation, what philosophers call proposi-
tional imaginings are sometimes mental states that take on something like the form ‘I 
believe that *p*’ rather than *I believe that p*. This view receives some support from 
                                               
68 This misunderstanding motivated some of the initial critics of his theory, such as Perner 
(1991) who emphasised that children lack a concept of REPRESENTRATION and so 
cannot be said to form meta-representations. 
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philosophers of language, such as Kripke (2011, 2013) and Thomasson (1999), who argue 
that much of our talk about fiction is subject to this sort of implicit sentential operator. 
To express that someone has this sort of belief, I will sometimes adopt the form used by 
Tullmann (2016) and Tullmann and Buckwalter (forthcoming) and maintain the relevant 
beliefs here are of the form ‘I believe p [in the fiction]’, since this form helps to bring out 
that this operator may not always be salient in our conscious experience. 
Matravers tentatively points out that defenders of the distinct attitude approach 
often don’t give us enough information as to why we should reject this sort of content-
based account. In relation to the attitude we take towards events that occur in the film 
version of Sense and Sensibility, he notes: 
“[t]he claim is that the audience imagine (or “make believe”) that Marianne is heart-
broken over Willoughby. However, with respect to this argument, there is no need to 
propose such a mental state: all that is needed is that the audience believe it is true 
in Sense and Sensibility that Marianne is heartbroken over Willoughby. (Matravers 
2010, p. 191) 
Neill also speaks positively of this view in relation to Emma: 
There is certainly nothing "putative," "insincere," "hypothetical" or "provisional" 
about my belief that Emma Woodhouse was handsome, clever and rich. I do, actually, 
believe that (it is fictionally the case that) Emma had all of these attributes. There 
is nothing fictional about beliefs of this sort; it is their content that concerns the 
fictional. Beliefs about what is fictionally the case, that is, are just that: beliefs. (em-
phasis mine) (Neill 1993, p. 3) 
This sort of change of content view is sometimes criticised for failing to explain why we 
can become immersed in works of fiction, and in light of this why we exhibit aﬀective 
responses to fictions. I will respond to this worry at the conclusion of chapter 5. 
 
Before moving on to consider the merits of these sorts of distinct content accounts of 
pretence and fiction as compared to distinct attitude approaches, it will be helpful to 
consider whether we have some prima facie reasons for resisting a distinct content view 
of pretence and fiction that can be found by reflecting on how we can defend the intro-
duction of a notion of belief-like imaginings associated with supposing. For the sake of 
argument, I will assume this same counterpart can play a role in all three activities, and 
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I will set aside my worries about uniformity and whether fiction involves an involuntary 
counterpart. We thus need to consider whether there are introspective, functional and 
neurological arguments for distinguishing belief-like imaginings and belief, and if these 
arguments do enough to associate a belief-like attitude with either fiction or pretence. 
These arguments I think can do enough to introduce some sort of counterpart to belief, 
but they do not give us reason to associate it with fiction or pretence. As such, we will 
need to consider more specifically what a theory of these activities has to account for to 
see whether we need to introduce belief-like imaginings. 
2.5 Distinct Attitudes or Distinct Contents? 
From the perspective of introspection, it can be pointed out that we are usually able to 
tell the diﬀerence between things we believe and things we might take ourselves to im-
agine propositionally in the sense that I am associating with a notion like supposing or 
entertaining.69 When I decide to take a break from writing and imagine that I am on a 
beach I can recognise that I am only imagining this. However, philosophers rarely place 
much emphasis on this sort of argument when it comes to justifying the introduction of 
belief-like imaginings into an account of fiction and pretence. It is true that in both 
activities we recognise that we don’t straightforwardly believe things. Having watched 
The Sopranos, I don’t believe that I could actually run into Tony’s crew if I were to visit 
New Jersey. However, this doesn’t do enough to show that I have belief-like imaginings 
about Tony and his gang as opposed to beliefs about the fiction. Introspection tells me 
that I don’t straightforwardly believe Tony and his crew exist, but not that I have belief-
like imaginings. A similar point is also relevant to pretence. If I pretend that I am a dog, 
                                               
69 Possible exceptions here include delusions and self-deception since it is debatable whether 
the states involved in these cases are beliefs or imaginings. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, 
Ch. 8) argues delusion involves mistaking an imagining for a belief. Egan (2008) suggests 
delusions involve somewhat belief-like and somewhat imagination-like states called ‘bi-
imaginings’. 
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introspection tells me that I do not straightforwardly believe that I am a dog; it does not 
tell me that I am imagining this proposition in a belief-like manner. 
When we made use of this sort of self-recognition argument to defend the idea that 
the formation of mental imagery is a counterpart to seeing, it was noted that mental 
images have a somewhat diﬀerent phenomenology to actual seeing. There is ordinarily 
an introspective diﬀerence between forming an image of an apple and actually seeing one. 
With belief and imagination, the case is less clear since it is not self-evident what the 
phenomenology of belief is, nor what the phenomenology of propositional imagining is 
supposed to be. For example, what is the phenomenology of believing that water is H2O? 
It’s not obvious this belief is associated with any distinct phenomenology, nor is it obvious 
it has a diﬀerent phenomenology as compared to imagining that water is H2O.70  
Bearing in mind these sorts of limits on introspection, philosophers tend to note 
functional similarities and diﬀerences between belief and belief-like imaginings in order 
to further justify their introduction and to associate them with fiction and pretence. A 
first question to ask is what is (or are) the functional role (or roles) of belief.71 Schwitz-
gebel (2016) helpfully summarises some common proposals for the functional roles of 
belief: 
1. Reflection on propositions (e.g., q and if q then p) from which p straightforwardly 
follows, if one believes those propositions, typically causes the belief that p. 
2. Directing perceptual attention to the perceptible properties of things, events, or 
states of aﬀairs, in conditions favorable to accurate perception, typically causes 
the belief that those things, events, or states of aﬀairs have those properties (e.g., 
                                               
70 Van Leeuwen (2013, p. 792-793) notes this sort of worry and points out that in general 
phenomenological reflection is not a good way of distinguishing belief and what he calls 
‘attitude imagination’.  
71 There are other approaches we could take here. We could, for example, say that believing 
involves having certain dispositions or to represent things in a certain way. Since the 
philosophers who introduce belief-like imaginings into accounts of fiction and pretence often 
defend functional views of belief, we will not consider alternative accounts of belief.  
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visually attending to a red shirt in good viewing conditions will typically cause 
the belief that the shirt is red). 
3. Believing that performing action A would lead to event or state of aﬀairs E, 
conjoined with a desire for E and no overriding contrary desire, will typically 
cause an intention to do A. 
4. Believing that p, in conditions favoring sincere expression of that belief, will typ-
ically lead to an assertion of p. 
It’s worth briefly reflecting on each of these proposed functional roles to see if they give 
us reason to associate a notion of belief-like imaginings with fiction and pretence. The 
first shows a functional similarity between belief and belief-like imaginings. If I imagine 
that I am on a beach in Orlando, and I believe that Orlando is in Florida, then I’ll 
imagine that I am in Florida (or at least, I will be disposed to do this upon reflection). 
Whatever attitude we take towards fiction and pretence also behaves in this way. If I 
take Sherlock Holmes to be a man in the fiction, and believe all men are mortal, I will 
take him to be mortal in the fiction (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, p. 14). 
The second proposed functional role reveals what looks like a diﬀerence between the 
two attitudes. Belief-like imaginings are not sensitive to perception in the same way 
beliefs are. If I decide to imagine that I am on a beach, this may well be on a mere whim, 
rather than on any sort of perceptual observation of the external world. There is also no 
obvious thing I could observe to make me cease to imagine this. However, this distinction 
becomes less apparent when we think about the sort of attitude involved in pretence and 
fiction. In the game of bears described by Walton that we discussed in section 1.4, chil-
dren do indeed come to think that there are three bears nearby on the basis of what they 
perceive: the location of stumps. This is also true when thinking about fiction. What we 
take to be true of fictions depends on what we see on the page or see on screen. The 
reason I think that it is fictionally true that Harry Potter is a wizard is not because of a 
mere whim but because of the sentences I read in the Harry Potter novels. 
(4) is also somewhat ambiguous when thinking about pretence and fiction. The claim 
here is along the lines of you will sometimes assert p if you believe p. We saw in section 
1.4 that people do assert things like ‘there are pies in front of me’ when playing games 
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of pretence or ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ when engaging with a fiction. Again, it’s not 
obvious this gives us a reason to introduce belief-like imaginings into our account of 
fiction and pretence.  
So far, all these mooted functional diﬀerences and similarities suggest that there may 
well be some sort of counterpart to belief, perhaps as I argued earlier one associated with 
notions like supposing or entertaining, but they do not show that this attitude must be 
associated with fiction and pretence. Beliefs with distinct contents can equally explain 
these functional diﬀerences. In the case of (1), my inferences when engaging with fiction 
might be made up of a collection of ordinary beliefs (such as that men are mortal) and 
beliefs about the fiction (such as that Holmes is a man). In the case of (2), we can argue 
that sometimes what we perceive should lead to us forming beliefs about what is true in 
a fiction or in an episode of pretence. Finally, (3) can be made sense of by suggesting 
that when people talk about fictions and pretence they are asserting what they believe 
to be fictional or pretend. 
(3), the point about belief being connected to motivation, tends to have the most 
weight placed on it in contemporary discussions of belief and imagination when it comes 
to justifying why a counterpart to belief must be involved in our engagement with fiction 
and pretence. Velleman sums up a version of this approach to understanding belief as:  
[a]ll that’s necessary for an attitude to qualify as a belief is that it disposes the subject 
to behave in certain ways that would promote the satisfaction of his desires if its 
content were true. (Velleman 2000, p. 255) 
This reflects a diﬀerence between belief-like imaginings and belief. Consider, for example, 
my imagining that I am on a beach in Orlando. On its own, merely imagining this 
proposition won’t motivate me to do anything. It may well do if it stimulates further 
beliefs and desires – I might realise I desire to be on a beach in Orlando and thus come 
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to believe I should book a flight, for example – but this imagining cannot motivate me 
qua imagining.72 
Unlike the first few functional roles we’ve discussed, this also illustrates a diﬀerence 
in the case of fiction. Sitting in a theatre watching Romeo and Juliet, you realise Juliet 
will shortly cast a dagger through her heart, and yet you do nothing to try to save her. 
You merely sit impassively in your chair, perhaps shedding tears at her plight. It could 
be argued that if the distinct content approach were right, we would have beliefs about 
Juliet in this sort of scenario and we ought to be motivated to perform actions on the 
basis of these beliefs. Since we are not motivated to try and interfere with fictions, beliefs, 
even those with distinct contents, cannot be involved in our engagement with fiction.73 
However, it’s apparent from how Schwitzgebel phrases (3) that the relation between 
belief and motivation is complex. In order for a belief to motivate us, we must also believe 
a given action we can perform will help to bring about a state of aﬀairs that we desire to 
bring about. The importance of this condition can be seen by supposing that you believe 
that a monster is attacking [in the fiction]. In this sort of case, you would also believe 
you were merely engaging with a work of fiction. As a result of this further belief, you 
will lack what we can call ‘conditional’ beliefs that would be necessary to motivate actions 
(Matravers 1991, pp. 34-35). In the Juliet case, we’d have to believe there were some 
actions we could perform to interact with the fiction and save her from her fate. Walton 
(1990, pp. 192-195) brings out that usually this sort of direct participation with fictions 
is ruled out. If we run on stage and attempt to snatch the knife out of Juliet’s hand, this 
will not constitute saving Juliet in the fiction as opposed to rather annoyingly 
interrupting the performance by taking the knife out the actress’s hands. 
                                               
72 Everett (2013, p. 11) also highlights this disconnection in relation to imagining that a book 
you need is in the library. Merely imagining this will not make you go to try and check it 
out. 
73 The case for pretence will be more complex, since children do indeed perform pretend 
actions. We will see in chapter 3 that Nichols and Stich explain this by suggesting beliefs 
and desires are what actually generate pretence behaviour when combined with belief-like 
imaginings.  
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Interactive fictions like videogames oﬀer an interesting contrast to illustrate this 
point. Take the recent role-playing game Persona IV. Like many videogames, the player 
is able to direct their on-screen avatar in various ways. For example, you can decide 
which non-player characters to spend your free time with, and eventually, which one to 
form a romantic relationship with.74 Now, when playing this sort of game, you are to 
some extent able to change the course of the fiction. This means that you possess the 
relevant sorts of conditional beliefs about being able to aﬀect events and happenings in 
the fictional world. If you want your avatar to date a certain character you can make 
this happen in the fiction.  
If this account of why we don’t interfere with ordinary non-interactive fictions is 
right, we can resist the introduction of belief-like imaginings into an account of how we 
engage with works of fiction. Our lack of motivation stems from a recognition of the 
limits of how we can interact with fictions, rather than the distinct functional role of 
some sort of belief-like attitude. In turn, this helps to explain why we can be motivated 
to perform pretend behaviours when engaging in pretence: this is also a case where we 
recognise that we are able to interact with a fictional world. As such, issues related to 
motivation do not force us to link belief-like imaginings and fiction.75 
                                               
74 Alternatively, one can choose to not form a relationship with any character, or to form one 
with multiple characters. This latter course of action comes to haunt you on (in-game) 
Valentine’s Day when your multiple lovers turn up at school with gifts for you, each 
delivering a line of dialogue about how you’ve broken their heart. These sorts of examples 
raise an interesting question about whether interactive fictions allow for some aﬀective 
responses we cannot exhibit towards non-interactive fictions, such as guilt.  
75 One could also question whether we really do lack motivation when engaging with non-
interactive fictions. Buckwalter and Tullmann (forthcoming, p. 12) point out that one 
might strive to only buy certain kinds of diamonds after witnessing the cruelty of the trade 
in Blood Diamond. Fiction is of course powerful in these sorts of ways, hence the 
controversy over certain political and social works. One might object that this is not 
suﬃciently being motivated by the fiction qua fiction. To this Buckwalter and Tullmann 
(forthcoming, p. 13-15) speculatively point out that we do still exhibit aﬀective responses, 
which is some sort of motivational response, albeit one that is somewhat attenuated. 
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In light of all this, solely focusing on the functional diﬀerences between belief and 
belief-like imaginings might help to further justify the introduction of some sort of notion 
of belief-like imaginings associated with supposing and entertaining, but does not give us 
reason to put this attitude to work in an account of fiction or pretence. This leaves us 
with neurological similarities. Schroeder and Matheson (2006) purport to oﬀer some neu-
rological evidence for both the existence of this distinct cognitive attitude and for asso-
ciating it with how we engage with fictions. They do this by tracing causal pathways 
from the propositional imagination to our aﬀective systems: 
[t]he view has emerged that these acts [imaginative acts, such as imagining the con-
tents of a fiction] have their power to move us through their activation of special 
cognitive attitudes, akin to beliefs in structure and in some of their eﬀects, but dis-
tinguished from beliefs in others. This view, positing what we will call a ‘distinct 
cognitive attitude’… is ultimately an empirical thesis in certain important respects, 
… We aim to add the blessings of neuroscience to the view, and thereby to put a final 
seal of approval on it. (Schroeder and Matheson 2006, p. 19) 
They begin by discussing how sensory impressions and quasi sensory impressions are 
generated by our sense organs. The contemporary neuroscientific view of this issue is that 
our sense organs produce neural signals that generate patterns in the brain called uni-
modal sensory representations. The ‘uni’ here captures the fact that these are represen-
tations from a single sense modality. Unimodal representations from various modalities 
combine to form multimodal sensory representations, which are representations of things 
in our environment we can experience via multiple senses. This applies to everything 
from the iMac I’m typing on, to the trains opposite my flat, to any other ordinary object 
in my environment. 
Schroeder and Matheson go on to point out that multimodal representations also 
play a role in generating aﬀective responses. Studies suggest that they are able to interact 
with various areas of the brain associated with aﬀective responses, such as the orbito-
frontal cortex, the aﬀective division of the striatum and the amygdala (LeDoux 1996).  
Their next move is to point out that this same pattern of interaction occurs regardless 
of whether a multimodal representation is of something real, or something imaginary/fic-
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tional. In particular, they point out that the same interactions between multimodal rep-
resentations and areas associated with aﬀective responses occur when engaging with 
works of fiction and when we engage with actual objects in our environment. This also 
holds true for imaginary representations that we generate at will. 
They argue that this sort of data demonstrates that belief-like imaginings and beliefs 
interact with our aﬀective system in much the same way (Schroeder and Matheson 2006, 
p. 29-30. However, it is equally possible that what these studies show is that our aﬀective 
systems respond to beliefs with fictional or imaginary contents in much the same way as 
beliefs about the real world.  
I presume they take this interpretation to be ruled out because they accept the 
arguments for belief and belief-like imaginings having distinct functional roles. For ex-
ample, they note (Schroeder and Matheson 2006, p. 29) that imaginings don’t appear to 
motivate us. As such, they may well take this as suﬃcient for justifying that there is a 
counterpart to belief involved in our engagement with fiction. However, as we noted 
above, reflecting on interactive fictions gives us reason to question this strict demarcation 
between beliefs and the cognitive attitude involved in our engagement with fiction. As 
such, since we have denied that functional arguments can demonstrate that a distinct 
attitude is associated with fiction, this neuroscientific data doesn’t have to compel us 
into accepting a distinct attitude view of our engagement with fiction.76  
Bearing all this in mind, purely considering introspective, functional and neurological 
issues does not do enough to show we should associate belief-like imaginings with either 
fiction or pretence. As such, we will need to look at these activities in more detail to see 
whether the best explanation of them is one that involves belief-like imaginings. 
 
                                               
76 Buckwalter and Tullmann (forthcoming, pp. 16-20) independently oﬀer a similar response 
to this neurological argument. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we saw in section 2.1 that there are good reasons to accept that there is 
some sort of voluntary counterpart to belief, which we can associate with notions like 
‘supposing’. However, in sections 2.3 and 2.5, I argued that there is no prima facie reason 
to introduce this counterpart into an account of how we engage in pretence and with 
fiction, or to reject a distinct content view of how we engage in these activities. We noted 
that this is particularly true in the case of engaging with fiction, where it looks like the 
relevant sort of counterpart to belief philosophers have in mind may well be an involun-
tary one.  
As such, the most productive approach to seeing if we should associate a belief-like 
counterpart with pretence and fiction will be to investigate what an account of how we 
engage in these activities needs to explain, and whether these desiderata can be met by 
beliefs with distinct contents, or if we need to allow a role for belief-like imaginings. We 
will begin by considering pretence. I will argue that ultimately pretence is better ex-
plained by a distinct content approach and that the distinct attitude view cannot explain 
all the issues related to how we engage in pretence. We will thus see that a distinct 
attitude is both insuﬃcient and also unnecessary for explaining how we engage in pre-
tence. 
 
93 
Chapter 3: The Imagination Box & Pretence 
Introduction 
We saw in the previous chapter that we cannot rely on generic arguments for taking 
belief to have a counterpart in order to justify associating belief-like imaginings with 
pretence. In this chapter, we will do two things. Firstly, we will introduce the explanatory 
demands that any satisfactory theory of pretence needs to account for. Secondly, we will 
criticise Nichols and Stich’s arguments for the claim that introducing a counterpart to 
belief is the best way of meeting these explanatory demands. Our focus will be on Nichols 
and Stich because they oﬀer the best-developed account of why we should associate a 
belief-like attitude with pretence.  
I will focus on some diﬃculties that arise from their claim that belief-like imaginings 
and beliefs share a single code, a concern also discussed by Stock (2011a). My argument 
will diﬀer from hers by emphasising the importance of clustering when it comes to ex-
plaining how we engage in pretence and with fiction. I will argue that clustering might 
be better explained by introducing a distinct content view, which will reveal a way in 
which we can challenge the non-doxastic assumption in the context of pretence by ques-
tioning the suﬃciency of introducing belief-like imaginings. 
The single code hypothesis tells us that beliefs and belief-like imaginings have the 
same logical and representational structure, and are therefore processed by our cognitive 
mechanisms in a similar way.77 If this is right, this means that a belief like the cat is on 
the mat has the same logical and representational structure as the belief-like imagining 
that the cat is on the mat. This doesn’t necessarily entail that these representations are 
                                               
77 An interesting question here is whether the notion of code is meant to have some sort of 
neurological implications. Nichols and Stich note that we don’t know exactly what the code 
of belief is, or whether there is only one code underpinning belief or multiple codes, but it 
looks like we have to think there is some sort of neurological link here, otherwise it is hard 
to get a grip on the notion of a ‘code’. 
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linguistic or quasi linguistic in form; the suggestion is merely that some sort of internal 
code determines how these representations are processed by our cognitive systems (Nich-
ols and Stich 2003, p. 15).78  
If this proposal is right, functional similarities between belief and belief-like imagin-
ings are explained by maintaining that code determines processing. This raises a question 
about the role of their ‘boxes’ when it comes to cognitive processing. Does the fact that 
a given representation is found in our belief box, rather than our imagination box, have 
implications for how it is processed? Or, alternatively, do only diﬀerences in code aﬀect 
processing? It might be thought obvious that the contents of diﬀerent boxes are processed 
in diﬀerent ways, at least on some occasions. This, after all, is part of what it means to 
say that two states have diﬀerent functional roles. However, whether Nichols and Stich 
can say this about belief-like imaginings and beliefs is unclear. They appear to suggest 
that the reason that there are similarities between belief and imagination is because they 
are in the same code. It is harder to see what explains the diﬀerences between belief-like 
imaginings and beliefs if we accept their theory. I will consider the diﬃculties their view 
faces when it comes to accounting for aﬀective responses and clustering.  
We could reject this specific commitment to a single code and endorse something like 
a simulationist view of belief-like imaginings. However, the appeal of the single code 
based approach is that it is supposed to give a principled way of explaining various 
features of pretence. If we jettison this hypothesis, we lose some of the reasons for pre-
ferring a distinct attitude theory of pretence to a distinct content theory of pretence.  
To develop this argument, in section 3.1 we will begin by setting out why childhood 
pretence has been regarded as puzzling by philosophers and psychologists. I will also 
introduce some specific examples of pretence that are oﬀered by Nichols and Stich, since 
these will be helpful for framing what a theory of pretence needs to explain. 
                                               
78 As such, this also shouldn’t be read as necessarily introducing a Fodorian language of 
thought. For example, it might be the relevant code is ‘map-like’ (Camp 2007). 
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In section 3.2, I will oﬀer my own interpretation of what a theory of pretence needs 
to explain, which will somewhat simplify Nichols and Stich’s account by placing the 
relevant features under three headings: set-up, elaboration and output. 
In section 3.3, I will explain why Nichols and Stich think that these three features 
are best explained by introducing a distinct belief-like attitude. I will also note that their 
explanations of the motivation of appropriate pretence behaviours and the recognition of 
pretence in others are somewhat unconvincing, and we will return to consider these issues 
in more detail in chapter 4. 
In section 3.4, I will question how we are able to explain the diﬀerences between 
Nichols and Stich’s distinct belief-like attitude and our genuine beliefs, bearing in mind 
that they think they both share a ‘single code’. I will highlight two particular issues. 
Firstly, we will discuss the fact that our aﬀective responses to what we appear to imagine 
in a belief-like way often vary from our ordinary responses. Secondly, we will discuss 
clustering, the way that our representations related to fiction and pretence form clusters 
and thus are not viewed as being fictionally true simpliciter.  
In section 3.5, I will consider how Nichols and Stich might make sense of these two 
asymmetries by considering the functional role response and the desire response. We will 
see that neither of these responses is entirely convincing. I will then suggest in section 
3.6 that the best way to make sense of aﬀective asymmetries is by allowing for clustering 
to play a role in shaping our responses to fiction and pretence. However, I will also argue 
that it is hard to accommodate clustering if we accept the single code hypothesis. This 
will reveal an initial way in which a distinct belief-like attitude might be insuﬃcient for 
explaining our engagement with fiction and in pretence and so will give us an initial 
reason to challenge the non-doxastic assumption. 
Finally, in section 3.7 I will reflect on whether we can defend Nichols and Stich’s 
theory against my worries by considering whether I have misunderstood the aims of this 
sort of ‘boxological’ theory. I will argue that these diﬃculties with explaining diﬀerences 
between beliefs and belief-like imaginings are indeed enough to make us reject Nichols 
and Stich’s idea of a ‘single code’. However, I will then suggest that a distinct attitude 
view which dispenses with this commitment will be less explanatorily satisfying. This will 
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set the stage for considering a distinct content approach to making sense of our engage-
ment in pretence in chapter 4. 
3.1 Childhood Pretence 
Trying to explain how young children are able to engage in pretence oﬀers a fascinating 
challenge for philosophers and psychologists. Pretence behaviour is so ubiquitous in chil-
dren that it is easy to overlook how remarkable it is. From around the age of 15 months 
(Bosco et al. 2006), children are able to engage in behaviour where they pretend the 
world is diﬀerent to how it really is, even though they still lack a sophisticated under-
standing of the world around them. My girlfriend’s young niece developed a habit of 
climbing on top of various objects and making a ‘woof’ noise just before turning a year 
and a half old, whilst still only being capable of saying a few basic words. 
Since the late 1980s, there has been a rapid advance of empirical and philosophical 
work that seeks to explain why children are able to engage in pretence from such a young 
age. To list a few examples, Baron-Cohen (1985) has done work on the relation between 
childhood pretence and autism; Leslie’s (1987, 1994) has investigated the link between 
pretence and theory of mind; Currie (1995) and Gordon and Baker (1994) have attempted 
to link simulation theory and pretence; and Lillard (1993) and Harris and Kavanaugh 
(1993) have investigated children’s understanding of the nature of pretending. Much of 
the psychological work on pretence is summarised by Harris (2000), and more recently 
in review articles by Weisberg (2015) and Gendler and Liao (2011), with the latter bring-
ing together both recent philosophical and recent psychological work on pretence in order 
to suggest further avenues for investigation.  
Before we begin our discussion of what mental attitudes might help to explain how 
children are able to engage in pretence, it will be helpful to introduce some examples of 
pretence. Nichols and Stich helpfully set out three specific examples of pretence from the 
psychological literature and also describe a series of their own experiments in which they 
requested adults engage in pretence. From these cases, they then bring out what any 
theory of pretence must explain.  
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I will set out all of their examples of childhood pretence, though for the sake of 
brevity I will only describe two of their experiments involving adult pretenders, since 
these two cover what Nichols and Stich aim to bring out about the nature of pretence 
from their adult examples. 
1. The Banana Phone 
In this first example, introduced by Leslie (1987, p. 416), a child engages in a game where 
they pick up a banana and act as if it were a phone, e.g. by holding it up to their ear 
and speaking into it. Nichols and Stich note two ways a child might engage in this sort 
of pretend scenario. Firstly, a child might spontaneously pick up a banana and start 
talking into it, perhaps saying ‘Hello grandma! Are you coming over later?’. This is an 
example of what we can call solitary pretence. Secondly, the child’s mother might pick 
up a banana and say ‘Hello? Yes, he’s right here, just a minute!’ and then pass the 
banana to her child saying, ‘It’s for you!’. Frequently, children will go along with this 
sort of pretence by ‘taking the banana and saying ‘Hello’ into it’ (Nichols and Stich 2003, 
p. 19). This is what we can call group pretence.  
Setting up these two versions of the banana phone example helps show that we need 
to do more than just explain how children initiate games of pretence. We must also make 
sense of how they recognise when games of pretence have been initiated by others. 
2. The Tea Party 
The tea party example is perhaps the most famous example of pretence in the literature 
on pretence, and was first introduced by Leslie (1994, p. 222). In Leslie’s original exper-
iment, children were asked to pretend that they were at a tea party and to ‘fill up’ two 
cups in front of them with ‘tea’. The experimenter then upturned one of the ‘filled’ cups. 
The children taking part in the experiment were then asked which of the two cups was 
‘empty’ and which was ‘full’. Leslie found that two-year-olds were reliably able to pick 
out the previously upturned cup as the ‘empty’ one, even though in reality both cups 
were empty throughout the tea party.  
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An account of pretence needs to say something about both how children keep track 
of what’s true in their pretence and about how these sorts of inferences are made. 
3. Monsters and Parents  
The third example Nichols and Stich introduce comes from CHILDES, a database created 
to study children’s language use. In the example they select from this database (Nichols 
and Stich 2003, pp. 20-21), two children are pretending a toy car is a bus, then one child 
says, ‘pretend there’s a monster coming ok?’ and the other replies, ‘No let’s don’t pretend 
that… Cause it’s too scary that’s why.’ They then proceed to play another game, where 
they pretend to be mother and father, and ‘cook’ a pair of shoes for food.  
This seemingly simple example has numerous implications for a theory of pretence. 
Firstly, it shows that children can refuse to engage in pretence and that seemingly ordi-
nary emotions (like fear) can play a role in this refusal. Secondly, children can spontane-
ously make use of props that resemble what they are pretending them to be (e.g. the toy 
car standing in for a bus) but also ones that don’t (e.g. the shoes as food). Finally, much 
like the banana case, this example shows that deciding what to pretend is not always a 
solitary activity. In this case, the two children decide amongst themselves what they 
should pretend to be the case. 
4. Dead Cat 
Nichols and Stich’s final example of pretence in children comes from Gould (1972, p. 
212). In this example, a child on a climbing frame says ‘I’m a pussycat. Meow. Meow.’ 
then climbs down from the frame, lies flat on the ground, and says ‘I’m dead. I’m a dead 
pussycat… I got shooted.’ 
Once again, this example raises several interesting questions. Firstly, we must ask 
why the child made a ‘meowing’ noise whilst pretending to be a cat. How did they know 
this was an appropriate action to perform? Secondly, we can ask why the child continued 
talking if he was supposed to be pretending to be a dead cat. Finally, the child suggests 
he is dead because he ‘got shooted’. This wasn’t entailed by the pretence beforehand. 
Why did the child say this is how his cat-self died? 
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5. Adult Pretence 
Nichols and Stich (2003, pp. 20-24) give several examples of pretend play in adults based 
on their own experiments. In their experiments, they gave university students a series of 
premises telling them what to pretend. Some of these premises related to solitary scenar-
ios (e.g. pretend this banana is a phone) and other premises related to group scenarios 
(e.g. pretend you are at a fancy restaurant and that one of you is the server and one is 
the diner). They draw special attention to two episodes of pretence that occurred during 
their experiments, both of which occurred during the fancy restaurant group scenario. 
In the first pretence episode, the person pretending to be a diner refuses the server’s 
oﬀer of a wine list, and tells them that they’re allergic to pepper and thus can’t eat 
something with pepper in the sauce. They order a house salad instead. In the second 
pretence episode, the waiter performs several unusual actions, such as pretending to grind 
peppercorns with the heel of his foot (since he has no grinder available) and bringing out 
a sword for the diner to eat his food with. Perhaps most unusually of all, the server is 
inattentive with this pretend sword, and at one point accidentally cuts oﬀ the head of 
the diner’s imaginary companion. 
3.2 Features of Pretence 
Drawing on these examples, Nichols and Stich suggest that there are five things an ex-
planation of pretence must make sense of. I’ll summarise them under three headings: set-
up, elaboration and output. 
1. Set Up 
In all these examples, the pretence episode began with what Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 
24) call ‘an initial premiss or set of premisses’. In the tea party example, the initial 
premise is that the child and the experimenter are going to have a tea party; in the fancy 
restaurant case, the premise is that one of the participants is a diner at a fancy restaurant 
and one is the server at a fancy restaurant; in the banana phone example, the premise is 
something like ‘this [banana] is a telephone’. 
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These examples also bring out the fact that these premises (or sets of premises) can 
be generated in two ways. Firstly, the pretender can spontaneously produce the premise 
(as in the banana phone example). Secondly, the pretender can go along with someone 
else’s premise (as in the fancy restaurant and tea party examples). A theory of pretence 
needs to explain both how the initial premise of a game of pretence can be spontaneously 
generated, and how a pretender is able to figure out what the premise is when they 
engage in games started by others. Under the ‘set-up’ heading we thus have two things 
that need to be explained by any theory of pretence: generation and recognition.79 
2. Elaboration 
In all the examples we discussed, the pretence episode seemed to proceed in-line with 
elaborations made by the pretender. These elaborations were both inferential and non-
inferential. In relation to inferential elaborations, Nichols and Stich note that: 
[f]rom the initial premiss along with her [the pretender’s] own current perceptions, 
her background knowledge, her memory of what has already happened in the episode 
… the pretender is able to draw inferences about what is going on in the pretence. 
(Nichols and Stich 2003 p.25).  
The tea party scenario is the paradigm example of this in the pretence literature. In order 
to correctly select the ‘empty’ cup, the child must infer that the upturned cup is empty 
in the pretence, even though both cups in the experiment will be literally empty through-
out, since no actual tea has been poured. These sorts of inferential elaborations were also 
                                               
79 One could also argue that we should explain refusal here, as occurred in the CHILDES case 
where the child refused to pretend because ‘it was too scary’. My reason for not including 
this as a separate category is because contra Nichols and Stich, I don’t think we need to 
say much about this feature of pretence. This strikes me as similar to asking why someone 
turned oﬀ a horror movie: it could be they had an unpleasant startled sensation; they might 
have found the plot boring; they might have found the representations of women in the 
film problematic; they might have just been hungry or have needed to go to the bathroom. 
I am sceptical of there being a simple factor we can point to that will neatly explain refusal 
beyond noting that at least some of our ordinary attitudes are involved in pretence, and 
that these will sometimes make us reject a pretence premise.    
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made in the fancy restaurant case, since some of the participants calculated how much 
‘change’ they were owed based on simple mathematical reasoning. Variations of the tea 
party experiment have revealed various examples of children drawing inferences related 
to their pretend games. Harris (2000 pp. 17-19) recounts an experiment where a ‘full’ cup 
of tea was emptied over a teddy bear’s head and children were asked what would happen 
to the bear. Children phrased their responses in various ways, but agreed the bear would 
be covered in ‘tea’. (e.g. some said the bear would be ‘teay’) 
These examples also bring out that many of the elaborations that occur during epi-
sodes of pretence are non-inferential. In a banana phone scenario, the child might ‘talk’ 
to a specific individual on the ‘phone’, such a grandma, but it isn’t logically entailed by 
the premise that the banana is a telephone which specific individual they are calling. In 
the example from CHILDES, when the children decided to put shoes in the oven as a 
prop for food, this also wasn’t entailed by the pretence premises. The two examples of 
adult pretence also involved non-inferential elaboration, since many of the actions that 
occurred during these episodes (e.g. rejecting the wine list, requesting a pepper-free dish, 
chopping a guest’s head oﬀ) were not entailed by the initial premises.  
As Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 25) note, some of these non-inferential elaborations 
reflect real world preferences of pretenders. For example, one participant said she didn’t 
like to ask for the wine list in real life as she doesn’t like being asked for identification to 
prove her age. However, this participant also said she was allergic to pepper in the pre-
tence, but she later clarified that she wasn’t allergic to pepper in real life: she merely 
pretended that this was true.80  
A successful theory of pretence must explain how these sorts of non-inferential elab-
orations are generated along with inferential elaborations. 
                                               
80 The server who managed to chop the head oﬀ one of the guests thankfully admitted he 
would not be so careless with a sword in real-life!  
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3. Output 
One of the more obvious features of pretence brought out by these examples is that 
pretenders do in fact perform various pretend actions during their episodes of pretence. 
A child who pretends that a banana is a telephone will actually pick up the banana and 
talk into it. Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 26) report that one server in the fancy restaurant 
case pretended to scribble down the order of their diner, while another actually wrote it 
down on a piece of paper.  
Children also seem to respond emotionally to their games of pretend, such as the boy 
in the monster case who refused to pretend a monster was approaching because it was 
‘too scary’. Harris (2000, p. 58) discusses an example from Taylor (1998, p. 212) of a girl 
who started crying, and when asked why explained that her (pretend) horse wasn’t able 
to come outside with her. She was apparently unable (or perhaps unwilling) to rectify 
the situation by choosing to pretend the horse was present. 
These sorts of phenomena leave us with several questions. In relation to action, we 
have to ask what motivates pretenders to actually perform pretend actions. What com-
bination of mental states motivates pretence behaviour? We also have to ask how a 
pretender knows what the appropriate pretend action to perform is: how does a pretender 
know that in order to pretend to be a cat they should ‘meow’ rather than ‘bark? Finally, 
since some of the behaviours described only dimly resembled what the pretender was 
pretending to be the case, we need to ask what counts as an appropriate pretend action 
in the first place. We saw that declaring ‘I’m dead’ appears to be an appropriate way of 
pretending to be a dead cat, but a dead cat would be silent (and in any case, even an 
alive cat wouldn’t speak in English or any other language). 
In the case of aﬀective responses, we need an account of how things we merely pre-
tend to be the case can generate emotional responses, and an account of why these re-
sponses appear to roughly track the responses we would exhibit to similar real-life sce-
narios.  
Although children respond emotionally to some of the things they pretend to be the 
case, in other respects the eﬀects of pretence seem to have no eﬀect on the subsequent 
mental states of the pretender and are instead quarantined from their ordinary attitudes 
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towards the world. Most obviously, Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 27) note that pretenders 
do not believe the pretended events really happened when they conclude their game of 
pretence. When a child pretends a banana is a telephone and uses it to pretend to speak 
to grandma, she doesn’t believe she actually spoke to grandma at any point before, after, 
or during the pretence.81 Any theory of pretence thus needs to explain motivation, aﬀec-
tive responses and quarantining.  
 
Having noted these features of pretence, Nichols and Stich move quickly to establish that 
any satisfactory explanation of these features will involve the introduction of a distinct 
belief-like attitude. The first step in their argument is to establish that a distinct cognitive 
attitude is required to explain pretence, before moving on to argue why this attitude 
must be a counterpart that shares a single code with belief. I will now reconstruct their 
argument so that we can introduce some worries about their suggestion that belief and 
belief-like imaginings share a single code. 
3.3 The Imagination Box 
We saw in section 2.3 that Nichols and Stich symbolise the idea that pretence involves a 
distinct attitude, which is a voluntary counterpart to belief, by saying that children 
possess an ‘imagination box’ where pretend representations are stored. This allows them 
to explain why these representations are quarantined from our ordinary beliefs: pretence 
representations are located in this imagination box; whilst our beliefs reside in our belief 
box. Langland-Hassan draws out this merit of their account, and other distinct attitude 
accounts, by noting that: 
                                               
81 This being said, Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 27) note that there are various limits to this 
sort of cognitive quarantining. For one thing, we are often very good at remembering the 
events we pretended to occur, and forming second order beliefs about what we have 
pretended. Gendler (2006) discusses cases where this quarantining seems to break down, 
and we treat things we appear to merely imagine like beliefs. 
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 [t]he existence of a distinctive imaginative attitude helps explain how one can believe 
that p while imagining (or pretending) that not p, or imagine (or pretend) that p 
while believing that p. For, provided that imagining is, like desire, its own cognitive 
attitude, there is no obvious epistemic diﬃculty—no threat of ‘‘inferential chaos’’—
presented by the fact that one imagines that p while believing that not-p, just as 
there are no such problems inherent in believing that p while desiring that not-p. 
(Langland-Hassan 2012, p. 161) 
It is worth noting that a distinct content view of pretence can also explain quarantining. 
We can argue that pretence representations are quarantined because they have diﬀerent 
contents to our ordinary beliefs, without needing to suppose that they reside in a separate 
‘box’. In a later article, Nichols (2004, p.130) suggests that considerations related to 
synchronous processing rule out a distinct content based account of how we are able to 
engage in pretence.  
Synchronous processing refers to fact that it looks like we can believe that p and also 
pretend that p (qua belief-like imagining) at the same time. Consider the tea party ex-
ample. The child who was pretending to have a tea party pretended that one cup was 
empty and that the other was full, whilst also believing that both cups were empty. This 
makes it look as if the child was able to process representations with identical contents 
at the same time: they pretended that the cup is empty and also believed that the cup is 
empty. As such, Nichols and Stich argue the diﬀerence between our real and pretence 
representations cannot merely be a diﬀerence in content. Nichols puts the point as fol-
lows:  
[a] pretense representation and a belief can have exactly the same content. So, pre-
tense representations are quarantined from beliefs, and yet the distinction is not 
driven by diﬀerences in content. The natural cognitivist proposal, then, is that pre-
tense representations diﬀer from belief representation by their function. (Nichols 2004, 
p. 130) 
I am not convinced by this argument. All the tea party example reveals is that on the 
surface it looks like we can have pretence representations with the same content as what 
we believe. For example, Leslie – the person who first introduced this empty cup example 
– would argue that the child believes that the cup is empty, and during pretence also 
believes that ‘I PRETEND that “the cup is empty”’. This special sort of content allows 
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Leslie to explain synchronous processing without introducing a distinct attitude. To put 
the point more generally, we can suggest that when a child takes it to be true that ‘the 
cup is empty’ in their game of pretence, this doesn’t have to mean they are straightfor-
wardly entertaining a representation with the content ‘the cup is empty’.82 For now 
though, we can accept this point about synchronous processing for the sake of argument.  
Accepting these arguments about quarantining and synchronous processing only 
gives us reason to hold that some sort of distinct attitude plays a role in pretence, not 
that this attitude is necessarily a counterpart to belief. These arguments also don’t inform 
us whether we should think of this counterpart as being voluntary or involuntary.  
To elaborate on why they think the relevant attitude is a voluntary counterpart to 
belief, we can bring out that Nichols and Stich’s ‘imagination box’ will need to make 
sense of how initial pretence premises are generated. We must account for how the child 
pretending a banana is a telephone is able to generate the premise that this [banana] is 
a telephone and how the child in the tea party example was able to follow the instruction 
to pretend that they were having a tea party.  
Nichols and Stich (2003, p.29) leave the mechanics of this somewhat vague, but 
Weinberg and Meskin (2006b, p. 182) fill in the gap here by postulating an ‘inputter’ 
that places representations into the imagination box either spontaneously or in response 
to being asked to imagine something. This notion of an inputter is supposed to represent 
one of the key functional diﬀerences between beliefs and belief-like imaginings, since the 
inputter cannot similarly input representations into the belief box at will. Ordinarily, I 
thankfully cannot choose to believe that a banana is a telephone.  
This helps to illustrate why, if there is a counterpart to belief involved in pretence, 
it will be an example of a voluntary counterpart. Nichols and Stich have in mind here a 
mental state that we can in principle enter into at will. This is not to say, of course, that 
                                               
82 Of course, they will have a belief with this content in the tea party example. My point here 
is that when the child says the cup is empty after seeing a cup being upturned, this doesn’t 
necessarily entail they now have two representations with the simple content ‘the cup is 
empty’. 
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is always entirely up to the pretender what is true in an episode of pretence: the point 
here is that power over what is true in a given episode of pretence is at least in principle 
possessed by the pretender. Going back to Walton’s game where stumps represent bears, 
it is made true by the presence of stumps that there are bears nearby, and this fictional 
truth does not depend on the pretender’s knowledge. However, even in this sort of rule-
governed case, the child could declare that they want to pretend otherwise (as we saw in 
the CHILDES example where what the children are pretending constantly changes) and 
that therefore the stumps are no longer bears.  
However, noting that we can produce pretence representations at will does not show 
that the distinct attitude involved in pretence is belief-like; it only shows that this atti-
tude is not belief. A first argument for why this attitude is belief-like can be found by 
considering how this imagination box can make sense of pretence elaboration. Various 
inferences and elaborations are made in a typical game of pretence on the basis of the 
initial premise, and we must explain how these are made. Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 29) 
explain inferential elaboration by proposing that an ‘inference mechanism, the very same 
one that is used in the formation of real beliefs, can work on representations in the 
[imagination box] in much the same way that it can work on representations in the Belief 
Box.’  
In other words, the pretence scenario gets filled in after we generate the initial prem-
ise because our ordinary inference systems infer from the pretence premise what we would 
infer if we believed the premise were true. For example, if the pretence premise is ‘I am 
a dog’ we might infer this entails ‘I should bark’. This also helps to justify the claim that 
belief-like imaginings share a single code with belief, since both attitudes are said to 
interact with our inference mechanisms in ‘much the same way’. They elaborate on this 
point by suggesting that: 
[r]epresentations in the [imagination box] have the same logical form as representa-
tions in the Belief Box, and … their representational properties are determined in the 
same way. (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 32, emphasis in original)  
The idea that beliefs and belief-like imaginings have ‘the same logical form’ and that 
‘their representational properties are determined in the same way’ is what the single code 
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hypothesis amounts to. This has the consequence that cognitive ‘mechanisms will process 
[pretence] representations in much the same way that they process beliefs.’ (Nichols and 
Stich 2003, p. 33, emphasis mine). 
However, merely introducing inference systems that operate on the initial pretence 
premise doesn’t do enough to explain the sort of richness that characterises episodes of 
pretend play. For example, from the single premise ‘this [banana] is a telephone’ we 
cannot directly draw many inferences, and almost certainly we cannot draw enough in-
ferences to guide an entire episode of pretence. As such, this does not fully explain infer-
ential elaboration during pretence. 
Nichols and Stich make sense of this by proposing that the contents of the belief box 
are placed in the imagination box during pretence, and that representations in both boxes 
are governed by an updater. In relation to this first proposal, they suggest that during 
an episode of pretence the imagination box is filled not only with the initial pretence 
premise (or premises) but also with every representation from the belief box (Nichols and 
Stich 2003, p. 29). Since these imported representations are in the same code as the 
pretence premise, this allows Nichols and Stich to explain why we are able to make 
inferences during episodes of pretence that go beyond the initial premise: we can draw 
inferences based on how our pretence premise relates to our ordinary beliefs about the 
world. 
That being said, Nichols and Stich note that there is initial diﬃculty with this sug-
gestion, namely that it will lead to there being contradictory representations in the im-
agination box (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 30). For example, during the tea party example, 
the imagination box will contain the representation that one cup is full and one is empty 
along with the conflicting representation that both cups are empty, since this representa-
tion reflects our actual belief.  
To make sense of this, Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 30) point out that our ordinary 
beliefs seem to be governed by some sort of ‘updater’. For example, if you believe that 
the Earth is flat, and I show you a photograph of a round Earth, you will (hopefully!) 
automatically update your belief box by getting rid of your representation that the Earth 
is flat and replacing it with a representation like the Earth is round. This mechanism’s 
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inner workings are unknown to us, but it seems to work to revise our beliefs on the basis 
of our having new visual experiences, or hearing testimony we take to be reliable, and so 
on. 
They argue that this updater also operates on the contents of the [imagination box], 
and that it does so in much the same way as it operates on contents of the belief box 
(Nichols and Stich 2003, pp. 31-32). This further illustrates why they argue the repre-
sentations found in the belief and imagination boxes share a single code.  
Nichols and Stich (2003, pp. 31-32 suggest that there are two ways in which this 
copying of contents from the belief to imagination box could happen. Firstly, the updater 
might act as a sort of filter, stopping beliefs being placed in the imagination box if they 
conflict with the initial pretence premise or premises. Secondly, it could remove beliefs 
that are found to conflict with the initial premise or premises. On both pictures, the end 
result will be the same: we do not have outright contradictory representations in our 
imagination box during pretence.83 
Even having introduced the idea of an updater, there are still some aspects of elab-
oration that remain unexplained, since, as we already noted, many elaborations in pre-
tence episodes are non-inferential. For example, we still have no explanation as to why 
the child in the dead cat example says he ‘got shooted’ or why one of the adult pretenders 
cut someone’s head oﬀ with a sword. 
In order to account for such non-inferential elaborations, they introduce another 
mechanism into our cognitive architecture. They call this component the ‘Script Elabo-
rator’, which fills in the details of an episode of pretence that ‘cannot be inferred from 
the pretence premiss, the (updater-filtered) contents of the Belief Box and the pretender’s 
knowledge of what happened earlier in the pretence.’ (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 35). 
This piece of cognitive architecture only interacts with the imagination box, and so is 
meant to illustrate a functional dissimilarity between the belief and imagination boxes. 
                                               
83 At least we won’t have them because of a background belief being present in the 
imagination box. It might still be the pretence scenario asks us to take contradictory 
representations to be true. 
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At this point, Nichols and Stich have oﬀered us an account of the second feature of 
pretence, elaboration, since this is explained by the inference mechanisms, updater, script 
elaborator, and more generally, the notion of a single code. We also have a partial expla-
nation of set-up, since we saw the generation of a premise is made possible by the input-
ter. The inputter can also explain how some forms of recognition occur, namely ones 
where the child is told explicitly what the pretence premise is. At this point, however, 
we haven’t been given an account of how children figure out what another individual is 
pretending when the premise isn’t made obvious. We also have a partial explanation of 
the third feature, output, since Nichols and Stich are able to explain quarantining by 
drawing attention to the fact that pretence representations involve a distinct cognitive 
attitude. However, we still have no explanation of how aﬀective responses to what we 
pretend are generated, nor of how pretend actions are motivated.  
In relation to motivation, Nichols and Stich propose that the motivation for perform-
ing pretend actions stems from the combination of three kinds of mental states: imagin-
ings, beliefs and desires. Children perform pretend actions because they imagine that 
they are something, or that they are doing something; they form desires to act similarly 
to how the thing they are imagining would act, or to how they would act if they were 
doing what they imagine doing; and they form beliefs about how the thing they are 
imagining would behave if it were real, or how they would behave if they were doing 
what they imagine themselves to be doing (Nichols and Stich 2003, pp. 37-38). This 
means something like the following combination of mental states is supposed to motivate 
pretence behaviour: 
1. Propositional imaginings (that I am phoning grandma, that I am having a tea 
party, that I am a dead cat, etc.) 
2. Beliefs about how things behave (that you speak into phones, that tea parties 
involve serving tea, that dead cats don’t move, etc.) 
3. Desires to behave in a way that would be appropriate if your imaginings reflected 
what was actually the case (a desire to behave in a way that would be appropriate 
if I am phoning grandma, a desire to behave in a way that would be appropriate 
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if I am having a tea party, a desire to behave in a way that would be appropriate 
if I am a dead cat, etc.) 
These combinations lead to pretend actions like talking into a banana, pouring out pre-
tend tea and lying on the floor like a dead cat. The desire element helps to explain the 
general motivation for engaging in any sort of pretence behaviour, and the belief compo-
nent is supposed to explain why appropriate pretence actions are performed. This means 
belief-like imaginings themselves do not directly motivate behaviour, allowing Nichols 
and Stich to argue that imaginings do not have a direct connection to our decision making 
and motivational systems. This is said to reveal a further functional diﬀerence between 
belief and imagination. 
There are numerous ambiguities in this sketch of the motivation of pretend actions. 
For example, there is a question about how closely beliefs about how things behave track 
appropriate pretend actions (e.g. cats don’t really make the meowing noise humans do 
when pretending to be cats, and as we noted earlier dead cats don’t say ‘I’m dead’ or 
that they ‘got shooted’). For now, we will leave these worries to one side, and will return 
to issues regarding motivation in Chapter 4, where they will serve to illustrate one of the 
benefits of adopting Leslie’s distinct content view when it comes to explaining how we 
are able to engage in pretence.  
As for recognition when the pretence premise isn’t made obvious, they argue that 
this involves recognising someone is behaving in a way that would be appropriate if such-
and-such were the case (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 53). However, as with their account 
of motivation it is ambiguous how this will work in practice, and I will set out why this 
will struggle to account for pretence recognition in chapter 4. 
In relation to why we exhibit aﬀective responses to what we pretend, Nichols and 
Stich propose that in light of beliefs and belief-like imaginings sharing a single code, they 
are processed by our aﬀect generation systems in a similar way, and so belief-like imag-
inings can lead to aﬀective responses. The single code hypothesis thus allows us to make 
sense of aﬀect in the same sort of way it allowed us to explain inferential elaboration.  
With these developments and elaborations of their theory in place, it looks like the 
introduction of a distinct propositional attitude combined with the hypothesis that it 
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shares a single code with belief, allows us to explain the three features of pretence that 
Nichols and Stich draw our attention to. However, a serious worry with this approach 
arises if we reflect on precisely what is entailed by two mental states sharing a single 
code. To see why this notion is potentially problematic, we should begin by noting some 
diﬀerences between ordinary beliefs and the sorts of representations involved in pretence.  
3.4 Diﬀerences Between Belief & Belief-Like Imaginings 
If we accept Nichols and Stich’s account of our cognitive architecture for the sake of 
argument, diﬀerence between beliefs and belief-like imaginings can be placed under three 
headings84: 
1. Input Asymmetries 
This is where a mechanism only takes representations produced by either the belief 
box or imagination box as input. For example, Nichols and Stich argue that our deci-
sion-making and motivational systems only take beliefs as input, since propositional 
imaginings cannot motivate us directly. 
2. Output Asymmetries 
This is where a mechanism only outputs representations into either the belief box or 
imagination box. For example, it looks like the inputter can only output belief-like 
imaginings, since beliefs are not under the control of the will.  
                                               
84 I have adapted these headings from Weinberg (2013, pp. 188-190) who also suggests we 
need a fourth heading here, ‘phenomenological’ asymmetry. This is because he notes that 
from a young age we seem to be able to tell the diﬀerence between what we imagine and 
what we believe. As I argued in chapter 2, I think we can equally explain this diﬀerence 
when thinking about pretence and fiction by saying we can tell the diﬀerence between what 
we believe to be fictional and what we straightforwardly believe.  
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3. Processing Asymmetries 
This is where a mechanism processes representations in the belief box and imagination 
box diﬀerently, or at least processes them diﬀerently in some instances. For example, 
the updater seems to resist getting rid of our initial pretence premises when we are 
engaging in pretence. 
Now, on the face of it, one might think that these three sorts of asymmetries are readily 
explained if we accept Nichols and Stich’s cognitive theory of imagination. Since they 
argue that propositional imaginings are a counterpart to belief, we should expect diﬀer-
ences in input, output, and processing: it is these diﬀerences that demonstrate imaginings 
have a distinct functional role as compared to belief, after all. 
We can call this the ‘functional role’ explanation of why these asymmetries are pre-
sent. This sort of response will entail holding that it is just a peculiarity of the diﬀering 
functional roles of beliefs and belief-like imaginings that leads to diﬀerences in processing, 
input and output, rather than something we can systematically explain. For example, 
maybe some mechanisms just do produce only imaginings, and maybe others just do 
process imaginings and beliefs diﬀerently sometimes. In other words, we defend the theory 
by suggesting functional roles are somewhat arbitrary and that the single code hypothesis 
shouldn’t be taken as being all that explains how our cognitive mechanisms process im-
aginings. This sort of response is hinted at by Nichols in relation to diﬀerences in input 
and output when he tells us that: 
[i]f pretense representations and beliefs are in the same code, then mechanisms that 
take input from the [imagination] box and from the belief box will treat parallel 
representations much the same way. (emphasis mine) (Nichols 2006, p. 461) 
For example, we have noted that pretence episodes are ordinarily initiated when a pre-
tence premise (or set of premises) is placed into the imagination box by the inputter. 
This reflects the fact that imaginings are subject to the will while beliefs are not – the 
inputter cannot place a representation into our belief box at will. For example, I can 
choose to imagine that David Cameron is a lizard, but I cannot choose to believe this. 
The functional role response doesn’t give us a deep explanation of why this is so, but we 
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still at least have some sort of explanation of why this asymmetry in input is present. A 
similar suggestion can also help to make sense of diﬀerences in output: belief-like imag-
inings cannot motivate actions directly because there just isn’t a pathway from the im-
agination box to our various decision-making mechanisms. 
However, endorsing this sort of response highlights a worry about the explanatory 
merits of ‘boxological’ accounts of the mind. There is a risk that if we endorse this sort 
of approach we end up labelling distinctions between mental states and attitudes without 
actually explaining them. 
Regardless of whether one finds this a satisfactory explanation of diﬀerences in input 
and output, this functional role response is less helpful as an explanation of processing 
diﬀerences. Indeed, Nichols goes on to note that: 
[i]f a mechanism takes pretense representations as input, the single code hypothesis 
maintains that if that mechanism is activated by the occurrent belief that p, it will 
also be activated by the occurrent pretense representation that p. More generally, for 
any mechanism that takes input from both the pretense box and the belief box, the 
pretense representation p will be processed much the same way as the belief repre-
sentation p. (Nichols 2006, p. 461) 
Accounting for diﬀerences in processing is challenging for Nichols and Stich thanks to 
their emphasis on the relationship between processing and code. It looks like they main-
tain that diﬀerences in processing ought to be explained by diﬀerences in code, since it 
is sharing a single code that leads to beliefs and belief-like imaginings being processed in 
a similar way. This leaves it an open question whether Nichols and Stich think that 
diﬀerences in functional role between two representations can aﬀect processing. If not, it 
is unclear why there are processing asymmetries between beliefs and belief-like imagin-
ings.  
We can bring out the worry here by making use of a reconstruction of part of Nichols 
and Stich’s theory by Stock (2011a pp. 272-274): 
 
1. A mechanism is of type M iﬀ it is a member of the set of mechanisms which 
realise/contribute to the realisation of D in the entities it processes 
2. In certain contexts, imagining and believing that p each realise D. 
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Therefore: 
3. In those contexts, imagining and belief that p each are processed by a mechanism 
of type M.  
 
In this reconstruction, Stock gives an account of how we justify the introduction of a 
piece of cognitive architecture and settle on its nature in premise (1), where she formalises 
the idea that mechanisms ought to be defined by what they realise (e.g. decision-making 
systems realise decisions, aﬀect-generating systems realise aﬀective responses). She then 
goes on to formalise the idea that this means beliefs and imaginings interact with at least 
some of the same mechanisms in (3). Stock thinks this view becomes problematic when 
we note that Nichols and Stich appear to endorse a further commitment, namely that: 
 
4. No mechanism of type M makes any discrimination between imagining and belief 
as input. 
 
This claim is problematic since there can be processing diﬀerences between beliefs and 
imaginings. To set out the scope of this worry, we should begin by noting two specific 
processing diﬀerences between belief and what Nichols and Stich are calling propositional 
imaginings (Everett 2013, pp. 10-13) oﬀers a more detailed list of further purported dif-
ferences). Setting out these two asymmetries will involve introducing some considerations 
that arise from thinking about how Nichols and Stich’s theory relates to fiction and 
philosophical thought experiments, since Nichols (2006) introduces one of these asymme-
tries in relation to worries about fiction and hypothetical reasoning. 
1. Aﬀective Processing 
We have already noted that sometimes our emotional responses to things we pretend to 
be the case are much the same as the responses we would exhibit to similar beliefs. This 
is easiest to bring out if we introduce some examples related to fiction rather than to 
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pretence. One might pity (or perhaps quasi pity) Anna Karenina in much the same way 
that one would pity a real woman who suﬀered her fate.85 
However, these similarities seem to break down in other cases. This can happen in 
two ways (Nichols 2006, pp. 464-465). Firstly, there are cases of absent aﬀect or judge-
ment. This sort of case is best demonstrated by considering philosophical thought exper-
iments. Take Mary, the neuroscientist locked in a black and white room her whole life. 
When we engage with this thought experiment, we don’t find ourselves distracted from 
questions about qualia because we feel sad that Mary has lived in this drab room her 
whole life, nor do we feel a sense of moral approbation towards her carers for apparently 
having locked her up in such bizarre and cruel way.  
Nichols (2006) explicitly associates this sort of hypothetical reasoning and the use of 
thought experiments with the imagination box, but if one is not convinced by this link 
(perhaps because one wishes to distinguish mere supposing from belief-like imagining) we 
can also find these sorts of examples in works of narrative fiction, such as videogames. 
Many children’s videogames contain elements that might be expected to lead to some 
sorts of negative emotional responses but due to their cutesy presentation, do not. For 
example, in the Kirby video game series Kirby, the titular avatar (who is more or less 
just a cute, constantly smiling, pink blob), sucks up enemies so that he can steal their 
powers and use them to solve puzzles.86 I’ve yet to hear of any children (or parents) who 
have responded with horror or disgust upon seeing Kirby suck up an enemy on-screen. 
To give another example, so far as I can tell, there has also not been any moral panic 
                                               
85 A similar point can be made about our moral processing. One might judge that Lady 
Macbeth behaves immorally in much the same way that one would judge that a real woman 
who behaves like her is behaving immorally. This is part of what guides an interesting 
question about whether there are things we cannot imagine, or perhaps resist imagining 
(Gendler 2000) or perhaps which we cannot take to be fictionally true (Walton 2006). 
86 For example, you might suck up an enemy who is carrying a hammer in order to gain the 
ability to swing a hammer around. This sometimes allows you to break certain blocks in 
the game in order to find hidden treasures. 
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instigated by Mario jumping on – and thus killing – turtle-like creatures in his various 
videogame adventures.  
However, if we learned of a real person who grew up in Mary’s circumstances, we 
would probably respond emotionally to their plight. As for our videogame examples, we 
are (at least) sometimes disgusted and horrified by the thought of eating other sentient 
beings alive, and would likely not approve of a plumber who went around killing turtle-
like creatures by jumping on top of them. These examples thus bring out that our emo-
tional responses to what we imagine do not always behave in ‘much the same way’ as 
our responses to what we believe. 
Secondly, there are cases of what Nichols (2006, p. 464) calls ‘discrepant’ aﬀect. He 
gives the example of the film Dr. Strangelove, but his worry relates to many other black 
comedies. In Dr. Strangelove, the fate of the world is threatened by all out nuclear war 
and this leads to several humorous scenes in the American War Room, such as one where 
various generals discuss military options with the President of the United States. How-
ever, while we might laugh at this scene when engaging with the fiction, we certainly 
would not do so if we learnt about such happenings in the real world. If these imaginings 
about Dr. Strangelove are in the same code as our beliefs, why do our aﬀect generation 
systems appear to process them diﬀerently? Videogame examples are also helpful for 
illustrating this sort of discrepant aﬀect. While playing first-person shooter games, one 
might take great pleasure in shooting various enemies, while in real-life being horrified 
by these sorts of actions. 
2. Clustering 
An important point made by Walton (2015, pp. 18-19) about out representations related 
to works of fiction and episodes of pretence is that they exhibit ‘clustering’. For example, 
belief-like imaginings about Romeo and Juliet concern only that particular fictional 
world, and representations about tea parties concern only that particular pretend tea 
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party.87 This contrasts with belief, since our beliefs all seem to be interconnected in a 
single ‘cluster’ and aim to reflect the truth of the actual world. If I believe that if p then 
q, and believe that p, I should refrain from believing q in any situation unless I come to 
believe that p is false.  
With fiction and pretence, this sort of inference only holds if p and q belong to the 
same cluster. If I believe that if all men are mortal then Jeremy Corbyn is mortal, I 
should only cease to believe that Jeremy Corbyn is mortal if I realise either he is not a 
man or that some men are indeed immortal. If, on the other hand, I engage with a work 
of fiction where some men are portrayed as immortal, I can happily take this to be true 
in the world of that fiction, whilst recognising that it won’t be true in other fictional 
worlds or in the real world. This clustering of our representations related to fiction and 
pretence thus allows us to explain why we can sometimes take on conflicting representa-
tions related to works of fiction. This is also true in relation to specific episodes of pre-
tence: if I pretend that ‘that [banana] is a telephone’ I won’t take this to be true in every 
game of pretence. 
If Nichols and Stich are right that these representations are belief-like imaginings, 
then why can they belong to clusters when beliefs cannot? For example, in the world of 
Midnight’s Children, we take it as fictionally true that people can read minds, while in 
the world of Disgrace we take it as fictionally true that such supernatural feats are 
impossible. But if an imagining about Midnight’s Children shares the same code as an 
imagining about Disgrace, how does this clustering come into play? It will be problematic 
for Nichols and Stich to hold that imaginings can be marked as belonging to a certain 
cluster while beliefs cannot be so marked, since this will risk constituting a systematic 
diﬀerence at the level of content between beliefs and imaginings.88 
                                               
87 As noted earlier, Walton’s notion of imagining does not amount to mere belief-like 
imaginings. However, Nichols (2004) takes belief-like imaginings to be the relevant sort of 
imaginings here and so presumably wouldn’t object to my characterising our engagement 
with fiction in this way. 
88 One suggestion here could be that imaginings are only ever to be found in our imagination 
box on a temporary basis, and that diﬀerent clusters thus switch in and out in-line with 
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To see how we might make sense of these processing diﬀerence, we will consider two 
responses in what follows, the functional role response and the desire response. I will 
argue that neither of these responses oﬀers a convincing explanation of these asymme-
tries. 
3.5 Dealing with Asymmetries 
1. Functional Role Revisited 
We might be able to make the initial functional role response work as an account of 
processing diﬀerences by drawing an analogy between our cognitive systems and a vend-
ing machine. Picture a machine that gives out either cans of Coke or cans of Pepsi. Let’s 
say that this machine represents our aﬀect-generation systems. To simplify matters, we’ll 
say that Coke represents ‘positive aﬀect’ and Pepsi for ‘negative aﬀect’. This machine 
accepts various coins, but only outputs one of these cans if you insert a single pound 
coin.  
There are two slots on the machine. Put a pound coin in one slot and you get a Coke. 
Put it in the other and you get a Pepsi. Now, there are two people who use this (rather 
odd) vending machine every day. These two people can be said to represent the belief 
box and the imagination box. They both have wallets filled with various coins, and every 
day they both put a single pound coin into the machine. We can say that their respective 
pound coins share a single code. Ordinarily, they both put their pound coin into the Coke 
slot. However, on one occasion, for no particular reason, one of our Coke-loving individ-
uals just happens to put his pound into the Pepsi slot and is provided with a Pepsi. 
                                               
our imaginative project. This would introduce an odd puzzle about what happens when we 
read a novel whilst the TV stays on in the background playing a film we’re half watching. 
It seems odd to suggest that switching between the TV and your book involves rapidly 
filling and emptying your imagination box as we pay more attention to one or the other 
fiction. 
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In this example, there is no principled explanation we can oﬀer for why one Coke 
lover has a Pepsi this time round: it just so happens that they put their pound coin into 
a diﬀerent slot. We could propose that imaginings and beliefs also just are processed 
diﬀerently on occasion. There is no elaborate reason we can give for why one happened 
to interact with the aﬀective systems diﬀerently to normal when engaging with Dr. Stran-
gelove, it just so happens that a slightly diﬀerent interaction to normal has taken place 
even though the relevant representations remain in the same ‘code’. The problem with 
this suggestion, however, is that it doesn’t seem to be merely random that this diﬀerence 
in processing occurs: it looks like there is some sort of reason why we laugh at approaching 
nuclear war while watching Dr. Strangelove when ordinarily we would be horrified by 
this prospect. Allowing that representations sometimes just happen to be processed dif-
ferently does little to help explain the diﬀerences in processing we set out above.  
2. Desire 
A second proposal comes from Nichols (2006, pp. 469-472), who suggests that we can 
find a better explanation of diﬀerences in processing by looking at the desires associated 
with our beliefs and imaginings. In relation to discrepant and absent aﬀect cases, he 
argues that our desires are behaving diﬀerently to the way in which they would behave 
if we had beliefs rather than imaginings.  
For example, in cases of absent aﬀect like the Mary thought experiment, we can 
suggest that in order to feel sorry for Mary you would need to have a desire for her not 
to have been raised in such restrictive conditions. With this desire absent, the aﬀect is 
also absent. Nichols (2006, p. 471) explains this point with the following two examples: 
 
1. Someone walks into your office and says: Imagine that everyone outside of this 
room is dead, what would Utilitarianism say about the importance of our 
interests? 
2. Someone walks into your office and says: Everyone outside of this room is dead; 
what does Utilitarianism say about the importance of our interests? 
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He suggests, plausibly, that your aﬀective response to (1) will be very diﬀerent to (2). 
He argues that this is because of the diﬀerent desires associated with these two examples: 
In both (1) and (2) we are encouraged to have the desire to figure out the entailments 
of Utilitarianism. In case (2), our desires about the real world would swamp any desire 
we have to work out the Utilitarian calculus. Hence, our inferences and recollections 
would be guided by these prevailing desires. In case (1), by contrast, we plausibly 
have no particularly pressing desires about the inhabitants of the imaginary scenario. 
As a result we are not compelled to draw the inferences and recollections that would 
follow in case (2). Rather, our desire to answer the question about Utilitarianism can 
be pursued without the intrusion of salient desires and concerns about the inhabitants 
of the imaginary situation. (Nichols 2006, p. 471) 
His thought here seems to be that we don’t always form desires related to the wellbeing 
of the inhabitants of fictional or imaginary worlds. On the other hand, when we engage 
with the real world, we cannot simply ‘detach’ our standing desires to preserve the lives 
of our loved ones and so on. As he puts the point: 
Imaginings can be constrained, filtered and directed in all sorts of ways that are not 
available to beliefs. For our desires about the imaginary scenario will depend on the 
context, the intent of the author, the tone of the work, the point of the thought 
experiment, and so on. Our desires about the real world are much less flexible. (Nich-
ols 2006, p. 472) 
For discrepant aﬀect cases, like Dr. Strangelove, he suggests that a diﬀerent desire is 
present as compared to if the scenario occurred in real life, perhaps a desire to be amused, 
or some internal desire about the contents of the fiction: 
When it comes to black comedy, we typically do not have such powerful desires for 
the preservation of human life in the imaginary scenario. Hence, we are not compelled 
to draw out disturbing inferences like billions of innocent people will die horrifically 
painful deaths. Rather, genre considerations make us want to focus instead on Slim 
Pickens’ exuberant missile ride. (Nichols 2006, p. 472) 
If this is right, then the discrepant aﬀect occurs because the desire involved is diﬀerent 
to the one that would combine with a similar belief (which would presumably be a 
straightforward one about avoiding the horrors of nuclear war). However, it’s not entirely 
clear whether this proposal preserves the single code hypothesis. If we embrace this 
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response, we now face the question of why our desires sometimes interact diﬀerently with 
our imaginings as compared to our beliefs. For example, Nichols argues that: 
The explanation for the asymmetries is not that the aﬀective mechanism itself re-
sponds diﬀerently to imagining that p and believing that p. Rather, the asymmetries 
arise because the aﬀective mechanism is sent quite diﬀerent input depending on 
whether one imagines that p or believes that p. (Nichols 2006, p. 472) 
 
But, he tells us little about why this diﬀerence in input is present; we are merely told 
that it is present thanks to it being possible for imaginings to be ‘sparse’. In particular, 
we have no explanation of why sometimes our desires interact with our imaginings in the 
same way that they interact with our beliefs, whilst in other cases they do not. For 
example, in their discussion of belief-like imaginings and motivation, Weinberg and 
Meskin suggest that: 
[t]he fact that our imaginatively driven responses do not result in the full gamut of 
behavioural responses can be explained by … pointing out the obvious fact that many 
behaviours require relevant motivational input … While a belief that one is being 
threatened by a tiger will typically interact with a (standing) desire not to be harmed 
and result in flight behaviour, imagining that one is threatened by a tiger does not 
interact in the same way with that standing desire. (Weinberg and Meskin 2006b, p. 
184) 
This claim about motivational input and aﬀective responses seems plausible, but this 
point does not explain why imaginings have a complex relationship with desire and why 
this should be seen as compatible with the idea that beliefs and belief-like imaginings 
share a single code. This quote seems to imply a systematic diﬀerence in how imaginings 
and beliefs relate to desire, and it is unclear why this diﬀerence would be present if these 
representations share the same code. Stock shares a similar worry, noting that:  
[t]he single code theory … looked committed to arguing that it was precisely a repre-
sentation’s code which determined which inference and aﬀective mechanisms it inter-
acted with, and to what extent. Yet here Nichols seems to suggest that two identically 
code representations can … give rise to diﬀerent aﬀect, depending on what desire are 
concomitant … Insofar as the original view held that imagining and belief that P 
produce similar output, Nichol’s claim that diﬀerent desires can accompany a belief 
and an imagining that p … requires further explanation. (Stock 2011a, p. 278) 
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What the desire response helps to capture, however, is the intuition that how we respond 
to a given representation related to a fiction or episode of pretence will depend on how 
it relates to other representations. This is perhaps why Nichols noted that imaginings 
can be ‘filtered’ and ‘constrained’ in various ways. I will draw on this point to oﬀer my 
own response to these processing diﬀerences. This will not allow us to salvage the single 
code hypothesis, but will tell us something important about how the representations 
involved in pretence and fiction behave. 
 
3.6 Clustering Revisited 
We have already noted that the representations involved in pretence and fiction are 
subject to clustering. One important consequence of this is that how we respond to a 
given representation associated with an episode pretence or a work of fiction will depend 
on which other representations are associated with it in a given cluster. 
Suppose, for example, a pretender has formed a representation like a bear is nearby. 
If one is playing a game where they’re pretending to be a bear, this representation won’t 
lead to a fear (or quasi fear) response, in fact it might make them happy because they 
realise their fellow pretend-bears are nearby. If, on the other hand, one is playing a game 
like the one in Walton’s bears example, then this representation may well lead to a fear 
response since it will be associated with representations related to being human, needing 
to hide from bears, and so on.  
The reason Nichols and Stich’s distinct attitude theory struggles to explain diﬀer-
ences in processing is because they focus for the most part on single representations 
associated with fiction and pretence and the features these representations do and do not 
share with ordinary beliefs. To explain processing asymmetries, we need to pay attention 
to the entire cluster of representations related to engaging with a work of fiction or 
engaging in an episode of pretence.  
However, Nichols and Stich’s imagination box combined with the single code hypoth-
esis is ill placed to explain why clustering occurs. In the case of the imagination box, the 
idea that we place our imaginings in a ‘box’ doesn’t account for the fact that we will 
have to associate representations in the box with various diﬀerent fictions (Walton 2015, 
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pp. 18-19). This is because simply putting a representation related to fiction into this 
sort of mental workplace doesn’t explain how we come to associate it with a particular 
work of fiction or episode of pretence. It is not enough to just take some sort of belief-
like attitude towards something we take to be true in a work of fiction or episode of 
pretence; we also have to recognise that we are engaging with a specific work of fiction 
or in a specific episode of pretence.89 This reflects one of the diﬃculties that arises if we 
try to make a single belief-like attitude do all the explanatory work in explaining hypo-
thetical reasoning, pretence and our engagement with fiction. Placing a proposition into 
this box might be suﬃcient for coming to suppose that p, but it is not so immediately 
clear how it will explain coming to take p to be true in fiction. 
Furthermore, Nichols and Stich’s commitment to the single code hypothesis makes 
it diﬃcult to find a way to accommodate clustering in their distinct attitude theory. For 
example, one-way Nichols and Stich could attempt to explain why clustering occurs 
would be to argue that in fact, this doesn’t reflect an asymmetry with belief. Beliefs are 
in some sense clustered because they are implicitly subject to an operator like in the real 
world, whereas imaginings can be subject to a variety of these sorts of operators, such as 
in War and Peace or in Romeo and Juliet. This sort of response will put pressure on the 
single code hypothesis, however, unless Nichols and Stich can explain why this doesn’t 
amount to there being diﬀerences in content between beliefs and imaginings. 
As such, this reveals an initial way in which we can question the non-doxastic as-
sumption, since introducing a distinct attitude is insuﬃcient for explaining this aspect of 
our engagement in pretence and with fiction, since merely introducing a belief-like atti-
tude will not explain clustering. I will reflect a bit more about the implications of this in 
chapter 5. 
                                               
89 Nichols and Stich could argue in response to this worry that there is something distinctive 
about fictional contents which leads to them being processed in a diﬀerent way to other 
representations in the imagination box, but they have not given us a mechanistic 
explanation of what might lead to this sort of diﬀerence in processing. 
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3.7 The Role of Boxology 
At this point, a certain sort of response can be anticipated in defence of Nichols and 
Stich, which is that the boxological account of the mind has been misunderstood and 
that I have been too demanding in my expectations of its explanatory power. Weinberg, 
responding to Stock, argues that: 
[o]ne need not think of mechanisms as the sort of thing that have one characteristic 
function that applies the exact same way in all cases, without any exceptions, con-
textual variations and so on … These theories [boxological theories] are marking out 
large and stable trends in the functioning of the cognitive systems that they are 
characterising, and the worth of such theories is found in such terms, and not in 
anything like metaphysical precision. (Weinberg 2013, p. 187) 
Weinberg (2013, p. 188) would charge me with trying ‘to apply [my] standard philosoph-
ical tools to theories whose home is more in the sciences.’ I shouldn’t be expecting a 
robust explanation of every processing diﬀerence or diﬀerence in input/output between 
belief and belief-like imaginings since Nichols and Stich are merely aiming to identify 
‘large and stable’ trends related to how the propositional imagination functions. This 
looks somewhat similar to my emphasis on the importance of clustering, since Weinberg 
specifically mentions the importance of ‘contextual variations’. 
However, this sort of move calls the explanatory value of Nichols and Stich’s cogni-
tive theory of imagination into question. Understood in this way, the theory has limited 
explanatory and predictive power, since it only predicts things we already know happen 
(e.g. that we sometimes respond emotionally to things we imagine and sometimes do not) 
and it does little to explain why these things happen. If all this complex philosophical 
machinery only serves to explain and predict things we can already explain and predict 
with ordinary folk psychology and philosophical reflection, one wonders why we ought to 
accept their cognitive architecture and why we should try to make sense of mysterious 
notions like that of a ‘single code’.90  
                                               
90 Stock (2011a) shares a similar concern. 
125 
Furthermore, this defence misrepresents the nature of the challenge which is intro-
duced by Nichols and Stich maintaining that belief-like imaginings and beliefs share a 
single code. If they merely argued that imaginings were functionally distinct from beliefs 
but with some important diﬀerences, this defence would ring true (albeit leaving us with 
a lingering worry about the explanatory value of the theory). It is Nichols and Stich’s 
focus on the notion of a single code that allows these worries about processing to come 
to the fore, since they seem to imply that there should be no exceptions to how imaginings 
are processed as compared to beliefs. Indeed, issues related to processing do seem to be 
viewed by Nichols as a problem for his theory, at least in relation to diﬀerences in pro-
cessing that relate to the same mechanism, since he says that this is ‘what the single 
code hypothesis says won’t happen’ (Nichols 2006, p. 465).91 
Since this theory risks being rendered unilluminating, we are left with three ways we 
could proceed in trying to explain how children are able to engage in pretence. Firstly, 
we could try to develop a theory of pretence that relies on introducing a belief-like state, 
but which either doesn’t depend on the idea of a single code or substantially weakens 
this notion. We could then investigate if this more minimal theory can still explain the 
three features of pretence we noted. However, this project has in some sense already been 
undertaken by simulation theorists like Currie (1995) and Gordon and Baker (1994), and 
                                               
91 This also relates to a worry raised by Goldman (2006, pp. 282-283) about whether belief 
and desire share the same code since they interact with many of the same cognitive 
mechanisms. Nichols denies this in personal communication with Goldman (2006, Ch. 11 
footnote 1). Goldman finds his reply puzzling noting: ‘After reading a previous draft of this 
material, Nichols (personal communication) commented that he doesn't think that desires 
and beliefs use the same code. That's because he takes code talk as a metaphor for the 
“computational features” of a representation. This raises many delicate issues, and I confess 
that I lose my grip on Nichols's code talk at this juncture. The view needs to be spelled 
out in more detail, including a spelling out of the entire boxology architecture.’ I share 
Goldman’s concern here. There is something seductive about the idea that beliefs and 
imaginings share a single code, but once we submit the notion of code to closer inspection 
it becomes unclear precisely what this claim amounts to, particularly if Weinberg is right 
that the notion of code doesn’t commit us to thinking isomorphic representations will 
always be processed in a similar way. 
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their theories of pretence have been convincingly critiqued by Nichols and Stich (2003, 
pp. 39-47) for being overly vague. Indeed, this is part of what motivated them to intro-
duce their heavy philosophical machinery and the notion of a single code.  
The notion of a single code does a good deal of heavy lifting in explaining set-up, 
elaboration and output, so if we adopt a distinct attitude view along the lines of Nichols 
and Stich’s but weaken or abandon the notion of a single code, we risk endorsing a view 
that merely stipulates how to explain these three things. Take for example the question 
of why we respond emotionally to things we merely pretend to be the case. The single 
code hypothesis let us say this is because beliefs and belief-like imaginings are processed 
in much the same way by our aﬀective systems. If we now maintain that this won’t 
always be the case, this means that all the theory tells us is that sometimes we will 
respond emotionally to what we pretend in much the same way as we respond to what 
we believe, and sometimes we won’t. Furthermore, if make this move, it will remain 
unclear how we should make sense of clustering without endorsing something like a dis-
tinct content and distinct attitude view of pretence. If we reject the single code hypothesis 
but continue to argue that belief-like imaginings have the same contents of our beliefs, 
this will struggle to account for how our representations related to fiction and pretence 
come to be associated with particular fictions and episodes of pretence. 
Secondly, we could consider whether we can explain pretence by introducing a really 
distinct attitude which isn’t a counterpart to another mental state. Bearing in mind the 
similarities between the representations involved in pretence and our ordinary beliefs we 
have noted, this will be a diﬃcult approach to make work, so I will not attempt it in this 
thesis. 
The final way to proceed in our investigation is to look at whether we can explain 
these three features of pretence by focusing on content rather than attitude. This is what 
we will do in the next chapter where I argue that this sort of approach is the only one 
that can oﬀer a compelling account of pretence recognition and motivation. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we saw in sections 3.1 and 3.2 that we can propose that any satisfactory 
theory of pretence needs to explain set-up, elaboration and output. In section 3.3, we 
discussed Nichols and Stich’s arguments for why the best way of making sense of these 
three features is by introducing a distinct belief-like attitude. We began the discussion of 
their theory by noting that their arguments based on quarantining and synchronous 
processing do not do enough to show that it is necessary to introduce a belief-like attitude 
into an account of how we engage in pretence. Nonetheless, accepting that their ‘imagi-
nation box’ is involved in pretence for the sake of argument, we saw that this posit does 
manage to explain these three features of pretence, albeit with some lingering worries 
about how their accounts of motivation and recognition will work in practice.  
However, we then saw in section 3.4 that their notion of a ‘single code’ makes it 
diﬃcult for them to explain processing diﬀerences between belief-like imaginings and 
beliefs. I suggested in section 3.6 that this is particularly true in relation to clustering, 
which I argued reveals an initial way in which we can challenge the non-doxastic 
assumption, since belief-like imaginings appear to be insuﬃcient for explaining why our 
representations related to fiction and pretence exhibit clustering. 
Having considered these worries with Nichols and Stich’s framework, we should now 
turn to consider whether it is more plausible to embrace a distinct content theory of 
pretence. We will do this by reflecting on recognition and motivation. 
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Chapter 4: Pretence Recognition & Motivation 
Introduction 
We will now discuss some further challenges for Nichols and Stich’s distinct attitude view 
of pretence: that it struggles to account for pretence recognition, and in a related way 
the motivation of appropriate pretend actions. To introduce this next stage of our dis-
cussion of pretence, it will be helpful to make a distinction between diﬀerent kinds of 
theories of pretence aside from the one I made earlier between distinct content views and 
distinct attitude views. Broadly speaking, theories of pretence can be placed under two 
headings. Firstly, we have behavioural theories of pretence, of which Nichols and Stich’s 
is an example. These sorts of theories propose that engaging in pretence involves children 
engaging in certain sorts of behaviour. Secondly, we have mentalistic theories of pretence. 
These sorts of theories maintain that in order to be able to pretend, children have to 
recognise something about the mental states that motivate pretence behaviour. The most 
prominent defender of this approach is Leslie (1987, 1994), who we saw in chapter 2 
argues that pretenders possess the mental state concept PRETEND, and this is what 
allows them to engage in and recognise pretence.  
This distinction between behavioural and mentalistic cuts across the one we have 
made between distinct attitude and distinct content views of pretence. Langland-Hassan 
oﬀers a behavioural, distinct content view to explain pretence, whereas Leslie oﬀers a 
mentalistic distinct content view. A common worry is that mentalistic theories of 
pretence attribute too much cognitive sophistication to young children because they 
suggest that children can form meta-representations while they still fail standard false 
belief tests. As such, in this chapter I will attempt to show why an account that attributes 
what might seem to be a surprising degree of sophistication to young children is necessary 
for explaining pretence. It is worth highlighting here that behavioural theories do not 
tend to dispute that adults and older children might have a mentalistic understanding of 
pretence. The issue is whether a behavioural account is suﬃcient for explaining younger 
children’s understanding of pretence. 
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In section 4.1, we will set out Nichols and Stich’s approach to motivation and 
recognition in more detail. In section 4.2, we will then consider an argument from 
Friedman and Leslie which suggests that Nichols and Stich’s behavioural approach 
cannot explain recognition, before setting out why it looks like a version of Leslie’s 
distinct content mentalistic view that focuses on intentions to pretend can explain these 
two issues in section 4.3. This will reveal that if we allow for meta-representational beliefs 
to be involved in pretence, one could argue that we also need to introduce a distinct 
attitude to explain how pretence premises can be generated at will. I will draw on some 
helpful considerations from Langland-Hassan to argue that this proposal can be avoided. 
This will show that it is unnecessary to introduce belief-like imaginings into our theory 
of pretence. 
Having done this, in section 4.4 we will then discuss Langland-Hassan and Stich and 
Tarzia’s recent attempts to respond to these worries by refining the behavioural view. 
These behavioural accounts both suggest that recognising that someone is pretending 
involves recognising that they are making some X saliently Y-like. However, I will argue 
that it is not clear how this is supposed to explain how children recognise the content of 
pretence episodes, or how they figure out what pretend actions they should perform. I 
will suggest that this is because an account of how children recognises pretence contents 
must allow that children have some sort of mentalistic understanding of the mental states 
that motivate pretend behaviours. As such, we will see another way in which introducing 
a distinct attitude is insuﬃcient for explaining pretence. 
In section 4.5, we will consider a worry raised by Stich and Tarzia about whether 
the mentalistic view is also ill-placed to explain how children grasp the content of an 
episode of pretence, and how they figure out what pretend actions to perform. I will 
respond to this challenge by reflecting on the fact that pretending involves communica-
tion. I will suggest an important role for intentions to pretend in the recognition of 
pretence, and I will argue that we can explain how children figure out which pretend 
actions to perform by introducing desires to make things fictional. As such, I will conclude 
that the mentalistic theory should be our preferred account of how children engage in 
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pretence, and that having embraced this view we can reject the non-doxastic assumption 
when it comes to explaining how we engage in pretence. 
4.1 Motivation & Recognition 
One of the most striking demonstrations of how adept children are at understanding 
pretence is that they can recognise when others are engaging in pretend play at the same 
time as they begin to engage in pretence behaviour themselves. This has been described 
as these two abilities being yoked together in development: there is no development stage 
where children can engage in pretence yet fail to recognise that others are pretending 
(Leslie 2002, pp. 105-108). Indeed, many experiments on children that try to shed light 
on pretence rely on children being able to recognise that the experimenter is pretending. 
For example, in Leslie’s tea party experiment, the child had to recognise that the exper-
imenter is having a tea party. 
In the case of motivation, it is easy to overlook the challenges posed by the need to 
recognise what pretend actions are appropriate ones to perform. For example, how does 
a young 15-month or 18-month-year-old child realise that to pretend a banana is a phone, 
one lifts the banana in question up towards one’s ear? 
Recent behavioural theories of pretence, such as Langland-Hassan’s, have tended to 
explain recognition and the generation of appropriate pretend actions in terms of children 
being able to recognise that they, or another individual, are playing a certain sort of 
game. Stich and Tarzia oﬀer a helpful summary of this sort of approach: 
[o]bservers can understand what someone playing the pretense game is doing by not-
ing that the person playing the game is creating a state of aﬀairs that is similar, in 
salient ways, to what is going on in an appropriate depiction of an imaginary world. 
(Stich and Tarzia 2015, p. 7) 
Mentalistic accounts, such as the one oﬀered by Leslie, maintain that children need to 
possess the mental state concept PRETEND in order to be able to recognise pretence 
and to generate appropriate behaviours. Leslie agrees with Nichols and Stich that recog-
nising pretence will involve coming to recognise a pretence premise, but he argues that 
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the only way to explain how children can recognise pretence premises is by supposing 
that they possess the concept PRETEND, which can allow them to recover the way the 
pretender is representing their action (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 108). 
To see the motivation for this argument, it will be helpful to compare desiring and 
pretending. There is a stage where children can desire things, for example milk, whilst 
lacking a concept of desire and while being unable to recognise that others desire things.92 
With pretending, there is no stage where one can pretend without being able to recognise 
that others are pretending. Leslie (1987) explains this by proposing that PRETEND is 
an innate mental state concept and that engaging in pretence is an early example of our 
mindreading capacities.93 This is also supposed to explain how appropriate pretend ac-
tions are motivated. Children can recognise that they are pretending that such-and-such, 
where this means recognising that they are in a certain kind of mental state, and this 
allows them to generate appropriate behaviours. 
Some philosophers and psychologists are uncomfortable with Leslie’s theory because 
it appears to attribute a relatively high degree of conceptual sophistication to young 
pretenders. Some experiments seem to suggest that children have a rather confused un-
derstanding of pretence (Lillard, 1993) so we should question whether children really do 
possess the mental state concept PRETEND.94 Leslie responds to these sorts of worries 
                                               
92 Some studies suggest an ability to recognise desires arises relatively early in development, 
and before an ability to recognise beliefs (Repacholi and Gopnik 1997). This doesn’t alter 
our point here, since this ability doesn’t arise early enough to predate children being able 
to have desires. 
93 One could of course accept the contention that PRETEND is a mental state concept, but 
deny that it is an innate concept.  
94 These experiments concern a Troll named Moe who is hopping around like a kangaroo, but 
does not know what a kangaroo is. Children are asked whether he is pretending to be a 
kangaroo. At a young age children answer ‘yes’ and this has been taken to show at least 
at younger ages children do not possess a mentalistic concept of pretence. German and 
Leslie (2001) respond that all this demonstrates is that children don’t recognise that one 
requires knowledge about X in order to pretend to be X.  
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by noting that young children do not possess concepts like MENTAL STATE or REP-
RESENTATION in light of their possession of the concept PRETEND. A child can 
possess the concept of a PHONE without possessing the concept of SOUND WAVES, or 
as Stich and Tarzia (2015, p. 9) put the point, the concept of COW without possessing 
the concept of VERTEBRATE.  
Before I oﬀer a more detailed defence of Leslie’s view, it will be helpful to explain 
why behavioural theories struggle to explain motivation and recognition. 
4.2 Broad & Narrow  
Friedman and Leslie (2007) raise two related worries about behavioural theories of pre-
tence recognition, which also bring out some worries about behavioural theories of pre-
tence motivation. The first is that behavioural theories are too broad: they predict that 
children will mistakenly categorise many ordinary behaviours as pretend behaviours. The 
second is that these theories are too narrow: it is diﬃcult to account for certain forms of 
pretence in behavioural terms.  
Let’s begin with the too broad objection. Thinking in terms of the idea that pretence 
is a game, Friedman and Leslie charge that if the behavioural theory was correct, young 
pretenders would make systematic errors about what sorts of behaviours indicate a pre-
tence game is being played. To see why, we can recall that Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 
53) argue that pretence involves behaving in a way that would be appropriate if p were 
the case. This means that for them, recognising pretence behaviour involves recognising 
that someone is behaving in a way that would be appropriate if p were the case. For 
example, in a banana-telephone scenario, the mother is recognised to be behaving in a 
way that would be appropriate if that [banana] was a telephone. 
However, even this careful formulation could accurately describe a wide range of 
human behaviour. For example, this behavioural description would also cover cases where 
people merely have a false belief that p. Friedman and Leslie set out the worry as follows: 
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It is often acknowledged that actions based on the false belief that P are instances 
where one behaves in a way that would be appropriate if P were the case. For exam-
ple, if Sally’s mother mistakenly believes that a candle is an apple then she will behave 
in a way that would be appropriate if the candle were an apple, and perhaps try to 
eat it. The Behavioral theory predicts that when Sally witnesses this mistaken action, 
she will incorrectly consider it to be an instance of pretense. (Friedman and Leslie 
2007, p. 111) 
Having introduced this worry about false beliefs, they go on to note that the kinds of 
behaviours a child could construe as behaving in a way that would be appropriate if p 
are even more numerous than we might initially think: 
[s]uppose that Sally’s mother draws with a piece of charcoal, and that it strikes Sally 
that Mother is using the charcoal similarly to a crayon. In this case, Sally might well 
think, MOTHER IS BEHAVING IN A WAY THAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE 
IF THE CHARCOAL WERE A CRAYON. That is, Sally will mistake her mother’s 
behavior for pretense. This example might not be so problematic if it were unique or 
even rare. However, countless other examples of non-pretense behaviors will in like 
fashion nicely fit the behavioral description. All that is required is that the child 
should be able to identify a similarity between one thing and another. (Friedman and 
Leslie 2007, p. 111) 
As such, the defender of a behavioural theory will need to find a way of explaining why 
children don’t make systematic errors about when people are pretending thanks to their 
frequently classifying ordinary behaviours as pretend behaviours.  
The narrow objection proceeds by noting that there are three related examples of 
pretence behaviour that are not easily explained by Nichols and Stich’s theory and other 
behavioural accounts. These are object substitution pretence, sound eﬀects pretence and 
pretend speech pretence.95 
An example of object substitution pretence would be a child pretending that a pencil 
is a car by pushing it along a table. An example of sound eﬀects pretence would be where 
the child pushing the pencil along the table also makes ‘vroom’ noises while moving their 
pencil-car along. A pretend speech example would be where someone sits behind a teddy 
                                               
95 The pretend speech worry is developed in a later paper (Friedman et al. 2010), but they 
take it to illustrate a similar worry to these first two examples of pretence. 
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bear and begins to lift up its arms and talk in an exaggerated manner, making it seem 
as if the bear is talking. Friedman and Leslie note that these examples cannot be easily 
explained in terms of appropriate behaviours if p were the case. If the child were behaving 
in the ways that were appropriate if the pencil were a car:  
[t]hen [the child] would hardly push it across a table or make engine noises! Handling, 
pushing, and making “vroom” noises are not appropriate behaviors when dealing with 
a real car. Instead, appropriate behaviors for dealing with a real car include opening 
its doors, getting inside or, if one is very young, being placed inside, sitting still, and 
looking out the window. (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 115) 
This quote helps to reveal why the worries here are so potent for the behavioural account 
of the motivation and recognition of pretence behaviour. It is not only that the supposed 
behavioural description fails to capture what other people are doing; it also fails to cap-
ture what the pretender takes themselves to be doing.  
If a behavioural theory is going to encompass these sorts of cases it will need to be 
modified. Friedman and Leslie suggest adding the addendum that sometimes when pre-
tending children will make X move in ways that would be appropriate if X were a Y. If 
we made this move, we would need to give a disjunctive account of pretence where we 
have (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 116): 
1. The child acts in a way that would be appropriate if X were a Y 
OR 
2. The child makes X move in a way that would be appropriate if X were a Y 
This means that the behavioural account of recognition will also have to be disjunctive. 
For example, Friedman and Leslie propose that if a child sees mother is pushing a car 
they’ll have to determine whether (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 116): 
1. MOTHER BEHAVES IN A (NON-SERIOUS) WAY THAT WOULD BE (NON- 
SERIOUSLY) APPROPRIATE IF THE PENCIL WERE A CAR 
OR 
2. MOTHER IS MAKING THE PENCIL MOVE AS IF THE PENCIL WERE A 
CAR 
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However, they argue that this addendum is going to take us back to the too broad worry, 
and indeed will make this problem harder to deal with: 
This expansion of the behavioral description, however, has the unsavoury consequence 
of leading the Behavioral theory to predict that children will treat as the same – that 
is, as “pretense” – all cases where a person makes one object move as if it were another 
object. What this comes down to again is simply whether the child perceives some 
degree of similarity between the motions of the object Mother is handling and some 
other motion the child knows about. Therefore, such examples will be damagingly 
ubiquitous. For example, … Sally will treat Mother (seriously) drawing with charcoal 
the same as Mother pretending to draw with, say, a spoon (namely, as pretending 
the charcoal/spoon is a crayon). Or, if Mother (seriously) throws a ball, then Sally 
might notice that her mother is making the ball move as if it were an airplane, and 
so on. (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 116) 
In other words, the worry is that this expanded behavioural theory is going to predict 
that children will mistake an even greater range of behaviour as pretence behaviour. This 
disjunctive account also still won’t encompass sound eﬀects or pretend speech pretence. 
As we noted previously, one example of sound eﬀects pretence is a child making ‘vroom’ 
noises while pushing along a pencil-car. A problem for the behavioural view can be seen 
if we take (2) and try to adjust it for this example. For example, we might say that the 
child is making the pencil sound like a car, and we can then oﬀer a modified (2r) and say 
that when mother makes a vroom noise the child recognises that MOTHER IS MAKING 
THE PENCIL SOUND LIKE A CAR (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 117). 
The issue with this proposal is that this isn’t an accurate behavioural description of 
what’s going on: this suggests mother is making the pencil sound like a car but mother 
is making the vroom noise, not the pencil.96  
                                               
96 Friedman and Leslie (2007, p. 117) suggest we could instead add a third disjunct to our 
behavioural theory of pretence: 
 
3. The child produces sounds that X would produce if X were a Y 
 
And correspondingly: 
 
136 
In light of these sorts of diﬃculties, Friedman and Leslie conclude that: 
It is not obvious to us how to modify the Behavioral theory so that it allows Sally to 
attribute the sound eﬀects that her mother makes to the pencil-as-car, rather than to 
just her mother. After all, the sound eﬀects are Mother’s behavior, not the pencil’s, 
and Behavioral theory only allows the child to describe Mother’s real behavior and 
not what mother is pretending as such. Mother is actually making car sounds on 
behalf of the pencil because she pretends the pencil is a car. But behaving ‘on behalf 
of’ an object is not something that can be made sense of behavioristically. It seems 
that the child cannot be a behaviorist about pretense and also get it right about 
sound eﬀects in pretense. (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 118) 
At this point then we have a strong challenge for any behavioural theory of pretence to 
respond to. Recent behavioural theories, such as the ones oﬀered by Langland-Hassan 
and Stich and Tarzia, need to refine their explanation of recognition so that it rules out 
children getting systematically confused about what behaviours are to be understood as 
pretend behaviours, at the same time as making sense of all the diﬀerent varieties of 
pretence. In turn, they also have to explain how appropriate pretend behaviours are 
motivated, since the foregoing worries about these accounts being too narrow will also 
apply to how children are able to recognise appropriate behaviours to perform. 
Before we see how they develop their theories to meet this challenge, it will be helpful 
to look at why the mentalistic account is well placed to step in here and explain the 
recognition of pretence and other features like set-up, elaboration and eﬀect. 
                                               
3r. MOTHER PRODUCES THE SOUNDS THAT X WOULD PRODUCE IF X WERE 
A Y 
 
The worry remains the same. For recognition to work in this case, the child needs to 
recognise that mother pretends the pencil is a car and pretends of the sounds she is making 
that the car makes those sounds. This revised behavioural description still says mother 
produces the sounds in question, not to the pencil-car. 
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4.3 Mentalistic Pretence 
As we have already noted, the two key proposals of Leslie’s theory are that children 
possess the mental state concept PRETEND and that pretence representations are ‘de-
coupled’. This PRETEND concept is supposed to play a key role in the recognition of 
pretence. To see why, recall the tea party example. In this sort of case, Leslie argues the 
mental state involved is a combination of an agent, attitude and representation. The 
agent is ‘I’, the attitude is ‘PRETEND’ and the representation is something like ‘I am 
having a tea party’. We end up with the idea that this episode of pretence involves 
forming meta-representational beliefs like: 
I PRETEND “[that] I am having a tea party” 
Recognition will involve the agent of this complex mental state changing, with the atti-
tude (PRETEND) staying the same and the representation staying largely the same. For 
example, the child might represent something like:  
MOTHER PRETENDS “[THAT] SHE IS HAVING A TEA PARTY” 
In order to recognise this, the child will attend to behaviour much as Nichols and Stich 
suggest, but this is used to infer the mental state that guided the behaviour in question. 
For object substitution, sound eﬀects and pretend speech cases, these descriptions will 
have to become more complicated but will be developed in the same general form. For 
example, Friedman and Leslie (2007, p. 118) (making use of demonstratives) suggest that 
recognition of sound eﬀects pretence might look something like: 
MOTHER PRETENDS (OF) THIS PENCILi “ITi IS A CARj” AND (OF) THAT 
SOUNDk “ITk IS MADE BY THE CARj” 
For the mentalistic theory there is no special problem raised by these kinds of pretence; 
the recognition of object substitution and sound eﬀects pretence is explained in the same 
way as other forms of pretence. As such, the too narrow worry doesn’t arise. Furthermore, 
since recognition depends on children possessing the mental concept PRETEND, we can 
also sidestep the too broad problem. Children’s possession of this concept will allow them 
to recognise genuine instances of pretence as compared to behaviour motivated by false 
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beliefs etc. As we just noted, the child can recognise that pretence is something more 
than mere ‘as-if’ behaviour and that it stems from particular sorts of mental states.  
This theory is well placed to make sense of the three features of pretence that any 
theory needs to explain.97 In the case of set-up, the generation of the pretence premise 
can be explained by Leslie’s notion of ‘decoupling’. In an early paper, Leslie (1987, p. 
419-420) argues that decoupling is achieved by three mechanisms. Firstly, we have the 
expression raiser. This can either take a primary representation of the external world, 
such as this is a banana, or a representation from memory, and decouple (disconnects) 
it from its ordinary logical connections. The quoted representation ‘this is a banana’ is 
then supplied with the context AGENT PRETEND by the manipulator. This gives a 
representation like ‘I PRETEND that ‘this is a banana’’. Now that this expression has 
been decoupled and the right context applied, it can be manipulated further thanks to a 
connection between the manipulator and what Leslie calls the interpreter. The interpreter 
provides information about primary representations from the external world (such as this 
is a banana), as well as from memory. In the present case, this might lead to the expres-
sion being transformed into ‘this [banana] is a telephone’ thanks to noticing some simi-
larities between telephones and bananas in terms of their shape or from remembering a 
previous time they pretended a banana was a telephone. Since this secondary represen-
tation is decoupled, there is thus no threat of inferential chaos here and we can explain 
synchronous processing. And, since this is supposed to be a sort of representational ma-
nipulation we can engage in at will, this explains why we are free to choose what we 
pretend when we generate pretence premises.  
In the case of elaboration, these manipulated representations still maintain some 
ordinary logical connections thanks to the interpreter, meaning that children can form 
regular inferences from a premise such as ‘this [banana] is a telephone’. Non-inferential 
elaboration and embellishment are possible because the manipulator leaves the child free 
                                               
97 Nichols and Stich (2003, pp. 47-57) note that Leslie is not always explicit about how his 
account explains various aspects of pretence. In what follows I am largely attempting to 
independently square what Leslie argues in various papers with various aspects of pretence. 
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to manipulate their pretence representations as they desire based on information from 
the interpreter. 
As for output, motivation is supposed to be explained by saying that because children 
possess the PRETEND concept, they can recognise what would count as an appropriate 
pretend action. It is unclear precisely why this is supposed to be the case, and we will 
return to this point shortly when we discuss Leslie’s approach to explaining recognition. 
This leaves the outstanding question of why children respond emotionally to their games 
of pretence. This is not an issue that Leslie directly addresses to my knowledge. I will 
say something that bears on this question in chapter 5, where I’ll discuss and respond to 
a general problem that arises when we argue that beliefs with meta-representational 
contents lead to aﬀective responses.  
Finally, it’s worth noting that this sort of distinct content approach gives us a useful 
explanation of clustering, since according to the mentalistic view children are able to 
reason about the contents of specific episodes of pretence. Weisberg (2015, p. 4) notes 
that the mentalistic view ‘finds support from research showing that children can navigate 
multiple episodes of pretend play with diﬀerent partners, an ability which depends on 
keeping track of these partners’ beliefs about what the props represent in the game.’ For 
example, Weisberg and Bloom (2009) report experiments that suggest children are able 
to separate out multiple pretend worlds (e.g. they realise a pretend prop can have diﬀer-
ent identities in diﬀerent episodes of pretence: that a banana is not a telephone in every 
game of pretend). 
The reader might wonder, at this point, whether this account is implausible because 
it attributes a capacity to form meta-representational beliefs to young children (as we 
saw in chapter 2, this means to form a representation of a representation, e.g. represent-
ing mother as believing X, or mother as pretending X). A common worry raised here is 
that children start to engage in pretence between 15 to 18 months, an age where they 
still fail standard false belief tests. In a standard false belief test, which is often called 
the ‘Sally Anne’ test, the child watches someone place an object into a container of some 
sort, such as a box or a drawer. The person who placed the object then leaves the room, 
and another person removes the object from the container and places it elsewhere, usually 
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in another container. Upon watching, this scene, the child is then asked where the person 
who originally placed the object will look for it when they re-enter the room. Before the 
age of four children tend to reply that they will check the container the object was moved 
to. After the age of four, they report that they will check the container the object was in 
originally.  
This is often viewed as demonstrating that children under the age of four lack an 
understanding of belief, and this can be seen as evidence that they cannot form meta-
representational beliefs about other person’s mental states. To this empirical worry, we 
can oﬀer two responses. The first comes from Leslie (1994, 2002) himself, who argues 
that the ability to form meta-representations containing the PRETEND concept arises 
before the ability to form meta-representations containing the BELIEF concept. This 
might be, for example because it takes additional development to come to understand 
the nature of false beliefs (Leslie and German 2001). A second response is to note that 
recent studies have suggested the ability to pass a false belief test arises much younger 
than previously thought, perhaps as early as 15 months (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005). 
These new studies rely on measuring things like looking time to establish whether young 
children show an understanding of false belief. As such, the claim that children can form 
these sorts of meta-representations at the point where they start engaging in pretence is 
empirically contestable, but there is no knockdown argument against granting this ability 
to young pretenders. As such, I will not worry further about the mere possibility of 
forming these sorts of beliefs, though we will touch on similar sophistication worries in 
relation to childhood engagement with fiction in chapter 5. 
As oﬀered, there are several ambiguities in this sketch of Leslie’s theory of pretence. 
I will mention two. The first ambiguity concerns what it means to say that PRETEND 
is a mental state concept. Here are two readings: 
1. PRETEND is a concept of a distinct attitude of pretending-that, a distinct atti-
tude from believing or desiring 
2. PRETEND is a concept of a certain form of belief, beliefs about what one is 
pretending 
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The second suggestion here is the one Leslie comes closest to directly aﬃrming. In an 
article co-authored with Nichols and Stich, we are told that: 
According to Leslie, in terms of boxology, there is no such thing as the ‘pretend box’, 
and thus no such thing as simply ‘having a pretend’. Instead, pretending is a special 
case of placing a representation in the ‘belief box’, where the representation says in 
eﬀect, ‘someone is pretending such and such’. (Nichols et al. 1996, p. 56) 
However, Currie (1998, pp. 39-41) suggests that the most charitable interpretation of 
Leslie is captured by the first suggestion: that engaging in pretence involves forming 
representations like ‘I pretend that p’ and also meta-representational beliefs like ‘I believe 
that I PRETEND that p’. This is for two reasons. Firstly, he notes that it’s unclear how 
the mental state concept PRETEND could literally be a concept of a certain kind of 
belief. Secondly, and perhaps more crucially, he also notes that we don’t typically think 
we can form beliefs at will, so it is unclear why we are supposed to be able to form meta-
representational beliefs at will while we are pretending. However, if we reject this second 
reading and embrace the first approach, we will introduce some sort of distinct attitude 
into our account of pretence. The resulting view would amount to the claim that we need 
to supplement an account along the lines of the one oﬀered by Nichols and Stich’s with 
an ability to form meta-representations and would amount to adopting a distinct attitude 
and distinct content view of the sorts of representations that allow us to engage in pre-
tence. 
However, I think we can develop the core of Leslie’s arguments without introducing 
a distinct attitude. To begin, it will be helpful to note a comment made by Weisberg. 
She argues that the crucial claim of the mentalistic theory is that: 
Engaging in an episode of pretend play crucially requires understanding something 
about the mental states involved, so that one is aware of what is intended in the 
game. On this view, playing the banana-as-telephone game requires knowing that 
one’s partner (or oneself) intends the banana to represent a telephone. (emphasis 
mine) (Weisberg 2015, p. 4) 
This is a weaker claim than either (1) or (2), and can be understood as amounting to the 
idea that children are able to engage in pretence and recognise when others are pretending 
because they recognise the intentions to pretend that motivate pretence behaviours. In 
142 
other words, in order to engage in or recognise pretence, we have to form beliefs like 
mother is (or I am) pretending that p where ‘pretending’ is understood as not being a 
form of mere behaviour or as a ‘distinct attitude’, but as relating to pretenders’ intentions 
to represent things. 
On this reading, arguing that PRETEND is a mental state concept amounts to 
arguing that in order to understand pretence children have to recognise something about 
people’s internal mental states, and this something is related to their intentions and the 
way they are manipulating their primary representations, rather than something like a 
distinct attitude that is some sort of counterpart to belief. It has to be recognised that 
the reason pretenders engage in certain sorts of behaviour has something to do with their 
intention to pretend, and what they are pretending has something to do with the way 
they are representing the world internally, rather than their primary representations of 
the world.  
That being said, we might press that the idea of an ‘expression raiser’ and more 
generally the notion of ‘decoupling’ amounts to the idea that we can entertain proposi-
tions in a belief-like way, thus serving to reintroduce belief-like imaginings. However, this 
piece of architecture enables just one part of the general process of forming a meta-
representation, and Leslie leaves it open whether we can merely decouple a representation 
without relating it to an informational relation such as PRETEND. For Leslie, decoupling 
occurs whenever we represent someone else’s mental state, such as if we represent that 
‘mother BELIEVES “the cat is on the mat”’. Decoupling is a general mechanism that 
allows us to remove representations from their ordinary input and output relations and 
in so doing allows us to engage in mindreading. Furthermore, even if one presses that 
decoupling must involve some sort of distinct attitude, it is unclear whether this will 
amount to introducing belief-like imaginings, rather than some thin notion of entertaining 
a proposition that occurs as a precursor to taking a more specific attitude towards the 
proposition in question.  
The crucial point about decoupling is that if the mentalistic view is right, then we 
cannot explain how pretence behaviour is motivated or recognised solely by allowing that 
we have an ability to decouple representations. It also has to be specifically recognised 
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that you or someone else is pretending, where this means being in a certain sort of mental 
state rather than engaging in a sort of mere behaviour.  
This still leaves Currie’s worry, however, about why we can generate pretence prem-
ises at will when we cannot ordinarily believe things at will. For example, when I decouple 
a representation in an attitude report like ‘mother BELIEVES “the cat is on the mat” I 
can voluntarily call to mind diﬀerent propositions mother might believe, but I am not 
free to choose which of them I take to be an accurate description of what mother believes. 
In pretence, on the other hand, it looks like you can simply form whatever representations 
you desire, and we could argue that to make sense of this we will have to introduce 
something like a distinct belief-like attitude. 
However, we can make sense of pretence premise generation without introducing 
distinct attitudes by drawing on an argument from Langland-Hassan, whose counterfac-
tual theory of pretence we first came across in section 2.4.1 and which we will discuss in 
more detail shortly. In explaining how we might engage in hypothetical reasoning, he 
oﬀers the following example: 
[s]uppose one wants to hypothetically reason about what will happen if the Cubs win 
the World Series this year (a hypothetical that promises to remain hypothetical). Call 
the proposition that the Cubs win the World Series this year ‘c’. The desire to know 
what will happen if c will be enough to cause one to access whatever general beliefs 
one has about teams that win the World Series. A few likely come to mind: the team 
jumps for joy (‘j’), their fans shed tears of elation (‘e’), they take part in a ticker-tape 
parade in their home city (‘t’), shirts are printed up (‘s’), and so on. Having brought 
these generalizations to mind, and believing the Cubs to be the sort of thing that falls 
under those generalizations (i.e., a baseball team), one then infers that if c then prob-
ably j and e and t and s, etc., and forms the corresponding beliefs. There is no need 
during all of this to put c itself in either the belief or desire ‘‘boxes’’—or any ‘‘box’’ 
at all (hence, no need to ‘‘quarantine’’ c). Turning again to the issue of pretense, if 
one wishes to pretend that the Cubs have just won the World Series, the inferred 
(and now believed) conditionals just mentioned will be sufficient to guide a sequence 
of pretend behavior. (Langland-Hassan 2012, p. 167) 
We can embrace part of his insight here, and allow that the voluntary generation of 
pretence premises has something to do with a general ability to think about what it 
would be like if such-and-such was the case by reflecting on our beliefs, rather than on 
an ability to enter into special belief-like states.  
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Going back to the mentalistic theory, we can allow that during pretence children can 
consult their beliefs about the thing they want to pretend, and so we can argue that all 
they need to do to generate a pretence premise is ask themselves what would happen if 
p were the case. Combined with a suitable desire to pretend this will be enough to get 
an episode of pretence started. This then leaves the issue of why at this point we should 
maintain that the relevant notion of ‘pretend’ here is mentalistic rather than behavioural, 
an issue we will consider in the next two sections of this chapter. 
That being said, we cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that some sort of 
notion of belief-like imagining is at least sometimes involved in pretence. It may well be 
that sometimes episodes of pretence get started because children entertain or suppose a 
proposition in a belief-like way. Equally, however, there could be alternative mental 
states that kick oﬀ pretence and this means that belief-like states are unnecessary for 
explaining pretence. The initial intention to pretend could arise from a desire to do 
something funny (Carruthers 2006, footnote 18, proposes that this is why the child in 
Gould’s example pretends to be a dead cat), or to play with a sibling. It might also stem 
from forming a mental image of a scary dragon and then beginning to act as if this dragon 
were real. The important point for present purposes is that all of these sorts of states are 
insuﬃcient for explaining how we are able to engage in pretence bearing in mind the 
worries we noted in the previous section about behavioural views of pretence. In order to 
pretend or recognise that someone else is pretending, you need to form a belief with 
distinct content like ‘I PRETEND “p”’ or ‘mother PRETEND “p”’ where this involves 
some sort of recognition of your (or mother’s) intention to represent p. We will need 
further beliefs about what would be the case if p and perhaps a desire to pretend that p, 
but there is no need here for belief-like imaginings. In this way, once we’ve adopted this 
sort of distinct content view it becomes unnecessary to introduce a distinct belief-like 
attitude into our account of pretence. 
Before we further defend this view of pretence motivation and recognition, we should 
firstly consider some behavioural responses to the worries that we raised about 
recognition and motivation. The cost of embracing an approach along the lines proposed 
by Leslie remains that it attributes a relatively high level of conceptual sophistication to 
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young children and commits us to the view that they can form meta-representations from 
a young age. As such, we should take care to examine whether a suitably modified 
behavioural theory can do the explanatory work here to see if we can avoid making these 
sorts of empirical commitments. 
 To develop my argument for why a modified behavioural theory will still struggle to 
explain all aspects of children’s engagement in pretence, we can introduce a distinction 
between recognising that someone is pretending, and recognising what they are 
pretending: the specific content of their pretence episode. In terms of motivation, we need 
to explain not only what motivates someone to pretend, but also what allows them to 
figure out what constitutes an appropriate pretend action. 
This issue has often been relatively ignored, but has started to receive a good deal of 
attention in recent years, with Langland-Hassan attempting to make sense of this issue 
on his single attitude behavioural view. Stich and Tarzia also oﬀer a distinct attitude 
behavioural view that seeks to make sense of this issue, and raise a challenge for 
mentalistic theories when it comes to explaining how children figure out appropriate 
pretend actions and recognising what others are pretending. 
4.4 Defending Behavioural Recognition & Motivation 
To begin this discussion, it will be helpful to quote Langland-Hassan’s account of how a 
tea party proceeds (in his example ‘P’ refers to what he calls a ‘perceptual attitude’, ‘B’ 
to a belief and ‘D’ to a desire.98): 
 
P1: You say, ‘‘Let’s have a tea party!’’ and start setting out dishes and cups. You do all 
of this with a familiar cluster of mannerisms (e.g., knowing looks and smiles, exagger-
ated movements and intonation, stopping actions short of normal goal points). 
                                               
98 He tells the reader that if they are sceptical of the existence of perceptual attitudes they 
can read these as being further beliefs. I take no stand on this issue here as it will not aﬀect 
our assessment of this theory. 
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B1: (inferred from P1) You are starting a game where we act in ways that would be ap-
propriate if we were at a tea party, even if we’re not at one.  
 
D1: I play this game, too.  
 
P2: You are acting as if you are pouring tea out of the teapot and into the cups.  
 
B2: (from D1 and P2) I should act as if you poured tea into the cups. 
 
B3: (from B2 and stored generalizations) If you had poured tea into both cups, they 
would both now be full.  
 
B4: (D1 causes this to be inferred from B3): I should act as if both cups are full.  
 
P3: You put down the bottle and say ‘‘watch this!’’; you turn the green cup upside 
down and then put it back on the table, right side up.  
 
B5: (background beliefs): When cups containing liquid are turned upside down, the liq-
uid spills out. When full cups are not moved, they remain full. 
 
B6: (inferred from P3, B4, and B5): If you had poured tea into both cups and over-
turned the green one, the green one would now be empty and the other one full.  
 
B7: (inferred from B6, due to D1) I should act like the green cup is empty and the other 
one is full.  
 
P4: You say, ‘‘Show me which cup is empty and which is full.’’  
 
D1—an abiding desire to play the game—then leads the child to consult B7 in giving 
her answer: she points to the green cup to indicate that it is ‘‘empty,’’ and then to the 
other to indicate it is ‘‘full.’’ (Langland-Hassan 2012, pp. 165-166) 
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In this way, he rejects a role for any belief-like states in pretence and also for meta-
representational beliefs. As such, he would reject my suggestion in the previous section 
that recognising pretence or engaging in pretence requires one to have, or to recognise, 
an intention to pretend, where this is understood as entailing that children do not un-
derstand pretence as mere behaviour.99  
In this sketch of a tea party, Langland-Hassan is suggesting a role for two diﬀerent 
sorts of beliefs in an explanation of how children can engage in pretence. The first sort 
of belief is captured by B3 (‘If you had poured tea into both cups, they would both now 
be full.’). We are told this is inferred from a desire to play the game (D1) along with 
beliefs about what’s going on in the game that lead to one asking oneself an internal 
question (represented by B2). This is the one he readily signposts by telling us that 
propositionally imagining involves forming counterfactual beliefs based on stored 
generalisations, as we noted in section 2.4.1. The other is captured by B1 and B2, which 
have contents of the form ‘I should act as if p’. These sorts of beliefs are what we can 
call self-regarding ones about how we ought to act or behave (or possibly about how 
others are behaving, in the case of the recognition of pretence). However, how the child 
can generate these sorts of beliefs is not explained merely by saying that they can ask 
themselves questions and call upon stored generalisations. Instead, Langland-Hassan 
implies that these are formed based on a mixture of the pretender’s counterfactual beliefs 
                                               
99 We can bring out here that the behavioural view is also mentalistic in some sense. We can 
contrast here what we can call a mentalistic mentalistic view and a mentalistic behavioural 
view. According to the former, children possess a concept of PRETEND and this concept 
is a mentalistic concept. According to the latter, children still have a concept of PRETEND 
but this is a concept of a certain sort of behaviour. The disagreement here is not about 
whether children possess any sort of PRETEND concept but about what sort of concept 
PRETEND is. The mentalistic view says that pretence has some mental component and 
has to be understood as involving mental representations in order for children to engage in 
pretence and recognise others are pretending. The behavioural view says that although 
pretence is made possible by the possession of mental states, the recognition and the 
generation of pretence behaviours only requires children to understand PRETEND as a 
behavioural concept. 
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and a desire to play the pretend game in question. This raises the question of whether 
Langland-Hassan can oﬀer a satisfactory explanation of how children recognise what sort 
of behaviour counts as appropriate during a pretence episode on the basis of these sorts 
of mental states.  
He argues that when a child forms a belief like ‘I should act as if you poured tea into 
the cups’ the ‘act as if’ here amounts to saying the child has a belief that they should 
act in a way that makes their actions appear saliently tea-has-been-poured-into-cups like. 
To make sense of pretence recognition he notes the importance of manner cues. For 
example, when we engage in pretence, we often perform exaggerated mannerisms: licking 
our lips going 'mmm' when we pretend to eat a cake, or winking after saying 'it's for 
you!' when answering a banana-phone. It would be natural for a behavioural theorist to 
integrate these manner cues into their account of pretence recognition. Indeed, Friedman 
and Leslie (2007, pp. 111-113) try to develop this sort of account on Nichols and Stich's 
behalf, though find it wanting since these sorts of behaviours are prima facie not the 
sorts of behaviours that would be appropriate if p were the case (one doesn't usually lick 
one's lips in an exaggerated manner when eating a cake; a real monster (presumably) 
wouldn’t shout out ‘I’m a monster!’ while making exaggerated roaring noises). 
Langland-Hassan attempts to integrate manner cues into behavioural theory in a 
subtle way. Langland-Hassan (2012, pp. 174-177) agrees with Friedman and Leslie that 
manner cues aren’t usually behaviours that would be appropriate if p were the case, but 
suggests that children can recognise that these manner cues often are not appropriate 
behaviours if p were the case. From this observation, Langland-Hassan proposes that 
pretence recognition is explained by children being able to recognise that the pretender's 
behaviour is making some X saliently Y-like, whilst also recognising various manner cues 
that make the pretender's behaviour less Y-like. The combination of the two allows chil-
dren to recognise that someone is pretending. The manner cues don’t make the pretend 
behaviour more Y-like, but they help to focus attention on the fact someone is pretending. 
Having made this proposal, he oﬀers a relatively simple way of evading the too broad 
and too narrow objections. Children don't mistake other kinds of behaviour as pretence 
behaviour because other kinds of behaviour are not accompanied by manner cues which 
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serve to render those behaviours less Y-like. In a false belief case, if someone mistakenly 
believes that a piece of plastic fruit is real, they won’t attempt to eat it whilst making 
exaggerated ‘mmm’ noises. Instead, they might take a bite and spit it out, or stop short 
of taking a bite upon realising the fruit is plastic. For the too narrow objection, his 
response is a bit more complex. Roughly he argues that the behaviours Friedman and 
Leslie mention (e.g. running a pencil along a table, making vroom noises) count as a way 
of making some X saliently Y-like. The child recognises that mother, in pushing the 
pencil along saying ‘vroom’, is trying to make the pencil saliently car-like. Perfect resem-
blance isn’t achieved here (as already noted, mother is making the noise, not the pencil), 
but according to Langland-Hassan ‘perfect’ resemblance isn’t necessary for pretending: 
Turning to the matter of pretense recognition, in recognizing the pencil/car pretense, 
the child recognizes that the father is trying to make the pencil saliently car-like (as 
above, manner cues both direct her attention to the pencil, and allow her to recognize 
that he is starting a pretense game with respect to the pencil). One way to make the 
pencil car-like is to cause it to move forward and backward around the table, since a 
salient feature of cars is that they move forward and backward. Of course, it is not a 
salient feature of cars that they have hands moving them, but the hand’s involvement 
is necessary to bring about some other salient resemblance. Another salient feature 
of cars is that their motions are accompanied by Vroom sounds. In making Vroom 
sounds while the pencil moves around the table, the father makes the pencil car-like 
in the respect that its movements are accompanied by Vroom sounds. Of course, the 
Vroom sounds of cars are made by engines, not mouths. Perfect resemblance is not 
achieved—but, fortunately, pretense does not require it. The point of pretense is to 
go some distance toward making some x saliently y-like. (emphases in original) (Lang-
land-Hassan 2012, p. 177) 
He sums up his approach by telling us that: 
[a] person can be reliably recognized as pretending that p by recognizing that she is 
acting in some salient ways that would be appropriate if p, while oﬀering some of a 
familiar cluster of manner cues, some of which involve acting as if not-p and draw 
attention to the subject matter of the pretense. (Langland-Hassan 2012, p. 175) 
Roughly then, Langland-Hassan’s view amounts to the idea that recognising pretend 
actions involves recognising some X has been made saliently Y-like, but is in some other 
ways not saliently-Y like thanks to the presence of manner cues. However, we should 
question whether Langland-Hassan’s account of children’s understanding of pretence can 
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explain how children recognise what someone is pretending in addition to that they are 
pretending. For example, when a child sees mother pretending to sip tea she needs to 
recognise that mother is pretending but also as more specifically pretending that she is 
at a tea party. In turn, this also raises the question of how the child figures out what 
pretend actions they should perform once they’ve called upon stored generalisations and 
formed a desire to pretend that p.  
We have been told that both these issues relate to the pretender making some x 
saliently y-like, but this is puzzling both from the side of the pretender and from the 
recogniser. In the first instance, how does the pretender know what will count as making 
X saliently Y-like? In the second instance, how does the recogniser realise whether X has 
been made suﬃciently Y-like? We have been told that perfect resemblance isn’t required, 
but we have no sense of what is needed instead. In this way, it looks like there is a 
troublesome vagueness at the heart of Langland-Hassan’s theory. 
Before we consider how we might respond to these issues, we should first develop 
Stich and Tarzia’s related approach to making sense of recognition and motivation. Stich 
and Tarzia (2015) develop their refined behavioural account along similar lines to Lang-
land-Hassan. The main diﬀerence with their account is that they return an imagination 
box to the picture, since they think that we need this box to account for where the child 
'tokens' pretence premises.100 That being said, they do not argue that recognition and 
motivation cannot be explained by Langland-Hassan’s theory and refrain from criticising 
his account in detail, simply pointing out in a footnote (Stich and Tarzia, footnote 10) 
that he will face issues explaining things like pretence deficits in children with autism. 
These worries need not concern us since both Langland-Hassan and Stich and Tarzia end 
up giving a similar account of pretence recognition and the generation of appropriate 
behaviours.  
                                               
100 Langland-Hassan would respond that the premise in fact isn’t tokened anywhere since it 
will not be entertained save for as part of a counterfactual belief. 
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Stich and Tarzia agree with Langland-Hassan that we should accept Friedman and 
Leslie’s criticisms of Nichols and Stich’s behavioural view, and drop the idea that 
recognition involves children merely recognising behaviour that would be appropriate if 
p were the case. They replace this with the suggestion that children recognise what 
someone is pretending by recognising that their external actions imitate the contents of 
their imagination box by being ‘similar, in salient ways’ to what is being represented in 
the imagination box (Stich and Tarzia, p. 7).  
For example, this means that if a child sees someone running around barking, they 
recognise that this is similar to the events represented in the pretender’s imagination box 
when the pretence premise is something along the lines of ‘I am a dog’. Appropriate 
pretend behaviours arise because children can form desires to create a series of events 
that is similar to the ones in their imagination box after they place a pretence premise 
into it. In this way, they can make sense of the too narrow worry by allowing that 
instances of pretence like pretend speech do indeed imitate the contents of the 
imagination box in some respects. To deal with the too broad worry, they rely on manner 
cues in much the same way as Langland-Hassan: 
[w]e propose that manner cues play an important role in alerting the observer that 
the pretense game is being played. The smiles, knowing looks, winks and nods, exag-
gerated gestures, unusual tone of voice and stopping short of normal goals that have 
loomed large in the pretense literature since Piaget, are signals to children (and to 
adults as well) that the pretense game is being played. (Stich and Tarzia 2015, p. 7) 
However, in this passage, it is only argued that these manner cues ‘alert the observer 
that the pretense game is being played’, which leaves it open how the pretender recognises 
which specific pretence game is being played. As such, Stich and Tarzia need to respond 
to similar questions to Langland-Hassan in order to explain how children recognise what 
someone else is pretending and what would count as an appropriate pretend behaviour 
when they engage in pretence. In trying to make sense of these issues, both theorists also 
need to avoid slipping a mentalistic notion of pretending into their accounts, a risk Lang-
land-Hassan (2012, p. 175-176) helpfully highlights.  
In the case of recognising the specific content of an episode of pretence, both Lang-
land-Hassan and Stich and Tarzia maintain that pretence content is recognised thanks 
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to manner cues. Manner cues thus need to do double duty in highlighting both that 
someone is pretending and what they are pretending. For example, Langland-Hassan 
(2012, p. 175) argues that manner cues ‘draw attention to the subject matter of the 
pretense’. To illustrate the general idea here, both thinkers consider the case of someone 
pretending to be sleepy who makes an exaggerated yawning noise and declares that 
they’re very sleepy, which they argue indicates the content of this pretence to the child.  
The problem here is threefold. The first is that not all cases of pretence recognition 
will involve obvious manner cues that draw attention to the subject matter of the relevant 
episode of pretence. The second is that it is unclear how manner cues are able to allow 
children to recognise the content of episodes of pretence if they understand pretence as 
mere behaviour, since pretend actions are not merely conventional. Finally, we still ha-
ven’t heard enough about how the child recognises what pretend actions are appropriate 
ones to perform in their own games of pretence. 
In relation to the first worry, Stich and Tarzia argue that in cases where the premise 
isn’t obvious: 
[t]he child’s cognitive system begins providing the [imagination box] with pretense 
premises and noting similarities between features of the world described in the [im-
agination box] and salient features of the behavior of the person (e.g. a parent) who 
has initiated the pretense. (Stich and Tarzia 2015, p. 7) 
This risks introducing a sort of regress into their theory of recognition: Stich and Tarzia 
don’t make it clear how children work out what sorts of premises they need to ‘try’ here 
or how they recognise when they have stumbled upon the right one. They accept Wein-
berg and Meskin’s (2006b, p. 182) proposal that pretence premises are placed into the 
imagination box by an ‘inputter’, but they do not explain how this mechanism knows 
which premises to input when we recognise that someone is engaging in pretence behav-
iour. Perhaps more crucially, they also do not tell us how our cognitive mechanisms 
recognise when the appropriate premise has been placed in the imagination box and in 
turn how children recognise that they should stop trying out new premises.  
In relation to the second worry, part of the issue here is that children are capable of 
being creative when they pretend to be an elephant, or a dog etc., and can pretend that 
this is so in novel and imaginative ways. However, when they see someone pretending in 
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a novel way, it is unclear how mere manner cues could lead the child to recognise the 
content of the pretence in question, if they have no understanding of the intentions of 
the pretender. This point leads us on to the third worry, since when children engage in 
novel pretence behaviour of their own, it is unclear how they would recognise that their 
behaviour is nonetheless ‘similar, in salient ways’ to the contents of their imagination 
box. 
Similar worries also arise when we reflect on Langland-Hassan’s view, since he doesn’t 
explain what allows children to recognise what counts as an appropriate pretend action 
to perform, or what makes them realise when some X has been made suﬃciently saliently 
Y-like.101 Going back to our original question for his theory, this means that he doesn’t 
tell us enough about what allows the child to form beliefs like ‘I should behave as if p’ 
or ‘mother is behaving as if p’.  
The answer to these sorts of worries presumably will come from getting clearer on 
the notions of ‘saliency’ and ‘similarity’ that these behavioural theories rely on. However, 
neither of these theorists say much about how we should understand these terms. For 
example, in a footnote we are told by Stich and Tarzia that: 
[i]n the pretense game, the player is aware of the representation of events of a certain 
sort in a component of her mind that she has access to. She need not be aware that 
that component of the mind is her [imagination box], or that the events represented 
                                               
101 This point also helps to rule out a further proposal we might introduce to defend 
behavioural theories of pretence. We could argue that there is a basic of kind of action – 
‘pretendings’ – which can be recognised as such. If this were true, recognition could be 
explained by saying we just need to recognise someone is performing an action of this kind. 
The diﬃculty with this approach is it seems that ‘pretendings’ are best thought of as 
representational actions, as noted by Friedman (2013, pp. 193-194). He suggests, for 
example, that we could draw a parallel with drawing, where arguably to recognise what 
someone has drawn you need to recognise the drawer intended to represent something. In 
much the same way, we could argue recognition of pretence involves recognising that 
someone intends to represent something and on the basis of this to infer what they are 
attempting to represent. In this way, a ‘type of action’ based account of pretence may well 
still end up being a mentalistic account. 
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are being imagined. She need not even have the concept of imagination. Rather, she 
has the demonstrative belief that events of a certain sort are occurring there (in her 
[imagination box]) and she desires to create a saliently similar sequence of events. 
(Stich and Tarzia 2015, footnote 11) 
It is notable here that this sort explanation of pretence gives us no hint of how the child 
knows what would count as a ‘saliently similar sequence of events’. For example, in 
response to the too broad objection, Stich and Tarzia argue that: 
[t]he child is not looking for behavior that would be appropriate if p were the case. 
Rather, she is looking for behavior creating a sequence of events that is saliently 
similar to the events represented in the [imagination box], when p is used as a pretense 
premise. And, as we have noted, the similarity can be far from perfect, and the man-
ner cues, while typically diminishing similarity, will also often heighten salience. We 
conclude that the over-extension problem is easily handled on the current account. 
(emphases mine) (Stich and Tarzia 2015, p. 8) 
The reason why behavioural theorists have strayed away from attempting to define these 
sorts of terms is presumably because they wish to avoid the sorts of issues Friedman and 
Leslie raised initially. If a broad sketch of similarity and saliency were to be oﬀered, this 
would risk the theory in question being subject to the too broad objection, and if we give 
a highly specific account of similarity and saliency, it will fail to readily encompass the 
wide variety of potential pretence behaviours.  
As such, Stich and Tarzia and Langland-Hassan both don’t do enough to explain 
how children work out the specific content of episodes of pretence or to address how 
children know which pretend actions to perform.102 For these theories to seem plausible, 
                                               
102 Ferreira (2014, pp. 104-108) raises a somewhat similar concern: whether behavioural 
theorists can develop a notion of ‘making’ that is robustly behavioural and doesn’t just 
amount to saying that we have a mentalistic notion of pretending. He considers and rejects 
various proposals, such as that making amounts to transforming, and argues that the most 
plausible notion of making involved in pretence is something like a notion of make-believing 
X has Y-like properties. However, as he notes, this amounts to attributing something like 
a mentalistic concept of PRETEND to the pretender. I am sympathetic to his worries in 
relation to Langland-Hassan’s view, but it strikes me that Stich and Tarzia can respond 
here by arguing that ‘making’ merely involves recognising the appropriate degree of 
similarity and saliency has been achieved in relation to a representation in the pretence 
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we eﬀectively have to take it as given that children just do possess a capacity to recognise 
that an appropriate degrees of saliency and similarity have been reached when it comes 
to performing their own pretend actions or observing someone else’s pretend actions. In 
turn, we have to accept that they possess these abilities even though they lack a deep 
understanding of what it is to pretend. On the other hand, if we embrace the mentalistic 
theory, this provides us with additional resources to explain how children figure out how 
to perform appropriate pretend actions and recognise the content of pretence episodes, 
since we can allow that children have some basic understanding of the fact pretenders 
intend to pretend and that pretence therefore has a mental component. 
However, Stich and Tarzia’s have developed a recent critique of Leslie's view of 
pretence motivation and recognition, with their chief objection being that it is overly 
mysterious how the PRETEND concept is supposed to enable pretence recognition and 
motivation. To conclude this chapter, I will attempt to respond to some of their concerns 
and will further elaborate on why a mentalistic view is better placed than the behavioural 
theory to explain pretence motivation and recognition. 
4.5 How much can PRETEND explain? 
Stick and Tarzia note that the PRETEND concept is supposed to do a lot of theoretical 
work for Leslie. For example, they suggest that for Leslie the PRETEND concept: 
[plays] a role in ‘‘generating and interpreting’’ pretense behavior; pretend play ‘‘issues 
from’’ PRETEND representations; both pretending and recognizing pretense ‘‘spring 
from’’ the concept; the concept ‘‘empowers’’ the child to recognize that someone else 
is pretending that P. (Stich and Tarzia 2015, p. 9) 
                                               
box. If Stich and Tarzia are right, this can be done without any awareness of the sorts of 
mental states involved in pretending. This returns us to our present worry about how a 
child can recognise this level of similarity has been reached if they possess a merely 
behavioural understanding of pretence, which I take to be the hardest challenge for 
behavioural theories to meet. 
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Their concern relates to how the PRETEND concept can do this. How does possession 
of this concept motivate pretend behaviours, and enable children to recognise pretence 
in others? Stich and Tarzia develop their challenge by noting that: 
[according to Leslie] possession of the PRETEND concept means that children are 
able to engage in simple episodes of pretense, to recognize them and to share them 
with others. Our question is how? How does possession of the PRETEND concept 
enable children to do these remarkable things? How, for example, does possessing the 
PRETEND concept enable Sally to understand what Mommy is doing when she holds 
the banana up to her face and says ‘‘Hello, Daddy’’? And how does it enable Sally to 
know what to do when Mommy hands her the banana? (Stich and Tarzia 2015, p. 
10) 
They are then able to raise a parallel worry to mine about recognising content and gen-
erating appropriate behaviour, pointing out that although Leslie and collaborators tell 
us that: 
[f]or Sally to pretend that the banana is a telephone simply requires representing the 
agent of pretend as self . . . or as we if pretense is shared, and using the resulting 
meta-representation, I (WE) PRETEND THIS BANANA ‘IT IS A TELEPHONE’’ 
in part as a high-level command to the action planning system. (Stich and Tarzia 
2015, p. 10) 
There is a gap here because Leslie and collaborators do not:  
[t]ell us how the action planning system manages to figure out that the right thing to 
do is to hold the banana up to one’s ear and mouth and talk into it, rather than 
pushing it around the table saying ‘‘zoom, zoom’’ or pointing it at one’s partner and 
saying ‘‘bang, bang.” (Stich and Tarzia 2015, p. 10) 
As such it looks like both the mentalistic and behavioural theories will struggle to explain 
the recognition of pretend contents and the motivation of appropriate pretend behav-
iours. If Stich and Tarzia are right, Leslie and collaborators simply fail to tell us how 
pretend contents are recognised, and if I’m right, then behavioural theories of pretence 
still need to spell out the notions of similarity and saliency which they introduce to make 
sense of this issue. We thus seem to be left at something of an impasse. 
However, I think that we can defend a mentalistic distinct content view against these 
sorts of worries. Stich and Tarzia are right to point out that there are some explanatory 
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gaps in Leslie’s account, but I think by reflecting on some of his claims about pretence 
we will be able to plug these gaps and render the mentalistic account of pretence more 
plausible than a behavioural one.  
Recall that Leslie’s theory tells us that pretence is underpinned by beliefs that look 
something like I PRETEND “I am a dog”. What we need is an explanation of how this 
sort of meta-representation leads to the actions that are performed when a child pretends 
to be a dog, and an explanation of how children can recognise that someone else has 
decoupled this sort of pretence premise. Our question then is how do children go from 
forming these sorts of complex beliefs to running around the garden barking, and when 
they see someone else running around the garden barking, how do they figure out the 
decoupled representation which is part of the pretender’s mental representation of their 
behaviour? 
To begin, we should consider whether Stich and Tarzia are right that Leslie has 
‘ignored’ this issue. They note in a footnote (Stich and Tarzia 2015, footnote 19) that he 
has ‘briefly’ discussed recognising content in an article co-authored with Happé on pre-
tence and autism (Leslie and Happé, 1989). It will be helpful to look at what Leslie says 
in this article to see how we might go about defending a mentalistic approach to making 
sense of how children recognise the content of pretence episodes and what allows them 
to perform appropriate pretend actions when engaging in pretence.  
Leslie and Happé (1989, pp. 209-211) suggest that pretence recognition and motiva-
tion can be explained by introducing the notion of communication. When mother is 
pretending to be a dog, or a child is pretending to be a dog, they are trying to communi-
cate something about their internal representations by manipulating their body and the 
world around them. As such, our initial questions now become: how does the child know 
how to communicate the content of their internal pretence representations via external 
behaviours? And, how does the child know how to recognise what someone else is com-
municating something about their internal pretend representations? 
Stich and Tarzia are right that Leslie and collaborators are often vague in response 
to these sorts of questions, but they do give us some information. For example, in the 
case of recognition, they note the relevance of manner cues for helping to focus attention 
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on what is being pretended, in a similar way to Langland-Hassan and Stich and Tarzia. 
Leslie and Happé (1989, p. 210) give the example of putting an empty cup near one’s 
mouth and licking one’s lips, and suggest that this sort of exaggerated display can ‘trigger 
the meta-representational mechanisms, which may allow the actor’s (pretender’s) inten-
tion to be inferred’. Friedman further develops the thought that pretence involves com-
munication and makes a related point about the importance of intentions when it comes 
to recognising pretence contents, telling us that:  
[r]ecognition of pretend play … requires people to recognize that certain actions and 
objects are intended to serve as representations, and to infer what it is the pretender 
intends to represent. (Friedman 2013, p. 193) 
One might worry here that this no more informative than the behavioural view, since 
manner cues will still underspecify the contents of at least novel episodes of pretence. 
However, the key point here is that you cannot recognise what someone is pretending 
merely by observing their behaviour with no recognition of the intentions behind it. When 
a child observes mother pretending, the child has to find a way of looking past mother’s 
odd behaviour (such as talking into a telephone) to infer the mental state that is guiding 
her behaviour. In this way, if we accept a mentalistic view, then manner cues are of more 
help for figuring out pretend contents, since children will have some understanding that, 
in exhibiting manner cues, pretenders are communicating something about their inten-
tions to represent things. 
That being said, one might wonder how it is possible for children to recognise inten-
tions to pretend and perhaps more crucially how these sorts of considerations help to 
explain the motivation of pretend actions. To make sense of the recognition question, we 
can note that Leslie argues that there is evidence that from a young age children can 
recognise goal directed activity, of which he thinks pretence is an example, in that it is 
something like an intentional mental activity: 
Deliberate—that is, goal directed—external, physical actions require the representa-
tion of their goal. Likewise, deliberate, internal, mental actions also require a repre-
sentation of their goal. Deliberately undertaking the external action of tying laces 
requires representing the goal of that action as one of tying laces and therefore re-
quires having the concept, TIE LACES. Likewise, deliberately undertaking the action 
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of pretending that P requires representing the goal of that action as pretending that 
P. And for this reason, the child who deliberately pretends uses the concept PRE-
TEND-THAT in his goal representation. Naturally, this is also the concept required 
for representing the mental state of another person who is pretending-that. (Leslie 
2002, p. 112) 
One might still worry, however, that this focus on internal representations and intentions 
still doesn’t do enough to explain how children generate appropriate pretence behaviours 
and recognise what others are pretending, and amounts to merely labelling the diﬃculties. 
We can, however, oﬀer a helpful response to the recognition question by reflecting on 
how we recognise the content of mental states mores generally, and the issue of 
motivation by reflecting on the sorts of desires that might motivate pretend actions. 
In the case of recognition, consider how we recognise the contents of mental states 
in other contexts. For example, let’s suppose we try to construct a theory of how people 
recognise the specific things that other people believe. We already have general overarch-
ing theories that seek to explain our mindreading capacities, such as the theory-theory 
and simulation theory, but it is hard to give specific advice for recognising a particular 
belief. Recognising exactly what a subject believes is a complicated task to perform, and 
yet we seem to be able to at least sometimes succeed in figuring out the specific contents 
of people’s beliefs. In light of this, it is hard to spell out precisely how a theory of mind 
or a simulation process allows us to figure out what mental states we should ascribe to 
others.  
Since mentalistic views argue that understanding someone is pretending involves a 
degree of mindreading, it is no surprise that we don’t have an easy answer to this sort of 
question about recognition of pretence contents. Figuring out what someone is intending 
to represent with their pretence is a complex task that will involve reflecting on the 
intentions of the pretender, the way their actions relate to other actions, manner cues 
and so on. That being said, recall that the issue with the behavioural approach is that it 
gives us no easy way of explaining how children figure out the content of pretence based 
on the limited resources provided by manner cues and noting similarities between real 
and pretend actions. If we embrace a mentalistic view, we can at least go beyond this by 
allowing that children can recognise something about the mental states that motivate 
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pretence behaviour. In so doing, this means that we cannot give a simple account of how 
children figure out the specific contents of an episode of pretence, but this should not be 
taken as demonstrating a failing of the mentalistic view as opposed to a natural conse-
quence of it. 
As for motivation, we can note that believing that ‘I PRETEND “p”’ will not moti-
vate any actions whatsoever unless it is combined with some further mental states. The 
standard Humean view of action holds that actions should be explained in terms of a 
cognitive and conative component. Ordinarily, this will be a belief and a desire: my walk-
ing outside with an umbrella can be explained in terms of a desire to not get wet and a 
belief that it is raining (or perhaps a belief that it will rain shortly, or that it is likely to 
rain etc.). When we ask why it is that a child runs around the garden barking like a dog, 
there will thus be a role for desire to play in responding to this question.  
Since we have accepted that children can form beliefs related to what is going on in 
specific episodes of pretence, we can also propose here that children can form desires that 
make explicit reference to the fact that they are pretending. Indeed, Leslie suggests the 
goal of pretence is ‘decoupled’: 
An obvious hypothesis about pretend actions is that the goal representation is decou-
pled. If so, this might explain why the movement undertaken typically does not carry 
through to the point in the real world that it would normally if it were generated by 
a regular "coupled" goal representation. For example, if I have a normal goal of 
drinking from a cup, I will lift the cup all the way to my lips ensuring close contact 
between cup and lip (for obvious reasons). If I pretend to drink from the cup, typically 
I will stop short of contact. I may even only outline the action of lifting and drinking 
in a highly truncated manner of gesturing the cup toward my lips. (Leslie 2002, p. 
11) 
Bearing this sort of consideration in mind, I think we can make a tentative case for the 
proposal that pretenders are motivated to perform pretend actions based on forming 
desires to make such-and-such fictional.103  
                                               
103 I argue for the introduction of these sorts of desires at greater length in my MPhil 
dissertation (Davis 2015, Ch. 2). 
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We can motivate this proposal by noting that when engaging in pretence children do 
not aim to make it literally true that, for example, they are a dog or that they are having 
a tea party. Furthermore, it doesn’t look like children mistakenly think they are trying 
to make it the case that they are a dog when they engage in this sort of pretence. Drawing 
on Walton’s theory of fictional truth, we can argue that children aim to make these 
things fictional: when a child pretends to be a dog, they aim to make it fictionally true 
that they are a dog (*I am a dog*).  
I do not have space to fully elaborate on this idea, but we can note two benefits of 
introducing these sorts of desires. Firstly, desires to make fictional are helpful for 
explaining how novel forms of pretence are generated, since desiring to make something 
fictional does not have to restrict you to wanting to pretend in obvious or predictable 
ways. This is because there are various ways of behaving that can satisfy a given desire 
to make something fictional. For example, a desire to make it fictional that you are dog 
could be satisfied by barking, woofing, running around on all fours, chasing a bone, or a 
combination of various behaviours. In this way, forming these sorts of desires can explain 
why children perform such a wide variety of actions when engaging in pretence.  
Secondly, when developing an account of the motivation behind pretend actions, we 
need to explain how children recognise how manipulating their bodies and the external 
world can communicate the contents of their pretence. This point is emphasised by 
O’Brien (2005, p. 60) in relation to belief, when she notes that the representations that 
guide pretend play can only play a motivational role when they are ‘draped’ over the 
external world. We can make sense of this by arguing that having a desire to make 
something fictional entails having some understanding of how to represent your internal 
pretend representations via your external actions. 
However, at this point, it could be argued that behavioural theories can also 
introduce desires to make things fictional in order to respond to my challenge about the 
vagueness of the notions of saliency and similarity. We could argue that children can 
form desires to make things fictional, but do not have any understanding of them, and 
that this is still enough to explain how they recognise what pretend behaviours are 
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appropriate ones to perform during a given episode of pretence.104 However, although this 
might help with issues related to motivation, this will not salvage the behavioural account 
of recognition. Even having introduced these sorts of desires, it will remain unclear how 
children can work out what others are trying to make fictional unless we attribute some 
sort of mentalistic understanding of pretence to them that allows them to reflect on the 
intentions that are guiding episodes of pretence.  
This leaves us with an important final question, which is whether the account I’ve 
oﬀered is too sophisticated as an account of how young children engage in pretence. To 
respond to this, it will be helpful to note some comments made by Friedman and Leslie 
about this sort of worry: 
To be clear, we do not believe that children’s possession of this concept PRETEND 
implies that they know much about this or other mental states. In particular, it does 
not imply that they theorize about mental representation or that they theorize that 
pretense is an ‘internal, subjective, mentally depictive state’, as some have supposed. 
. . Nor does it require that children can report that pretenders ‘are thinking’ and 
what they are ‘thinking about’ while pretending. (Friedman and Leslie 2007, p. 120) 
We haven’t done much here to complicate this picture. All we need to add to this is that 
possession of a mentalistic PRETEND concept also means that children can form desires 
to make things fictional, which allow them to realise their communicative intentions when 
they engage in pretence. This still doesn’t entail that children possess complicated con-
cepts like that of a MENTAL REPRESENTATION. This mentalistic approach also re-
mains more plausible as an account of pretence recognition and motivation as compared 
to the behavioural approach, since attributing this sort of sophistication to children gives 
us some tools for making sense of the mysteries of how they are able to engage in and 
recognise pretence, whereas the behavioural view is forced to rely on vague notions such 
as ‘similarity’ and ‘salience’ to make sense of these abilities. 
                                               
104 Indeed, Schellenberg (2013) makes this sort of amendment to behavioural accounts, 
suggesting children could have a non-conceptual understanding of these sorts of desires.  
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Conclusion 
We saw in this chapter that issues related to pretence motivation and recognition pose a 
crucial challenge to behavioural theories of pretence, both those that rely on belief-like 
imaginings and those that do not. In section 4.4, we saw that behavioural theorists have 
recently developed more elaborate accounts of pretence in order to explain these issues. 
However, these refined behavioural theories are more plausible when it comes to explain-
ing how children recognise that someone is engaging in pretence as opposed to what 
someone is pretending. In turn, this means that these accounts struggle to explain how 
children figure out which pretend actions they ought to perform when they engage in 
pretence. As such, I argued that we should prefer a mentalistic view of pretence that 
introduces meta-representational beliefs, since this sort of view will allow that children 
have some awareness of pretenders’ intentions to represent things with their pretend 
actions. In turn, this helps to explain how they recognise the content of episodes of 
pretence and what counts as an appropriate pretend action. 
In section 4.5, we saw that Stich and Tarzia argue that the mentalistic view of 
pretence also suﬀers from diﬃculties when it comes to explaining how children recognise 
pretence contents and figure out what counts as an appropriate pretend action. I intro-
duced some responses to these worries by focusing on the fact that pretence behaviour is 
communicative, by highlighting that pretence is a goal-directed activity, and by intro-
ducing desires to make things fictional. Having done this, we saw that the mentalistic 
view remains more plausible than the behavioural view as an account of pretence. 
As such, we have come to see that belief-like imaginings are insuﬃcient for explaining 
how we are able to engage in pretence. In addition, they are also unnecessary, since once 
we introduce meta-representational beliefs of the form ‘I PRETEND “p”’ we have no need 
to introduce a belief-like attitude in order to explain our engagement in pretence. We 
can thus justify rejecting the non-doxastic assumption in the context of pretence. We 
will now turn to consider whether we should similarly reject this assumption in the con-
text of our engagement with fiction. 
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Chapter 5: Imagination & Fiction 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will consider whether we need to introduce belief-like imaginings to 
explain how we are able to engage with fictions. I will argue that belief-like imaginings 
are not necessary for explaining our engagement with fiction. This is not to say that they 
can never be involved in our engagement with fiction; nor that there is no plausible 
argument for associating belief-like imaginings and fiction. I will instead suggest that we 
can also explain our cognitive engagement with fiction by introducing beliefs with distinct 
contents, namely beliefs implicitly subject to a fictional operator. 
Many philosophers would likely accept that when reading about the exploits of 
Sherlock Holmes in one of Conan Doyle's novels, we can form beliefs with fictional content 
such as 'I believe that Holmes is a detective [in the fiction]' (Kripke 2013, Tullmann 
2016). If we borrow notation from Walton (1973) and Evans (1981), the idea here is that 
we can form beliefs like ‘I believe *Holmes is a detective*’. This is because beliefs subject 
to a fictional operator play an important role in the philosophy of language when it comes 
to explaining why we can use seemingly empty names in ordinary language. Indeed, even 
defenders of imagining-based views of how we engage with fiction, such as Walton (1990, 
Ch. 10), allow that we can form these sorts of beliefs. As such, my argument here can be 
understood as considering whether these beliefs, which are already frequently introduced, 
can do all the work in explaining how we engage with fiction, or whether we also need to 
introduce a distinct belief-like attitude. As such, although the view I wish to defend 
might seem counter-intuitive, it may, in fact, be more parsimonious than distinct attitude 
views if the defender of these views also accepts that we can form beliefs like ‘I believe 
Holmes is a detective [in the fiction]. 
That being said, one might want a more positive reason for why we should try and 
develop this sort of distinct content account of our engagement with fiction. One reason 
is that in embracing this sort of view, we avoid the need to introduce somewhat 
mysterious involuntary imaginative counterparts in the context of our engagement with 
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fiction, and then having to explain which states have these sorts of counterparts (belief) 
and which do not (e.g. the emotions if we reject the idea of quasi emotions). Furthermore, 
Tullmann (2015, pp. 36-38) argues that having resisted the introduction of imaginative 
counterparts into our account of our engagement with fiction, we are well placed to 
explain various important issues that we will not have space to discuss in this thesis, 
such as the puzzle of imaginative resistance (why we seem to resist ‘imagining’ certain 
propositions in fictions, such as that ‘killing babies is a good thing’) and sympathy for 
the devil (why we sometimes sympathise with immoral protagonists like Tony Soprano 
and Walter White). 
To defend the distinct content view, I will begin in section 5.1 by setting out the 
similarities and diﬀerences between fiction and pretence, which will bring out the 
involuntary nature of the cognitive attitude involved in our engagement fiction. I will 
argue that this means we cannot oﬀer exactly the same explanation of how we are able 
to engage with fiction and in pretence. This will conclude our challenge to the uniformity 
assumption that we introduced in chapter 2. 
In section 5.2, I will consider whether there are aspects of our cognitive engagement 
with fiction that can only be explained by introducing belief-like states. I will suggest 
that there are not by considering worries related to sophistication, ontology and 
metafictional statements made in works of fiction. Our discussion of sophistication will 
also serve to remind us that distinct attitude views struggle to make sense of clustering, 
which will suggest that we may have some reason to think that belief-like imaginings are 
insuﬃcient for explaining how we are able to engage with fictions. 
In section 5.3, we will discuss whether belief-like imaginings are needed to explain 
the distinction between fiction and non-fiction. I will argue that they are not and that a 
better view of this distinction can be found by endorsing Friend’s proposal that fiction 
and non-fiction are genres, with neither genre involving a distinctive attitude that isn’t 
involved in our engagement with the other. 
In section 5.4, we will consider a debate between Matravers and Friend about 
whether research related to how we construct situation models when engaging with 
narratives suggests that an account of our engagement with fiction requires belief-like 
166 
imaginings. I will side with Matravers that it does not, and will oﬀer some reasons for 
why constructing situation models won’t necessarily require belief-like imaginings.  
In section 5.5, we will consider whether beliefs about what is fictional can explain 
why we can become immersed in fictions and why we sometimes respond emotionally to 
them. I take it this is the strongest objection to an approach to explaining our 
engagement with fiction that dispenses with belief-like imaginings when explaining our 
engagement with fiction. I will set out several ways that a defender of a distinct content 
view can explain why we respond emotionally to fictions, and will question why these 
sorts of beliefs cannot explain immersion. 
I will thus conclude that there is no need to associate belief-like imaginings with our 
engagement with fiction, though I will also tentatively suggest that other forms of 
imagining might be involved, such as objectual and sympathetic imaginings. We will thus 
reject the non-doxastic assumption in the context of our engagement with fiction since 
introducing a distinct belief-like attitude is unnecessary for explaining our engagement 
with fiction. 
5.1 Belief-Like Imaginings & Fiction 
Before we can establish whether we should prefer an account of fiction that relies on 
beliefs with distinct contents to one that relies on belief-like imaginings, we will first need 
to say a bit more about the relevant sort of counterpart to belief that might be involved 
here. I suggested in chapter 1 that there are two sorts of counterparts: voluntary and 
involuntary counterparts, and it looks like the counterpart involved in our engagement 
with fiction is best thought of as an involuntary counterpart.  
The view that there is a connection between imagination in a propositional belief-
like sense and fiction has been defended by Currie (1990), Lamarque and Olsen (1994), 
Sutrop (2002), Livingston (2005), Davies (2007) and Stock (2011b) among others. 
Defenders of the consensus view tend to embrace something similar to Walton’s notion 
of fictional truth, and argue that what is fictionally true in a given work of fiction is what 
we are prescribed to imagine in a belief-like way by the work. However, in recent years 
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the view that there is a distinctive link between fiction and belief-like imaginings has 
been called into question.105 Friend (2008) argues that the imagination is often equally 
involved in our engagement with works of non-fiction; Matravers (2013) goes a step 
further and argues that engaging with both fiction and non-fiction does not necessarily 
have anything to do with the imagination; and Tullmann (2016) adopts a ‘single attitude’ 
view of fiction which denies that any imaginative counterparts whatsoever are involved 
in our engagement with fiction.106 I think we can maintain the insight that fictions ask 
us to take propositions to be fictionally true, but can argue that instead of prescribing 
us to imagine these propositions in a belief-like way, we are simply prescribed to believe 
these things are fictionally true. 
Most philosophers who are explicit about the nature of the counterpart to belief 
involved in our engagement with fiction appear to take it to be one in the voluntary 
sense. This is because they embrace the uniformity assumption and argue that this belief-
like attitude is the same as the one that is involved in pretence and perhaps also 
suppositional reasoning, and both of these activities must involve some sort of attitude 
that is subject to the will (e.g. Nichols 2004, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Goldman 
2006b). However, when we look more closely at the role belief-like imaginings are thought 
to be playing in our engagement with fiction, it becomes apparent that it is ambiguous 
whether we're discussing a role for a counterpart in this voluntary sense or whether we 
are discussing an involuntary counterpart. This is ambiguity arises because there is an 
important distinction between engaging with fiction and creating a work of fiction. To 
bring out this ambiguity, it will be helpful to contrast fiction and pretence. 
                                               
105 Not all of these thinkers use the phrase ‘belief-like imagination’. All agree, however, that 
there is a special attitude associated with fiction which is some sort of counterpart to belief.  
106 Tullmann’s argument is broader than mine. I only wish to deny that belief-like imaginings 
play a role in our engagement with fiction. Tullmann denies that any sort of imaginative 
counterpart is involved in our engagement with fiction, thus also rejecting a role for quasi 
emotions, i-desires and so on. 
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I suggested in chapter 3 that there are three things a theory of pretence needs to 
explain: set-up, elaboration and output. These three headings parallel – to some extent 
– what an account of our engagement with fiction needs to explain. 
 
1. Set-Up 
The first aspect of set-up, the generation of the initial pretence premise, looks like it has 
something in common with fiction-making, the act of creating a work of fiction. If a belief-
like counterpart is involved in fiction-making, it will have to be a voluntary counterpart 
since the fiction-maker is able to freely generate the contents of their fiction. When J.K. 
Rowling decided that she wanted to make it fictionally true that Harry Potter is a wizard, 
this is presumably something she was able to make fictionally true at will by, for example, 
writing certain words on a computer screen or in a notebook, which would eventually 
make their way onto a printed page.107 I will not say much about the attitude (or 
attitudes) that allows us to create works of fiction in what follows. I suspect that fiction 
making may well have important features in common with the generation of pretence 
scenarios and it might also involve creative or constructive imaginative capacities that 
cannot be readily reduced to mere belief-like imaginings.108 When it comes to engaging 
with a work of fiction, generation is less obviously involved since what we are supposed 
to take as fictionally true is already given to us on the page or on screen etc.  
Before we move on to consider how fiction relates to elaboration, we should note that 
the issue of recognition which we placed under the heading of set-up (how children are 
able to recognise that someone else is pretending) is also important when it comes to 
explaining our engagement with fiction. When I pick up a book, I need some way of 
                                               
107 More contentious is whether an author can make things fictionally true without including 
this truth explicitly in their fictional work. For example, there has been some controversy 
in the Harry Potter fandom about whether Dumbledore is gay since this is not prescribed 
as being fictionally true in the novels but J.K. Rowling stated this was true of Dumbledore 
in an interview. 
108 Van Leeuwen (2013) oﬀers an interesting discussion of constructive imagination and some 
reasons for why it might not neatly reduce to belief-like imagining.  
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determining whether it is fiction or non-fiction, and the same is true if I turn on the TV 
and see that a movie is playing. We might be able to do this by relying on the description 
on the sleeve of the book, or by checking TV guide, but there is a question about whether 
we can also determine whether a work is fictional or non-fictional in the absence of this 
sort of information. My suspicion is that we cannot, since there are no obvious surface 
features of fictions that serve to distinguish them from non-fictions. In practical terms, 
this is unlikely to be a frequent concern since we are usually aware of whether we are 
engaging with a work of fiction or non-fiction. This also helps to bring out a diﬀerence 
between pretence and fiction: while engaging in pretence we perform seemingly odd 
actions, often accompanied by manner cues, with this helping to draw attention to the 
pretend status of our actions. With a work of fiction, the sentences contained within can 
just be ordinary examples of sentences in a given language. 
 
2. Elaboration 
Though generation is not essentially involved in our engagement with fiction, elaboration 
is frequently involved, at least in the sense of inferential elaboration. While we are 
engaging with works of fiction, we draw various belief-like inferences and these inferences 
are essential for rendering fictional worlds coherent.109 For example, few works of fiction 
take the time specify that their human characters have internal organs, but we 
nonetheless take this as given.110 We infer that Sherlock Holmes has a liver in the Sherlock 
                                               
109 Following Walton (1990, Ch.4), the task of figuring out how these inferences are drawn 
can be described as trying to find the ‘principles of generation’ that govern our engagement 
with fiction. There is little widespread agreement about how we should set out these 
principles, but I assume that the way we set out these principles will be equally compatible 
with either a distinct attitude or distinct content view of how we engage with fiction. 
Friend (2017) oﬀers the interesting proposal that we assume everything that is true in 
reality is also true in a given fiction and only depart from this assumption when the fiction 
gives us reason to do so.  
110 At least in most cases: we won’t infer this if a fiction explicitly tells us its human characters 
do not have organs. This deviation, however, can be explained by the fact that works of 
fiction are free to depart from at least some truths about the actual world. 
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Holmes novels, for example, and also that he requires food for energy. Sometimes, and 
indeed probably for the most part, these sorts of inferences will not involve forming 
occurrent representations. If a realistic novel tells us a character has travelled from 
London to New York, we may not consciously represent that they have travelled by 
plane, but if the next page tells us they teleported between the two cities we will be 
surprised.111 
On the other hand, non-inferential elaboration does not seem to be associated with 
engaging with fiction, though it can be involved in fiction making. We might perform 
non-inferential elaborations to try to figure out why certain fictional events happened, or 
how they might have transpired diﬀerently, but works of fiction do not ordinarily 
prescribe us to take propositions to be fictionally true when they are not explicitly stated 
in the work or cannot be inferred from the explicitly stated fictional truths of the work.  
This is because we have less control over the fictional events described in a work of 
fiction as compared to the fictional events that make up an episode of pretence. When 
engaging in pretence, children sometimes make valid inferences and follow instructions 
about what to pretend, but they are also free to break the rules of their pretence. For 
example, a child can declare that all the tea at their tea party has evaporated and this 
can be made fictionally true because of their declaration. On the other hand, when 
engaging with a novel, I cannot simply declare that whatever I imagine is fictionally true. 
As noted in chapter 1, it is not within the power of a mere reader of Sherlock Holmes to 
make it fictionally true that Holmes is a wizard.112  
A slight complication about the role of non-inferential elaboration arises when 
thinking about interactive fictions. When engaging with an interactive fiction, such as a 
                                               
111 Walton (1990, pp. 16-18) oﬀers an interesting discussion of whether there can be non-
occurrent imaginings, and argues that there can be. Regardless of whether we endorse a 
distinct content or distinct attitude view, we need to allow that not everything we take to 
be fictionally true will be occurently represented by us. 
112 As we noted in chapter 1, they might be able to create their own fictional world in which 
Sherlock Holmes is a wizard. The point here is they cannot make him a wizard in the world 
of the novels. 
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videogame, players often have the power to make at least some things fictionally true 
based on their own volition, even if these things aren’t strictly entailed by previous events 
in the fictional world. The extent of this power will vary greatly depending on the game 
in question. Some games allow for a great deal of player control, such as sandbox games 
like Minecraft, while others are more linear, such as Uncharted 4. Even in more linear 
games, the player still has the power to, for example, make it fictionally true that their 
avatar stood in a certain spot, climbed a wall in a certain way, picked up a certain power-
up, and so on.113  
We could argue that the reason this sort of non-inferential elaboration is possible 
when engaging with interactive fictions is because the gap between fiction-maker and 
consumer is not clearly demarcated in these sorts of fictions. If we return to the 
distinction that Walton makes between work worlds and game worlds, it might look like 
the reason videogames allow for this sort of non-inferential elaboration is because players 
can sometimes directly aﬀect what is fictionally true in work worlds. Tavinor (2005, 2009) 
defend this view, suggesting that videogames render Walton’s distinction ambiguous. 
Meskin and Robson (2012) respond that the work world and game world distinction is 
still applicable to videogames, and that players in fact cannot ordinarily directly aﬀect 
the work world.114 Instead, they argue that we should think of a player as being similar 
to a performer in a play. The player-as-performer has a great deal of control over what 
happens in their playing, but this control is not absolute and they cannot directly aﬀect 
the work world, only the world of their specific performance. To see how this idea works 
in practice, consider the final boss fight in an adventure game such as Uncharted 4. It 
                                               
113 One might also think this means that generation plays a role in our engagement with 
interactive fiction. However, generation is supposed to refer to the initial generation of a 
premise in a game of pretence, and it’s not obvious that someone engaging with an 
interactive fiction can generate this sort of initial premise. For example, with a videogame 
the initial premises will be set by the development team, as will much of the subsequent 
story in narrative-based videogames. 
114 One exception is perhaps when playing massively multiplayer online games where there is 
a single fictional world every player interacts with at the same time. 
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might be true in the work world that your avatar defeated the final boss, but the player 
cannot make it true in the work world that the boss was defeated in precisely the manner 
they directed their avatar. These specific details are only fictionally true in the context 
of your specific performance 
I am inclined to side with Meskin and Robson here, since the videogame player is 
more limited in what they can make fictionally true as compared to the fiction-maker or 
someone engaging in pretence, since they are still constrained by the rules set by the 
developer. In Crash Bandicoot, I can choose whether Crash moves to the right or the 
left, or whether he jumps over the hole or into the hole, but I cannot choose to make it 
fictionally true that he is a thylacine rather than a bandicoot. In a game of pretence, 
these sorts of limits will only be present if explicit rules are agreed upon, and even then, 
these rules can be transgressed if the pretenders decide to reject them or alter them. 
With a videogame, I can only completely change the rules by either hacking the game to 
change its code (thus arguably simply creating a new game) or by having the fiction-
maker perform the change. We do not have the space to consider these intricacies in any 
further detail, but it’s worth bearing in mind that an explanation of the mental goings 
on when we engage with interactive fiction may not perfectly match an explanation of 
the mental goings on when we engage with non-interactive fiction.115 
 
                                               
115 That being said, I doubt that this means we need to introduce belief-like imaginings to 
explain how we engage with interactive fictions if we accept that they are not involved in 
our engagement with non-interactive fictions. It is unclear why we would maintain that 
just because someone makes the decision to move Crash Bandicoot from point A to point 
B this means that they imagine in a belief-like way that he is at point B, while if they see 
a movie character move from point A to point B they do not imagine that he is at point 
B but instead just believe this to be fictionally true. I expect that if there is a diﬀerence 
here it will concern the role of desire in our engagement with interactive fictions and the 
opportunities for fictional action that this opens up. 
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3. Output 
Output is also relevant to our engagement with fiction. In the case of aﬀect, we appear 
to exhibit emotional (or emotion-like) responses to works of fiction. Action and 
motivation are less obviously related to how we engage with non-interactive fiction since 
we cannot perform ‘pretend’ actions when engaging with non-interactive fictions. One 
could argue that our tears at the death of Anna Karenina constitute a sort of action, or 
that covering our eyes during a gory horror film constitutes an action, but these are not 
the same sorts of actions that are involved in pretence. Covering one’s eyes is an action 
in the real world to block our certain images, whereas the child running around the 
garden like a dog is trying to make something fictional with their real-world actions.116 
 
There are thus both similarities and diﬀerences between what an account of pretence 
needs to explain and what an account of our engagement with fiction needs to explain. 
Perhaps the key diﬀerence is that because the generation of fictional truths is only related 
to fiction-making, it’s not so obvious that the sort of mental attitude involved in engaging 
with fiction is under the control of the will. The relevant state looks to be a largely 
automatic response to what we read on the page or see on screen etc. There is an 
important distinction between the fiction-maker, who presumably is able to create works 
of fiction thanks to some sort of voluntary attitude, and the individual engaging with a 
work of fiction. This distinction is not usually present in the pretence case, since often 
the child who is pretending is also in some sense the creator of their pretence.117 As 
Sainsbury puts a similar point: 
                                               
116 A follower of Walton might argue that covering one’s eyes is an event with the ‘game 
world’ and so is a fictional action in some sense. It still seems to me that there is an 
important diﬀerence here in that covering one’s eyes doesn’t constitute a separate fictional 
action in the way a child raising their arm can constitute fictionally raising their trunk. 
117 Another philosopher who emphasises the importance of associating something like an 
involuntary attitude with fiction is Cooke (2014, p. 324), who argues that: ‘the act of 
fictively imagining x is not identical to the act of non-fictively imagining x. This is either 
because the propositional attitudes … associated with the two are not the same or because 
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Like belief, but unlike pretence, make-believe is often involuntary. To open a novel 
with a normally receptive mind is to start make-believing. Likewise, to engage in 
conversation with a normally receptive mind is to start believing. (Sainsbury 2010, p. 
12) 
As such, if we need to introduce a counterpart to belief to explain our engagement with 
fiction, it will be an involuntary counterpart rather than a voluntary one. In this way, 
we have now developed our challenge to the uniformity assumption.  
To defend the proposal that an involuntary counterpart to belief is involved in our 
engagement with fiction, we will need to follow my third principle and argue that either: 
a) there are constraints on forming beliefs which prevent beliefs subject to a fictional 
operator from doing all the explanatory work when it comes to explaining our engagement 
with fiction, or b) that there are puzzling aspects of our engagement with fiction that 
cannot be explained by mere beliefs. As such, we will need to consider if there is reason 
to think either that we cannot form beliefs about what is true in fiction, or that there 
are aspects of our engagement with fiction that these beliefs cannot explain. This is 
because, as we noted in my second principle, we cannot justify introducing this 
counterpart solely by noting that the relevant attitude here is formed in response to 
engaging with something we recognise as being fictional.  
That being said, as noted in chapter 2, my distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary counterparts does not entail that if there is a counterpart to belief involved 
in fiction, it necessarily has to be a distinct counterpart from one that might be involved 
in hypothetical reasoning or pretence. It might be that sometimes belief-like imaginings 
are under the control of the will and sometimes they are not: they could be an example 
                                               
the imaginings have diﬀerent content.’ His first suggestion here is broadly in line with my 
starting proposal in chapter 2: we can argue that there is one sort of imaginative attitude 
associated with entertaining or supposing, and another associated with fiction (and perhaps 
also pretence). The second would be to introduce a distinct attitude distinct content view 
of propositional imaginings, where there is one distinct attitude here but some of them 
have special contents, of the form ‘I imagine that p [in the fiction]’. As already noted, this 
doesn’t strike me as having any obvious explanatory benefit compared to adopting a 
distinct content view. 
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of a counterpart that can either be voluntary or involuntary depending on context. In 
section 1.5, the issue with making this suggestion in the case of imagining seeing was 
that the formation of mental images cannot be what makes things fictionally true about 
what we see in paintings. In the belief case, we do not have this sort of prima facie reason 
to rule out the proposal that a voluntary counterpart to belief can sometimes behave in 
an involuntary manner when engaging with fiction.118 
However, while this is a possible approach, we will need positive reasons for extending 
the functional role of belief-like imaginings in this way and for associating them with 
fiction. This will still involve showing that constraints on beliefs are violated when we 
engage with fiction, or that puzzles arise if we don’t introduce belief-like imaginings into 
our account. The diﬃculties for the uniformity assumption this discussion has revealed 
suggest that we should resist moving too quickly from establishing a voluntary belief-like 
attitude is involved in pretence (or can be associated with a notion like ‘supposing’) to 
arguing that this same attitude is involved in our engagement with fiction.  
Having set out in a bit more detail the sort of counterpart that might be involved 
here, we can now turn to consider whether constraints on forming beliefs are present 
when thinking about our engagement with fiction. I will consider three worries; worries 
about conceptual sophistication, an ontological worry and a worry about the contents of 
fiction.  
5.2 Cognitive Engagement 
In this section, I will consider three arguments for resisting the idea that beliefs with 
distinct content can explain our engagement with fiction. These worries will concern for 
                                               
118 For example, Weinberg and Meskin (2006b, p. 196) mark a distinction between streaming 
and punctate inputs to make sense of why belief-like imaginings are sometimes subject to 
the will and sometimes they are not. We could argue that engaging with fiction involves 
belief-like imaginings, but that fictions only provide streaming inputs. 
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the most part constraints on believing, but will also include aspects that are better 
understood as puzzles. The first issue is whether these beliefs are too sophisticated for 
young children to form, the second issue is whether ontological and linguistic issues point 
towards a belief-like state being involved in our engagement with fiction, and the final 
issue is whether there are some sentences found in works of fiction that we cannot believe 
to be true in fiction.  
5.2.1 Sophistication 
Let’s begin with the sophistication worry: whether young children can form beliefs about 
what is true in fiction. We noted in passing that from a young age, children don’t appear 
to mistake fictional characters for real individuals (Harris 2000, pp. 60-65). In light of 
this, children are able to engage with fiction from a young age. However, one could 
question whether we can explain this ability in terms of them forming beliefs about what 
is fictional, on the grounds that young children presumably lack this sort of adult concept. 
If this concern has merit, it at least shows that children cannot engage with fiction by 
forming beliefs about what is fictional, and this will also be problematic when thinking 
about adults if we seek a unified account of how people engage with fiction. On the other 
hand, it seems less conceptually onerous for children to simply imagine that Harry Potter 
is a wizard or that Peppa is a pig. 
One way to motivate this worry would be to accept what Bermúdez and Cahen 
(2015) call the conceptual constraint.119 They set out this constraint as follows: 
                                               
119 This relates to a debate about whether there can be nonconceptual mental content. 
Bermúdez and Cahen suggest that whether there can be nonconceptual content turns on 
how one thinks we ought to make sense of something like the following two claims: 
 
1. In specifying what a thinker believes, what a perceiver perceives or what a speaker is 
saying by uttering a certain sentence in a particular context one has to be as faithful as 
possible to how that thinker, perceiver or speaker apprehends the world. 
2. How a thinker, perceiver or speaker apprehends the world in having beliefs about it, 
perceiving it or speaking about it is a function of the concepts he possesses. 
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Specifications of the content of a sentence or propositional attitude should only em-
ploy concepts possessed by the utterer or thinker. 
If this is right, this would give us reason to resist saying that young children engage with 
fiction by forming beliefs about what is fictional, since it is unlikely they possess this 
adult concept. In the case of PRETEND, we were able to say that this is a concept that 
was part of a theory of mind, but it is not so clear how we could justify introducing a 
fiction concept. That said, since I am allowing children can form meta-representational 
beliefs about pretence, this means that we shouldn’t prima facie rule out the possibility 
of children forming what appear to be something like meta-representational beliefs about 
fiction (we can describe them in this way since we believe that such-and-such is the case 
according to fiction, which is perhaps in some ways similar to believing that such-and-
such is the case according to mother). Indeed, as I will now go on to argue, it is important 
at the very least that children recognise that some of the things they engage with are 
fictional, since otherwise both the distinct attitude and distinct content views will 
struggle to explain how children engage with fiction. 
To begin, it will be helpful to think about how distinct attitude theories are supposed 
to avoid sophistication concerns. Presumably this is because, as noted above, we might 
think children can form imaginings such as ‘Peppa is a pig' from a young age. Thinking 
in terms of Nichols and Stich’s theory, this representation is placed in the imagination 
box and can be placed in this box from a young age. But how exactly does the child 
recognise that this proposition should be placed in the imagination box? In the case of 
pretence recognition, Nichols and Stich defer to recognising certain sorts of behaviour, 
and Stich and Tarzia add to this the importance of manner cues. But there are no similar 
features of fiction that children could notice to trigger putting content into their 
imagination box, since even if we think producing a fiction involves pretending in some 
sense, there is no behaviour that children could observe to recognise this. As such, the 
child has to in some way figure out that the fiction in question is not be literally believed 
before they can imagine its contents in a belief-like way. 
One way to make sense of this is to argue that children are somehow able to (at least 
sometimes) recognise when they are engaging with content that is ‘made up’. From a 
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relatively young age, they can recognise that Peppa isn’t a real, existing, pig even if they 
don’t explicitly recognise Peppa is a fictional pig. However, once we allow that this sort 
of recognition, this does not have to entail that children then go on to form belief-like 
imaginings about Peppa. Instead, it can mean that they form beliefs about her that are 
diﬀerent in some sense from their ordinary beliefs, thanks to their recognising that Peppa 
doesn’t actually exist. 
Furthermore, we noted in chapter 3 that the representations involved in our 
engagement with fiction exhibit clustering: we do not represent that Harry Potter is a 
wizard simpliciter but that he is a wizard relative to the world of the Harry Potter novels. 
Research suggests that young children are also able to recognise this sort of clustering. 
Skolnick and Bloom (2006) performed an experiment to investigate whether five-year-old 
children could distinguish between things that are true in the world of SpongeBob 
Squarepants and things that are true in the world of Batman. They found that children 
were indeed able to separate out these two sets of fictional truths, e.g. recognising that 
Batman does not believe SpongeBob exists.  
This suggests that children are able to compartmentalise their representations about 
fictional worlds, a notion we will say something more about when we discuss discourse 
processing in section 5.4. Children are in some sense aware not only that fictional entities 
do not exist, but also that things are only true of them relative to particular works of 
fiction. This shows an impressive degree of sophistication in how young children 
understand fictional worlds, since it suggests that they understand their attitudes 
towards fictions – be they imaginings or beliefs about the fiction – only relate to some 
fictional worlds and not others. If we say that children have belief-like imaginings about 
fictions, this does nothing to directly explain why they are able to distinguish between 
what is true in one fictional world and false in another fictional world. As we noted in 
chapter 3, for philosophers like Nichols (2004), the belief-like imaginings involved in our 
engagement with fiction are not supposed to have distinct contents and are meant to be 
isomorphic to ordinary beliefs. 
Returning to our initial examples, imagining that Peppa is a pig does not explain 
how children are able to keep this representation separate from an imagining that Harry 
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Potter is a wizard. Indeed, we saw in section 4.3 that Weisberg (2015, p. 4) argues that 
the fact that children can compartmentalise in this way when engaging in pretence oﬀers 
prima facie evidence for a mentalistic view. In a similar way, we can argue that these 
sorts of experiments show that we don’t have to rule out the possibility children form 
something along the lines of beliefs about what is true in specific fictions, even if they 
will perhaps have to be represented internally via somewhat diﬀerent concepts. As such, 
issues related to sophistication appear to show some benefits of adopting a distinct 
content view of how we engage with fiction, and reveal at least one way in which a belief-
like attitude based approach is potentially insuﬃcient for explaining our engagement 
with fiction.  
That being said, this debate relates diﬃcult empirical issues about children’s 
understanding of fiction, and it is hard to oﬀer an easy answer to these sorts of questions. 
The important point to note here is that much like with pretence, saying children take a 
distinct belief-like attitude towards fictional contents does not make sense of all the 
mysteries related to how they are able to engage with fiction. This remarkable ability to 
engage with fiction is not readily explained simply by supposing that they have a capacity 
to form belief-like imaginings, since this leaves open the more basic question of how they 
know they should form these sorts of imaginings rather than straightforward beliefs.  
If we endorse a distinct attitude view, we thus still have no explanation of why 
children are able to recognise at least some of the rules and conventions of fiction from a 
young age. As such, regardless of whether we think a distinct attitude is involved in 
children’s engagement with fiction, we still might need to attribute a surprising amount 
of sophistication to them since they show a surprisingly nuanced understanding of the 
nature of fictions and fictional worlds from a young age. 
5.2.2 Ontology 
The second worry about whether constraints on forming beliefs suggest we need to 
introduce belief-like imaginings into our account of how we engage with fictions arises 
when thinking about the ontology of fictional characters. The notion of ‘fictional 
characters’ can be understood in a broad sense as relating to failed scientific posits (such 
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as Vulcan), fictional events, fictional places, and perhaps other seemingly non-existent 
things (Friend 2007, p. 142). Philosophers of language have argued that it is potentially 
troublesome for us to talk about fictional characters in ordinary language, making 
statements like ‘Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street’. A common view of how names 
function in language says that they are referring expressions and this raises the question 
of what ‘Holmes’ refers to in this sort of sentence, and also what ‘221B Baker Street’ 
refers to.  
There are two main approaches we can take in response to this question about 
reference. Firstly, we can take a realist approach and argue that Holmes and 221B Baker 
Street exist in some sense – perhaps as abstract objects (van Inwagen 1977) or possibilia 
(Lewis 1983) – and that when we use these names, we refer to these abstracta or 
possibilia. Secondly, we can take an anti-realist approach and argue that Holmes does 
not exist, and that we are doing something like pretending to refer to someone or 
something when we use an empty name like ‘Holmes’ in a sentence (Walton 1990, Ch.10).  
Both the realist and anti-realist proposals raise questions for a distinct content view 
of how we engage with fiction. If the realist approach is right, this might entail that we 
have straightforward beliefs about fictional characters, rather than beliefs about what 
they’re up to in fiction. If the anti-realist approach is right, one might worry that 
pretending to refer necessarily involves a distinct attitude, and that it is only after 
imagining in a belief-like way that ‘Holmes exists’ that we can go on to form beliefs like 
‘Holmes is a detective [in the fiction]’.  
This ontological debate is nuanced and hard to settle. This issue becomes rapidly 
more complex when we consider the sheer variety of sentences that appear to refer to 
fictional characters. For example, as well as utterances like ‘Holmes is a detective’, we 
can make: 
 
1. Cross-fictional utterances like ‘Holmes is a better detective than Shaggy and 
Scooby Doo’ 
2. Utterances that appear to ascribe real-world properties to fictional characters 
like ‘Bart Simpson is a pop culture icon’ 
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3. Negative existential claims like ‘Holmes does not exist’.  
 
Regardless of whether one takes a realist or anti-realist position, it is hard to explain 
how these seemingly empty names function in all these contexts. In particular, negative 
existential claims prove tricky. If we adopt a realist view such as the abstract object 
view, this claim about Holmes seems to be false, since it asserts that something which 
exists does not exist. If we take an anti-realist view where we say sentences about fictional 
characters should be understood as subject to something like a fictional operator, then a 
negative existential claim about Holmes would amount to saying, ‘Holmes does not exist 
[in the fiction]’, yet this seems false, since according to the fiction Holmes does indeed 
exist.  
To streamline discussion, it is worth noting that many philosophers who defend 
abstract object views of fictional characters argue that we do often attach an implicit in 
the fiction operator to many of our beliefs about fictional characters. This is because 
abstract objects cannot possess the properties that works of fiction ascribe to fictional 
characters: to be a wizard, Harry Potter has to be a concrete individual of some sort. 
Defenders of these sorts of mixed views (e.g. Thomasson 1999) argue that when we say 
something like ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’, we are expressing a claim about what is 
fictional: we are saying ‘Harry Potter is a wizard [in the fiction]’, since an abstract object 
cannot be a wizard. If we say, ‘Harry Potter is a pop culture icon’, this is instead supposed 
to be a straightforwardly true claim about an abstract object. Since the former sort of 
representations are more relevant for engaging with works of fiction, adopting a realist 
view does not entail that we should abandon a distinct content view unless we have 
reason to think that pretending to refer involves a distinct attitude.  
At this point then, there are two issues we need to consider. The first is whether the 
sort of pretence involved in referring to fictional characters (or at least making internal 
statements about them) necessarily involves a distinct attitude. The second is whether it 
is problematic to argue that something we know to be non-existent is the intentional 
object of one of our beliefs. We will begin with this second concern. 
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 The best response to make to the concern about whether fictional characters can be 
the intentional objects of our beliefs, is to note that disallowing this entails adopting a 
restrictive view of reference, and it is not obvious why we should commit ourselves to 
this sort of view. For example, it seems uncontroversial to allow that we can have beliefs 
such as ‘I believe that according to John, Santa Claus exists’ and presumably this means 
that we can also have beliefs such as ‘I believe that according to folklore, Santa Claus 
exists’.120  
This leaves open the possibility, however, that we cannot refer to a fictional character 
without doing something like pretending or make-believing that they exist, and that 
pretending and make-believing necessarily involve a distinct belief-like attitude. If this is 
right, then when I pretend to refer to Santa Claus (such as when I say to a young child 
‘make sure to leave out some milk and cookies for Santa’), this means that I must have 
some sort of belief-like imaginings with propositional content related to Santa. For 
example, perhaps I can only make this utterance if I imagine in a belief-like way that 
‘Santa Claus exists’.  
However, it looks like we can nonetheless refer to something non-existent without 
first imagining it to exist. To see why, we can return to the Santa Claus case. When I 
knowingly using a name that has no referent – such as ‘make sure to leave out some milk 
and cookies for Santa’ – this may well involve a sort of pretence, but we can argue that 
I am able to pretend to refer in this context because I believe Santa Claus exists according 
to the child in question. In this way, we do not have to accept that imagining in a belief-
like way that Santa exists is a precursor to being able to pretend to refer to him. 
As such, worries issues concerning the ontological status of fictional characters are 
unlikely to settle the debate about what sort of cognitive attitude is involved in our 
engagement with fiction. Puzzles about the ontological status of fictional characters and 
our practice of using seemingly empty names in ordinary discourse do not go away if we 
introduce a notion of belief-like imagining, and they do not reveal any constraints on 
                                               
120 Thanks to Stacie Friend for this example. 
183 
belief that give us a reason to reject the possibility that beliefs subject to a fictional 
operator can explain our engagement with fiction.121 
5.2.3 Fictions Are Weird 
At this point, one might object that although it looks like a distinct content view can 
explain how we engage with works of fiction, it will in fact struggle to explain how we 
understand some of the utterances found in works of fiction. Picciuto (2015, p. 70) points 
out that sometimes fictions contain odd passages, such as the following from The Lion 
the Witch and the Wardrobe: 
‘Let’s go home,’ said Susan. And then, though nobody said it out loud, everyone 
suddenly realized the same fact that Edmund had whispered to Peter at the end of 
the last chapter. They were lost.  
Picciuto suggests that it is strange to say we believe that in the fiction these characters 
realised what Peter had whispered at the end of the last chapter since this would mean 
these characters are aware they live in a merely fictional world.  
To respond to this worry, we should first widen the scope of this objection since it 
captures one of many aspects of what we might call the Fictions Are Weird problem. 
Fictions often experiment with storytelling devices and this can raise tricky questions 
about how we should understand their fictional worlds and what they prescribe us to 
take as fictionally true. For example, in the comic Bomb Queen, a character called Editor 
Girl has the power to alter the content of speech bubbles (Cook 2012, p. 177). Ordinarily 
speech bubbles in comics are mere genre tropes that are not supposed to be viewed as 
part of the fictional world, yet here we have to explain whether they do indeed exist as 
a tangible part of this particular fictional world. 
                                               
121 There are many further issues we could have discussed here, such as whether fictional 
names are understood to refer de re or de dicto. I have chosen to leave the discussion at 
this point because since I find it unlikely we will settle the debate about the cognitive 
attitudes involved in fiction with further discussion of ontological and linguistic issues. 
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However, the fact that fictions are weird does not have to be seen as ruling out a 
distinct content view. Picciuto is highlighting a question about what we ought to do 
when we are presented with inconsistent or incoherent aspects of a fiction. Walton (Ch. 
4, pp. 174-182) worries about some of these issues, calling them silly questions. For 
example, in Othello, should we take it as fictionally true that Othello can speak in iambic 
pentameter despite the fact he is supposed to be a somewhat brutish individual? These 
sorts of questions about fictional truths arise for any account of the attitude we take 
towards fictions, and they do not tell in favour of a belief-like imagining based view. The 
notion of imagining associated with fiction is supposed to track fictional truths, and 
saying that we imagine that ‘in the last chapter …’ is no less puzzling as compared to 
believing that in the fiction metafictional claims are true. 
One response here is to simply declare that such things are indeterminate in the 
fiction. It is neither fictionally true nor fictionally false that they recalled what had been 
said at the end of the last chapter. If one finds this unsatisfying, Matravers (2013) oﬀers 
several further ways to respond to these sorts of questions: 
Faced with an incoherence a reader can do one of four things. He or she could take 
the story to be a misreport; that is, take the narrator to be mistaken or lying. If this 
were the case the reader would reject the claim as false; both false in the narrative 
and, if the events were being reported as actual, false per se (I shall call this ‘the 
rejection strategy’). The reader could think hard and find a way in which the narra-
tive could be made coherent (I shall call this ‘the reconciliation strategy’). The reader 
could reclassify the narrative; that is, attribute to the world it describes a principle 
in which the situation is no longer contradictory (I shall call this the ‘weird world 
strategy’). Finally, the reader could simply ignore that part of the narrative or put it 
aside as a flaw, and try to make sense of the rest without it (I shall call this the 
‘disregarding strategy’). (Matravers 2013, p. 131) 
In the passage from The Lion the Witch and the Wardrobe highlighted above, we can 
use the ‘reconciliation’ approach. The initial reference is to ‘the same fact that Edmund 
had whispered to Peter’ and we could take this passage as saying everyone recalled the 
whispered fact itself, rather than that they recalled this fact and also recognised it was 
whispered at the end of the previous chapter. These sorts of metafictional examples are 
thus compatible with a distinct content approach to explaining how we engage with 
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fictions. It will sometimes be hard to explain what is true in a given fiction, but these 
complexities should not push us into accepting a role for belief-like imaginings here.  
As such then, these initial concerns about sophistication, ontology and weird fictions 
haven’t given us reason to introduce belief-like imaginings into our account of how we 
engage with fiction. 
We will now turn to discuss something like a puzzle that philosophers have argued 
can only be solved by introducing belief-like imaginings. This puzzle concerns how to 
spell out the distinction between fiction and non-fiction. Several philosophers have 
suggested this distinction is best explained by supposing fictions invite imaginings 
whereas non-fictions invite belief, so we should consider whether this issue forces us to 
introduce belief-like imaginings into our account of how we engage with fiction. 
5.3 Fiction & Non-Fiction 
The question of how we should distinguish works of fiction from works of non-fiction has 
received a great deal of attention in contemporary philosophy of fiction. Much of this 
debate has focused on verbal fictions, such as novels, though it is usually thought similar 
arguments and issues arise when thinking about plays, films and other visual fictions.122 
Lamarque and Olsen emphasise this distinction, suggesting that: 
[t]he classification of narrative into fiction and non-fiction is of the utmost significance; 
not only is it a precondition of making sense of a work, but it determines how we 
should respond in both thought and action. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994, p. 30) 
Whether we classify a work as fiction or non-fiction will have important implications for 
how we engage with it. If you picked up a dystopian novel such as Orwell’s 1984 and 
didn’t realise it was a work of fiction, it would be a disaster for your representations of 
                                               
122 As we will go on to see, this is because much of the debate has focused on how we should 
understand the propositions that makeup works of verbal fiction but it has been argued 
this account might also apply to visual fictions (Currie 1990, p. 39)  
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the world. Suddenly, you could find yourself forming various beliefs about wars that have 
taken place between Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia, grossly distorting your 
understanding of world history.  
In recent philosophical work, it has been suggested we should distinguish fiction and 
non-fiction with reference to the attitude they prescribe readers to take towards their 
content.123 Defenders of this sort of view argue that works of fiction present propositions 
that we should make-believe or imagine, whereas works of non-fiction present propositions 
that we should believe. In this way, we might be forced to introduce belief-like imaginings 
into an account of how we engage with works of fiction in order to capture this crucial 
distinction. 
This sketch of the attitudes we take towards fiction and non-fiction is too simplistic, 
however. Most works of non-fiction will contain at least one proposition that we are not 
supposed to straightforwardly believe, and many works of fiction contain propositions 
that we are supposed to straightforwardly believe. For example, a work of history might 
ask us to consider what it would be like if Christianity had never become the world’s 
dominant religion, and a work of fiction can also contain utterances we are supposed to 
believe. Friend (2012, p. 184) gives an example from Mary Barton ‘There are some fields 
near Manchester, well known to the inhabitants as “Green Heys Fields”, through which 
runs a public footpath to a little village about two miles distant’. This looks like an 
                                               
123 This sort of view is contrasted most frequently with a view where one argues there is 
something about the form, syntax or semantics of fiction that distinguishes it from the 
form, syntax or semantics of non-fiction. These views are unpopular because it looks like 
works of non-fiction and fiction can be written in much the same way (e.g. a recent review 
in the London Review of Books (https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n15/sheila-fitzpatrick/good-
communist-homes) of the history book The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian 
Revolution argues it has much in common stylistically with War and Peace). As such, 
philosophers have attended to the pragmatic factors that might distinguish fiction from 
non-fiction. This relates to my earlier point about recognition: there are no obvious surface 
features of works of fiction that serve to distinguish them from works of non-fiction (e.g. 
both a work of fiction or a work of literary non-fiction can begin with the sentence ‘Once 
upon a time …). 
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utterance that is supposed to invite straightforward belief, and the same can be said for 
various other descriptions of places and locations found in works of fiction. There are also 
more general claims found in fictions that seem to invite belief, such as Tolstoy’s ‘All 
happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.’ Again, this is 
not something we are supposed to take to be only true in the fiction: it looks like Tolstoy 
is asserting this to be straightforwardly true. 
The most popular way of setting out the diﬀerence between fiction and non-fiction 
is what Stock (2016, pp. 205-209) calls the ‘imagining plus’ view. This view maintains 
that prescriptions to imagine are necessary for distinguishing fiction from non-fiction, 
but are not suﬃcient. These prescriptions are supplemented with reference to authorial 
intentions and some sort of additional condition.  
This intention-based view was first set out by Currie (1990) drawing on work from 
Grice (1957). Currie argues that authors of works of fiction put forward what have come 
to be known as fictive utterances (Lamarque and Olsen 1994, pp. 32-33), and that authors 
intend for readers to imagine these utterances and to do so because they recognise this 
intention. To see how this works in practice consider a novel like Harry Potter. This 
novel contains various utterances about wizards, wizarding schools and other magical 
goings on. According to Currie and his followers, the starting point for explaining what 
makes Harry Potter a work of fiction is that these utterances express propositions which 
are supposed to be imagined, and we are supposed to imagine them because we recognise 
J.K. Rowling’s intention to present these as propositions to be imagined. 
Thinkers who have been drawn to this sort of view have also added a second 
necessary condition to set a demarcation between fictive and non-fictive utterances, 
driven by several hypothetical examples introduced by Currie (1990, pp. 42-44) For 
Currie, this condition is that a fictive utterance must be either false or non-accidentally 
true, which is supposed to rule out, for example, a case where someone writes what they 
take to be a work of fiction based on repressed childhood memories. Lamarque and Olsen 
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(1994, p. 44) and Davies (2007, p. 46) oﬀer subtly diﬀerent twists on this formula but 
the general idea of introducing an additional condition remains.124 
However, so far, we have not seen how this view accounts for the diﬀerence between 
works of fiction and non-fiction. We have introduced the theoretical notion of a fictive 
utterance, but as we pointed our earlier a work of non-fiction can also contain fictive 
utterances, since a fictive utterance is merely one that we are supposed to imagine and 
not believe. In practice, this means that for Currie and his followers both works of fiction 
and works of non-fiction are what we can call 'patchworks' (Currie 1990, p. 49) of fictional 
and non-fictive utterances. This leaves a question of what makes a given patchwork 
fictional rather than non-fictional.  
This focus on fictive utterances also introduces another patchwork problem, the 
‘patchwork of attitudes’ problem (Stock 2011b, Friend 2011, p. 167). If Currie and his 
followers are right, when we engage with a fiction we will sometimes believe the 
propositions expressed by utterances that we read on the page, and sometimes imagine 
them. Indeed, we might even switch between these two attitudes over the course of a 
single paragraph. However, reading a work of fiction or non-fiction feels like a unified 
psychological experience, at least introspectively. When reading a work of fiction, there 
is no immediate phenomenological diﬀerence between reading a sentence that sets out a 
truth as opposed to a fictional truth. 
As such, introducing a counterpart to belief to explain the distinction between fiction 
and non-fiction may well serve as an example of where introducing an imaginative 
                                               
124 A good recent summary of this debate and various existing views can be found in Kajtar 
(2017). I will not focus on these developments here, since my claim that we don’t need to 
introduce belief-like imaginings to explain the distinction between fiction and non-fiction 
does not depend on adopting any specific imagining-plus view. For what it’s worth, I have 
some sympathy with Davies’ (2007, p. 46) ‘fidelity constraint’, which an author follows ‘if 
they include only the events she believes to have occurred, narrated as occurring in the 
order in which she believes them to have occurred’, since I would agree with him that there 
is more liberty for authors of fiction to depart from truths about the actual world in their 
narratives as compared to authors of non-fiction. 
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counterpart not only fails to solve a purported puzzle (how to demarcate fictions from 
non-fictions), but also serves to deepen the puzzle. This is because this approach looks 
like it will lead to us maintaining that there is a distinct attitude involved in reading 
fictions as compared to non-fictions, when this is not phenomenological evident on 
reflection.  
This, of course, does not rule out an involuntary counterpart being involved here 
since an involuntary counterpart to belief could be phenomenologically identical to 
genuine belief. However, this also doesn’t rule out an approach where we recast being 
prescribed to imagine in terms of being prescribed to believe something to be fictionally 
true. The diﬃculty here, however, is that we would still face the initial patchwork 
problem: we have no simple explanation of how to move from noting the presence of 
utterances that express propositions we are supposed to believe to be fictional to 
categorising a work as fiction or non-fiction. 
As such, I think a better sort of approach to distinguishing fiction and non-fiction is 
oﬀered by Friend, who dispenses with any reference to prescriptions to imagine. Friend 
(2012) suggests that we should think of fiction and non-fiction as being genres. Drawing 
on Walton's categories of art (1970), she argues that there are standard, contra-standard 
and variable features associated with being a work of fiction or non-fiction. Standard 
features are the features a member of a category normally exhibit, such as being on a 
canvas for a member of the painting category. Variable features are those that can vary 
amongst members of a category, such as the colours used to paint a particular painting. 
Contra-standard features are features that normally rule out membership of a given 
category, such as being observable in the round for a painting.125 
                                               
125 In terms of appreciation, this has important implications. This does not mean that there 
cannot be a painting that is observable in the round. What it means is that if we categorise 
something observable in the round as a painting, we will see this as a striking feature of 
the work. If we categorise something observable in the round as a sculpture, this will 
normally be less striking since this is a standard feature of statuary. 
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Friend (2012, p. 190) argues that containing many statements we are not supposed 
to straightforwardly believe is a standard feature of fiction. This explains why we find 
some works hard to classify. She gives the example of the Reagan autobiography Dutch, 
which features various obviously made up segments. This sort of material is contra-
standard for non-fiction, and this is why it is unclear how we should classify this work. 
In response to this sort of problem case, the imagining-plus view needs to find a way of 
moving from noting the presence of these apparently fictive utterances, to establishing 
whether the work is fiction or non-fiction. On the other hand, Friend can simply point 
out that we ought to be surprised by the presence of this content, but can nonetheless 
reflect on factors like how the work was classified on release, what sort of work the author 
took himself to be writing, and so on.  
At this point, it will be helpful to take a step back from our discussion of the 
distinction between fiction and non-fiction. The orthodox view of the fiction and non-
fiction distinction explains it in terms of the attitude that we are prescribed to take 
towards the utterances that make up the work in question. This raises various patchwork 
worries, and in particular, does not rule out that fictions prescribe us to believe things 
are fictionally true. In light of these patchwork concerns, I prefer Friend’s approach which 
doesn’t rely on making a move from classifying an utterance as fictional to classifying a 
work as a whole as fictional. However, endorsing this genre approach will not allow us to 
simply conclude that there is no role for belief-like imaginings in our engagement with 
fiction. Indeed, Friend argues that belief-like imagining can play a role in our engagement 
with both fiction and non-fiction. She relies on considerations from discourse processing 
to establish this view, and we will now turn to consider whether this research suggests 
that we should associate belief-like imaginings with fiction. 
5.4 Discourse Processing 
Psychologists have developed accounts of discourse processing to explain how we engage 
with all kinds of texts, and as such psychologists working in this area do not tend to 
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argue that there is one way in which readers engaging with fiction and another way in 
which they engage with non-fiction.126 
The psychological consensus is that there are multiple levels of memory 
representation that we form when engaging with texts. A representative example of these 
diﬀerent levels – adapted from a recent review article (Graesser and Forsyth 2013, p. 
477, Table 30.1) – is as follows: 
1. Words and Syntax: a representation of the actual words that make up the dis-
course along with the syntax of the propositions that make up the discourse. 
2. Textbase: paraphrased representations of the propositions in a discourse. 
3. Situation model: a model of the situation described in a text, supplemented by 
pre-existing knowledge. 
4. Genre: information about the genre of a text and relevant classificatory issues 
(e.g. is it a work of a fiction? A newspaper article?). 
5. Pragmatic communication: information about the goals of the author and the 
intentions behind their discourse. 
These levels of representation shouldn’t be thought of as being entirely independent of 
one another. Instead, the idea is that these levels constitute diﬀerent dimensions to our 
engagement with a discourse and reflect the diﬀerent psychological constructs and 
cognitive processing involved in our engagement with texts.127 That being said, not all 
psychologists accept the existence of these diﬀerent levels of representation. Most would 
at least accept the existence of the textbase (perhaps combining this with the words and 
                                               
126 Matravers oﬀers a helpfully summary of much of this research in chapters 4-7 of his Fiction 
and Narrative (2013). His overview is admittedly biased since he takes this psychological 
work to show that the consensus view that fiction involves a distinct imaginative attitude 
is mistaken. 
127 Various psychological methods are used to show these levels exist, such as verbal reports 
and attention tests (Graesser et al. 1997).  
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syntax level) and the situation model level.128 Roughly, this marks the distinction between 
our representation of the propositions that make up a text and of the events described 
in a text.  
For present purposes, we need to consider whether any of these levels involve belief-
like imaginings, either when engaging with any sort of discourse or when engaging with 
works of fiction. So far as I’m aware, it has not been argued that the first two levels of 
comprehension involve belief-like imaginings. These levels relate to our initial viewing of 
words on a page and recognising them as making up sentences, followed by us forming a 
representation not of the literal form of the sentence, but a paraphrase of its meaning. 
These two levels are supposed to be sub-personal and automatic, with this processing 
occurring in the same way for all kinds of discourse (Sparks and Rapp 2010). Later levels, 
represented by (4) and (5) also don’t seem to require belief-like imaginings. Weinberg 
and Meskin (2006a, pp. 229-231) explicitly allow that when engaging with fiction we form 
beliefs about things like genre, and they would presumably say something similar about 
pragmatic issues related to the goals of the author.129 
This leaves (4), the situation model, as the level where belief-like imaginings might 
be involved and this is where Friend (n.d.) draws a connection between fiction and belief-
like imaginings. The situation model is the eventual result of our engagement with a text 
and represents the various happenings in a story. Johnson-Laird (quoted in Matravers 
2013) tells us that: 
                                               
128 We can also call these ‘mental models’ (Johnson Laird 1983), a name which appears to be 
more frequently used in philosophical discussions. 
129 They consider this in a discussion about, among other things, how beliefs about actors and 
actresses can colour our viewing of a visual fiction and how beliefs about genre can influence 
our engagement with all kinds of fiction. The distinct content view is well placed to make 
sense of this. You just do believe that James Stewart is an all-around nice guy, and this 
interacts with your belief that in a given film, a character played by him is not such a nice 
guy. This is an issue where simple beliefs alone might struggle to capture how we engage 
with fiction, but once we accept that some of our beliefs will have content about what is 
true in fiction, this can allow for interesting interactions between our standing beliefs and 
beliefs about fictions. 
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[situation models] play a central and unifying role in representing objects, states of 
aﬀairs, sequences of events, the way the world is, and the social and psychological 
actions of daily life. They enable individuals to make inferences and predictions, to 
understand phenomena, to decide what action to take to control its execution, and 
above all to experience events by proxy; they allow language to be used to create 
representations comparable to those deriving from direct acquaintance with the world; 
and they relate word to the world by way of conception and perception. (Johnson-
Laird 1983, p. 397) 
One way to motivate the suggestion that situation models involve forming belief-like 
imaginings is to note that the models that we produce when we engage with texts are 
ordinarily compartmentalised (Potts et al. 1989). That is to say, we do not automatically 
integrate information from these models into our pre-existing structures of belief. Studies 
show that this happens with non-fictions as well as fictions. This is obvious on reflection, 
since so long as we are being appropriately critical, we don’t come to believe that 
everything we read in a work of non-fiction is true.130 
This introduces the question of what sort of attitude we take towards the 
compartmentalised propositions found in a situation model. Matravers argues that we 
take no particular attitude towards them whatsoever: we merely regard them as 
‘representations in a situation model’. Some of these propositions we will go on to believe, 
and this is the only point at which we take a specific cognitive attitude towards them. 
As he puts this: 
If a proposition in a fictional narrative does not become a belief, the proposition’s role 
in our cognitive economy is only that of a proposition that forms part of the content 
of a narrative. It has this role in common with the other propositions that are part 
of the [situation] model we form on engaging with a narrative, whether non-fictional 
or fictional. If a proposition in a fictional narrative does become a belief, it has a role 
                                               
130 Interestingly, there is some evidence that we are in fact less discriminatory when reading 
works of fiction as to what we come to believe after (Prentice and Gerrig 1999, cited in 
Matravers 2013 p. 97). One reason for this might be that when we read a work we believe 
to be non-fictional (or which we believe to purport to oﬀer a faithful account of the actual 
world) we pay close attention to suspect claims, whereas with a fiction (or something we 
don’t believe to oﬀer a faithful account of the actual world) we are less discriminating of 
suspect claims. 
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as a proposition that forms part of a narrative and it becomes a belief. (Matravers 
2013, p. 96) 
Friend (n.d.), on the other hand, argues that we imagine these propositions in a belief-
like way and that this means belief-like imaginings play a key role in our engagement 
with fiction. She associates forming a situation model with the notion of ‘imagining a 
world’ and argues that imagining a world involves certain forms of non-propositional 
imaginings, such as mental imagery and imagined perspectives, along with propositional, 
belief-like imaginings.131 This means she accepts that situation models have an analogical, 
rather than propositional structure. Friend defends this view by adopting a particular 
approach to understanding how we construct at least some situation models: the ‘event 
indexing’ model (Zwaan et al. 1995).132 Accepting for the sake of argument that this a 
plausible account of how we form models of the situations described in works of fiction, 
we should consider whether Friend is right that we have to be understood as imagining 
the propositions found in a situation model. If she is, then we necessarily have to 
introduce belief-like imaginings into our account of how we engage with works of fiction. 
Indeed, this may even make sense of my clustering worries in relation to the distinct 
attitude view. If one thinks that we can explain clustering in terms of the formation of 
situation models, and situation models often contain belief-like imaginings, then the 
distinct attitude theory will have at least some sort of response to my concerns about 
how to explain clustering. 
A first point to make is that psychologists do not argue that the propositional 
contents in situation models are marked as relating to ‘fiction’ at the level of content. 
                                               
131 It is perhaps interesting that this is similar to the notion of an imaginative exercise which 
Everett used in the initial quote of this thesis about the intuitive link between fiction and 
imagination. 
132 This event indexing approach is supposed to help explain how we form models of discourses 
where the events are described in a diﬀerent order to the order in which they actually 
occurred. This is often necessary when engaging with fiction, since not all fictions give a 
neat and ordered timeline. Even when they do, we still have to do some work to figure out 
how the diﬀerent described events fit together. 
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Friend notes that situation model themselves may well be marked with a source ‘tag’ 
such as ‘in Harry Potter’, but the propositions within the model are supposed to be 
represented simpliciter. We could deny the scientific consensus on this matter, but it will 
be more productive to consider whether we are forced to accept that these 
compartmentalised propositions are imagined in a belief-like way.  
To respond to Friend’s proposal, it will be helpful to quote Matravers again on this 
point: 
In as much as we have an attitude to them [compartmentalised propositions we do 
not believe] at all, it is merely one of them being part of the content of whatever 
particular representation we are reading or remembering. We may have an attitude 
to the representation as to it being fictional and non-fictional … but that is a diﬀerent 
matter. (Matravers 2013, p. 79) 
I take it part of what Matravers wants to bring out here is that often we do not pay 
much attention to the contents of situation models, so it might seem implausible to think 
that all the propositions within them are either believed or imagined in a belief-like way. 
As such, these compartmentalised propositions don’t seem to exhibit the richness that 
philosophers like Nichols and Currie seem to have in mind when they associate belief-like 
imaginings with our engagement with fiction:  
Unless we have reason to think that the psychological processes of reading texts such 
as histories, biographies, and novels should diﬀer completely from those that operate 
when reading the texts that feature in psychology experiments (a claim that would 
be empirically incredible) we have reason to think that the subsequent mental models 
are going to be rather vague and sketchy. In short, what goes on in our heads when 
we read is, generally, a great deal less exciting than we might have thought. (Matrav-
ers 2013, p. 73) 
Furthermore, it’s worth reminding ourselves that not believing p does not mean we 
necessarily imagine p in a belief-like way. This is particularly relevant in the present 
discussion, since construction of situation models goes on when we read any sort of 
narrative, including works of non-fiction. It would be counter-intuitive to argue that 
whenever we take a claim to be false in a work of non-fiction we imagine it in a belief-
like way, as opposed to just regarding it as part of the content of what we are reading. 
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For example, when I read a newspaper article I disagree with, it would be odd to describe 
myself as taking a belief-like imaginative attitude towards its contestable claims. 
At this point, we can anticipate the following response from someone defending the 
idea that we should associate fiction and belief-like imaginings. It could be argued that 
although belief-like imaginings are not involved in constructing situation models, they 
are nonetheless generated on the basis of constructing models related to works of fiction. 
We could suggest, for example, that we form belief-like imaginings when we reflect on 
the events described in fictions, or on what is true in a fiction. However, we can also 
suggest that when we reflect in these ways beliefs about what is fictional are generated. 
As of yet, we have no reason to think that beliefs subject to a fictional operator are 
unable to serve this role in our reflection on works of fiction.  
As such, we have yet to find any constraints on belief, or puzzles related to our 
engagement with fiction that necessitate the introduction of belief-like imaginings. 
Indeed, in the case of sophistication, we saw that clustering might reveal a way in which 
the distinct attitude view is insuﬃcient for explaining how we are able to engage with 
fictions. This leaves a final important issue to consider, which is whether beliefs about 
what is true in fiction can explain the way we can become immersed in works of fiction. 
5.5 Immersion & Aﬀect 
The most important objections to a distinct content view of fiction arises when thinking 
about what we can call immersion. I will consider two issues here, one related to what 
Gerrig calls ‘transportation’, and another related to aﬀect raised by Weinberg and 
Meskin.  
Gerrig points out that fictions have a remarkable ability to engage our attention. He 
illustrates this with the metaphor of transportation: 
Readers become ‘lost in a book’; moviegoers are surprised when the lights come back 
up; television viewers care desperately about the fates of soap opera characters; mu-
seum visitors are captivated by the stories encoded in daubs of paint. In each case, a 
narrative serves to transport an experiencer away from the here and now. (emphasis 
mine) (Gerrig 1993, p. 3) 
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This notion has since been made more formal by Green and Brock (2000), who introduce 
a 15-point scale for transportation. Transportation is thought to partly explain many 
diﬀerent aspects of our engagement with fiction, such as why we find it enjoyable to 
engage with fictions, why we end up being persuaded by merely fictional works, and why 
we have emotional responses towards them.133 
This allows us to introduce a worry about whether beliefs about fictions are suﬃcient 
for explaining this sort of transportation. This is because they look to be external rather 
than internal attitudes. Perhaps we need internal attitudes – namely belief-like 
imaginings – in order to be transported by a work of fiction. 
However, this worry is not entirely compelling. I have two objections here. Firstly, 
it is unclear why beliefs about a fiction are unable to explain transportation and 
immersion while belief-like imaginings can. This mirrors a debate about whether there is 
a role for desire-like imaginings when accounting for childhood pretence. Velleman (2000, 
p. 257) argues that an explanation of pretence in terms of desires to pretend in certain 
ways is depressingly un-childlike and cannot explain immersion because it renders 
children as like actors following a script. However, Funkhouser and Spaulding (2009, pp. 
12-13) rightly respond that this trades on a stipulation about what sort of states can and 
cannot explain immersion. In the case of beliefs about the fiction, having these sorts of 
beliefs does not have to entail that you’re constantly reflecting on the fact that you are 
engaging with a fiction, with this somehow preventing immersion. Instead, it just means 
that when we engage with fictions we form beliefs implicitly subject to a fictional operator. 
We would require a further argument for why it matters whether the relevant attitude 
is ‘internal’ or ‘external’. Weinberg and Meskin perhaps oﬀer the relevant sort of 
argument here in relation to aﬀect, and we will discuss their argument shortly. 
The second objection to make here is that works of narrative non-fiction are equally 
capable of transporting us (Green and Brock 2000), which suggests that belief-like 
                                               
133 A good recent summary of these connections, among others, can be found in Green and 
Donahue (2009). 
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imaginings are unnecessary for transportation, since the cognitive attitude involved in 
our engagement with non-fiction is usually agreed to be belief. That being said, we may 
well need to associate some other aspects of imagination with transportation in order to 
explain why we are sometimes transported by works of non-fiction. For example, while 
reading a piece of long-form journalism about a war zone, I might begin to form imagery 
of a war-torn environment, or what it would be like to be one of the subjects of the piece. 
As such, in the case of non-fiction, it looks like beliefs are either redundant for explaining 
transportation, or are able to interact with objectual and sympathetic imaginings to allow 
for transportation. If the former is right, then even if we introduce belief-like imaginings, 
this reveals that they would presumably also be redundant when it comes to explaining 
transportation when engaging with works of fiction. If the latter is correct, then we can 
allow that beliefs about fiction can also interact with non-propositional imaginings to 
transport us when engaging with works of fiction. 
Having noted why these initial worries about immersion shouldn’t make us endorse 
a distinct attitude view of how we engage with fiction, we can now turn to consider 
Weinberg and Meskin’s argument for why beliefs about fiction cannot prompt aﬀective 
responses.134 
The argument for why distinct content views struggle to explain our aﬀective 
responses to fictions is helpfully set out Weinberg and Meskin when they note, after 
having considered and rejected an illusion-based theory of fiction, that: 
The failures of the illusion theory suggest a diﬀerent belief-based theory: to imagine 
the fictional content p is simply to hold the belief about the fiction that in-the-story-
it-is-true-that-p. Although the "meta-representational" theory clearly entails behav-
ioral circumscription (since such beliefs about a fictional story will rarely prompt us 
to an action), it also seems unable to explain phenomenological/physiological robust-
ness. Fearful aﬀective responses, for example, seem to require representations of the 
form S is in danger, where S is someone we care about. But it is not enough for the 
representation to be a subpart of another representation. For example, if you believe, 
                                               
134 Boruah (1988, pp. 59-64) also raises some related worries here. I take them to have been 
adequately dealt with by Neill (1993), so I will not elaborate on them for the purposes of 
this discussion. 
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not that the slime is threatening, but that a friend think the slime is threatening, 
your only fear will be for that friend's sanity; similarly for a belief that it is meta-
physically possible that a slime is threatening. So a belief like in the novel it is true 
that S is in danger is not of the right form to generate correct aﬀective responses. 
(Weinberg and Meskin 2006a, p. 225) 
As such, Weinberg and Meskin argue that beliefs about the fiction are insuﬃcient for 
generating aﬀective responses. They then go on to argue that they are also unnecessary, 
since mere imaginings can generate aﬀective responses: 
A further problem for the meta representational theory is that we often have aﬀective 
responses to imaginings that are not derived from any fiction. Merely imagining a 
close friend's being in great pain may be enough to produce a pang of pity, without 
there being any work of fiction at all concerning your friend and his or her suﬀering 
…. While it might seem tempting to suggest that in such cases a minimal story is 
created, such a view leaves open the question of what it is to be a story. And the 
meta representational theorist cannot explain what a story is in terms of imagining, 
since that would lead to vicious circularity. (Weinberg and Meskin 2006a, p. 225) 
We will begin with this second argument. As we have already seen, I think we have 
reason to be sceptical that when we talk about a notion of imagination related to fiction 
it is the same as the one related to imagining things about a close friend. For one thing, 
the latter seems to involve a voluntary, rather than involuntary attitude. As we noted, 
it could be that belief-like imaginings behave in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent contexts but 
we will need a positive argument for this claim, and as such whether this second worry 
needs to concern us depends in part on whether we find the insuﬃcient argument 
compelling.135  
Having made this response to their ‘unnecessary’ argument, we can now consider 
their first argument, the ‘insuﬃcient’ argument. We can break down Weinberg and 
Meskin’s argument as being something like the following: 
                                               
135 It’s also worth bringing out here that they refer to imagining ‘your sister being in pain’. 
On the face of it, this is not a propositional imagining, but something like an imagined 
experience. One response here would be to say that mere propositional imaginings, even if 
they do exist, are not enough to generate aﬀective responses in the first place and that we 
need to refer to other forms of imagining. 
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P1: When you engage with a fiction, you form beliefs about what is true in 
the fiction  
P2: When you engage with a fiction, you exhibit emotional responses towards 
the events depicted in the fiction  
P3: In order to exhibit an emotional response to something, you need a rep-
resentation of the form X is F136 
P4: Beliefs about what is true in fiction are not representations of the form X 
is F 
C: Beliefs about what is true in fiction cannot be what generates our emotional 
responses to fictions 
We can note first of all that P1 and P2 are hard to deny. P1 is a truism unless one has 
a restrictive view of reference, which we saw in section 5.2.2 we do not need to commit 
ourselves to. P2 one might prefer to rephrase as ‘emotion-like’ responses if they think our 
responses to fiction involve quasi emotions, but otherwise seems like a truism. P4 is also 
hard to deny. If I believe that S is threatened [in the fiction] this is not a representation 
of the form X is F since it is a representation of the form X is F [in the fiction]. 
As such, we should see if we have reason to challenge P3. A first question is how 
strong Weinberg and Meskin intend their claim to be. One way of reading this claim 
would be that all emotional responses require a representation of the form X is F. The 
other is that some emotional responses require a representation of the form X is F. I am 
going to take it they mean ‘some’ here, since the ‘all’ claim will quickly run into diﬃculties 
                                               
136 This claim is diﬀerent to the belief claim we used to introduce the paradox of fiction in 
chapter 1. Their claim here is only that we need to take some sort of attitude towards a 
representation of the form X is F to generate an emotional response. This does not commit 
them to the stronger view that the relevant attitude has to be belief, which is of course a 
crucial distinction for them since they think belief-like imaginings are what prompt 
emotional responses to fictions (Meskin and Weinberg 2003) 
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when thinking about automatic reflexes, such as being startled by loud noises. Indeed, 
one can also be startled by events depicted in a work of fiction even if one doesn’t have 
a representation of the form ‘X is startling’; at least in the case of visual fictions like films 
that sometimes make use of sudden images and sounds.137 That being said, there are some 
important emotional responses to fiction that look like they might require this sort of 
representation. If I feel pride for Superman, presumably this means I do have some sort 
of representation about Superman, as opposed to my pride being a mere automatic bodily 
response. 
A second point to make in this respect is that having a representation of the form X 
is F (be it a belief or a belief-like imagining) is not suﬃcient for generating an aﬀective 
response. At the very least, we will need some sort of desire to accompany the relevant 
representation. We saw this in chapter 3, where we noted that Nichols (2006) argues that 
sometimes belief-like imaginings seem to lead to aﬀective responses and sometimes they 
do not. Indeed, if at this very moment I imagine that I am being chased by a monster, 
this doesn’t seem to make me fearful.  
It is also worth noting at this point that, as I suggested in response to worries about 
transportation, imaginative aspects of our engagement with fictions – aside from belief-
like imaginings – likely play an important role in generating our emotional responses to 
fictions. For example, Van Leeuwen (2011, p. 66) emphasises the importance of imagery 
in generating aﬀective responses, arguing that ‘There is reason to think that imagining 
in, say, visual or auditory detail has far greater emotional impact than bare, propositional 
imagining’. Indeed, this is backed up by psychological work on transportation, where a 
higher degree of transportation is associated with the formation of imagery. 
The association of these further kinds of imaginings with fiction is compatible with 
my preferred distinct content view. If we need to make reference to our objectual and 
sympathetic imaginings to explain our emotional responses to fiction, then the reason 
that Weinberg and Meskin’s worry arises is because they’re asking beliefs about the 
                                               
137 On the other hand, I doubt that one can be ‘startled’ by a novel. 
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fiction to do too much explanatory work. However, this worry will equally arise if we 
seek to explain our aﬀective responses to fictions solely in terms of belief-like imaginings.  
In response, Weinberg and Meskin could argue that although belief-like imaginings 
are insuﬃcient for generating aﬀective responses, at least they don’t rule them out: they 
could argue that beliefs about what is fictional shouldn’t be able to play a role in 
generating aﬀective responses regardless of which further imaginings might accompany 
them. In other words, they could move to argue that a representation of the form X is F 
can combine with other mental states to produce aﬀective responses, whereas beliefs 
about fiction cannot. 
Whether this is right will turn on their suggestion that in order for a representation 
to lead to an emotional response, ‘it is not enough for the representation to be a subpart 
of another representation’. However, they do not make it explicit what a subpart of a 
representation is supposed to be. Their examples of the sort of representations that 
cannot lead to aﬀective responses because they involve subparts are 1) if you believe that 
a friend thinks a slime is threatening, and 2) if you believe that it is metaphysically 
possible that a slime is threatening. But, suppose I believe that my sister will be 
threatened in two weeks. Does this mean ‘my sister will be threatened’ is a mere subpart 
because my representation contains a temporal operator? Likewise, if we stretch the 
notion of a subpart, we could argue that an everyday representation that leads to a fear 
response is of the form X is threatened in reality. Neill develops a similar point: 
[t]o the extent that my belief that fictionally Shylock is a victim of injustice can be 
construed as "a mere recognition that fictionally, something is the case," my belief 
that many Guatemalan refugees are victims of injustice can be construed similarly as 
"a mere recognition that, actually, something is the case." And there is no reason to 
suppose that "mere recognition" of what is fictional is any less causally eﬃcacious 
with respect to emotion than "mere recognition" of what is actual. (Neill 1993, p. 3) 
What then, is supposed to be special about the subpart involved in thinking that X is 
threatened in the fiction which is supposed to rule out this representation provoking an 
emotional response? Indeed, we seem to care about the trials and tribulations of fictional 
characters, and in light of this, it is perhaps only to be expected that we exhibit emotional 
responses towards them. 
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Weinberg and Meskin’s intuition here might relate to what is entailed by one’s 
representations of the world. If I believe that in two weeks my sister will be threatened, 
this entails that I do in fact believe that my sister is threatened. Likewise, if I believe 
that my sister is threatened in reality, this implies that my sister is threatened simpliciter. 
The fiction case is diﬀerent. If I believe that my sister is threatened in the fiction, then I 
don’t believe she is actually threatened: all that is entailed by this belief is that she is 
threatened in the fiction. A similar point applies to both further examples of subparts 
they give. If you believe that your sister thinks she is threatened, you won’t believe that 
she is actually threatened – and if you believe a slime is metaphysically possible, you 
won’t believe that you are actually threatened by one. 
To respond to this way of developing the worry about subparts, it will be helpful to 
return to consider how distinct attitude theorists make sense of our aﬀective responses 
to fiction. In chapters 2 and 3, we saw that the distinct attitude theorists argue that 
belief-like imaginings and beliefs can interact with our aﬀective systems in much the same 
way, and as such can prompt aﬀective responses. One way to explain why this might 
happen is oﬀered by Harris (2000, Ch. 4), who argues that emotional responses are the 
product of appraisals, a view associated with Lazarus (1991). According to appraisal 
theory, our emotional responses result from how we appraise situations across various 
dimensions, such as how a given situation relates to our goals. To explain why we exhibit 
emotional responses to the merely fictional and pretend, Harris (2000, pp. 65-67) suggests 
that this appraisal process may not discriminate between fictional and real inputs. 
Now, this sort of suggestion can be understood as entailing that there is an 
insensitivity between belief and imaginings in our appraisal processes, but we can equally 
view this as entailing that there is as an insensitivity between diﬀerent sorts of content 
in our appraisal processes. As such, we could argue that whether or not we represent 
something as fictional or real at the level of content has no (or limited) bearing on the 
aﬀective responses we exhibit to it.  
This gives us a way of responding to Weinberg and Meskin’s worry about subparts. 
When you merely believe that your sister thinks she is threatened, you will not feel fear 
because you don’t appraise this as a situation that merits a fear response. In a fiction 
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case, you do perform this sort of appraisal because this appraisal process is neutral as to 
whether a representation concerns reality or fiction. In the sister and metaphysical 
possibility examples, you merely think someone isn’t actually threatened, while in the 
fiction case you do believe someone is threatened, albeit in fiction. If this is right, then 
although our aﬀective systems are not always neutral between cases where we take 
someone to be threatened and someone to not be threatened, they nonetheless are 
somewhat neutral in the special case of beliefs about fiction.  
One might object, however, that this view ignores the fact that diﬀerences in content 
ordinarily do alter our emotional responses. If you have a representation of the form X 
is annoying, this will play a role in making you angry; if you instead represent that X is 
scary, this will play a role in making you fearful, and so on. Similarly, we might object 
that judging that X is annoying [in the fiction] should lead to a diﬀerent aﬀective response 
as compared to judging that X is annoying simpliciter. However, as we noted in our 
discussion of quasi emotions in section 1.6, our response to fictions often are indeed 
somewhat diﬀerent to the ones we exhibit to ordinary stimuli. For example, Charles, who 
clutches his arm rests and yelps as an on-screen slime glares at him, is not motivated to 
respond in the usual way to feeling fear and makes no attempt to flee his cinema seat. 
As such, we could take Weinberg and Meskin’s worry as an argument for the 
suggestion that beliefs about the fiction lead to us feeling quasi emotions, rather than 
emotions simpliciter. This might seem like an odd response bearing in mind that I am 
denying a role for the perhaps more intuitive notion of belief-like imaginings in our 
engagement with fiction. However, it’s worth emphasising that suggesting that we form 
belief-like imaginings when we engage with fiction does not mean quasi emotions are 
rendered explanatorily redundant. Walton’s motivation for introducing these 
counterparts was to account for some puzzling features of our emotional responses to 
fiction, in particular that they seem to have diﬀerent connections with motivation as 
compared to ordinary responses. We can remain neutral about this issue for present 
purposes, since the more important point to bring out here is that if one is concerned 
that we ought to respond diﬀerently to beliefs about fiction as compared to 
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straightforward beliefs, there is some evidence that we do respond diﬀerently once we 
look beyond mere phenomenology and bodily sensations.    
At this point, Weinberg and Meskin might want to remind us that the paradox of 
fiction introduces not only a causal worry, but also a worry about rationality. They could 
argue that even if there is some way of explaining how beliefs about fiction can cause 
emotional responses, it is nonetheless irrational for us to exhibit these responses.  In turn, 
they could argue that it would be more rational to respond emotionally to our belief-like 
imaginings, and that as such we have reason to prefer a distinct attitude account of our 
emotional responses to fiction.  
To see how we might respond to this rationality worry it will be helpful to introduce 
some responses developed by distinct attitude theorists. One common response to the 
rationality worry made by defenders of distinct attitude views, is that emotional 
responses to fictional scenarios help to inform our future actions and behaviour in much 
the same way as our emotional responses to actual scenarios. For example, Robinson 
(1995) claims that fictions can help educate our emotions so we exhibit appropriate 
emotional responses to real world happenings. In a somewhat related vein, Nussbaum 
(1984) argues that engaging with fictions and responding emotionally to them can develop 
our moral sensibilities. 
However, all of these sorts of considerations are equally applicable to an account 
founded on the possibility of our having emotional responses to beliefs about what is 
fictional. These responses trade on pointing out how our emotional responses to fiction 
might be useful in our everyday life, and the utility of these responses remains if we say 
they are produced in response to beliefs about what is true in fiction. 
It is also worth noting that Davies (2009) oﬀers some helpful responses to the 
rationality worry on behalf of a belief-based view. He argues that it is, in fact, perfectly 
rational to feel emotional responses towards what you believe to be fictional, since for 
the fictional characters we feel emotions towards, the relevant issue is what is true in the 
fiction. Put simply, if we have any reason to feel pity for Anna Karenina (and not another 
emotion), it will be because of what happens to her in the fictional world, not in reality: 
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The belief relevant to Diana's pitying Anna Karenina is not that Anna exists in the 
actual world but that she suﬀers in the world of the fiction. … so long as she is aware 
of the context that places Anna in a fictional or possible world, Anna's non-existence 
in the actual world should not inhibit Diana's pity for Anna. And notice that Diana's 
response of pity now can be seen as rational, because she has the pity-relevant belief, 
which is that Anna suﬀers, whereas by contrast, amusement at Anna's plight and 
satisfaction at her suicide would not be appropriate. (Davies 2009, p. 270) 
Furthermore, he draws on Moran to argue that emotional responses to fictions are not 
unique in being somewhat disconnected from existence beliefs. Moran notes: 
Relief, regret, remorse and nostalgia are, after all, among the paradigm cases of emo-
tional response; and although they are essentially backward-looking, they are not 
commonly thought to present any special puzzle among the emotions. But at the 
same time from within everyday psychology we have also to confront the proverbial 
injunction against crying over spilt milk, which can itself seem very puzzling. After 
all, if we can't cry after the milk is spilled, when can we cry? Presumably not on 
confronting the milk still safely in the bottle. (Moran 1994, p. 78-79) 
We could argue in response to this sort of argument that these cases are somewhat 
diﬀerent to the fiction case because you believe something existed in the past, not that 
something simply doesn’t exist. However, the important point here is that we have no 
principled reason for saying that it is rational to have aﬀective responses as a result of 
past-directed belief, while maintaining that emotional responses to fiction-directed beliefs 
are irrational.  
It is thus unclear why we should think it would be rational to respond emotionally 
to belief-like imaginings, yet irrational to respond emotionally to a belief about what is 
true in fiction. This is not to say that this rationality worry is easily dealt with and none 
of the points canvassed above will conclusively respond to this worry (a helpful summary 
of this debate can be found in Friend 2016, pp. 223-227). For example, we haven’t 
considered whether it is rational for Charles to either fear or quasi fear for himself, bearing 
in mind he doesn’t think he is actually threatened: Davies (2009, p. 281) concludes 
Charles is, in fact, irrational, and presumably he would maintain that this is true 
regardless of whether we endorse a distinct content or distinct attitude view of our 
emotional responses to fiction. The key point here is there is no clear-cut reason why 
introducing a distinct attitude makes it easier to respond to rationality worries, as 
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compared to allowing that our emotional responses to fiction are caused by beliefs with 
distinct contents. 
As such, it looks we can respond to both causal and rationality worries about beliefs 
about the fiction leading to aﬀective responses. This will also be helpful for explaining 
our aﬀective response to pretence, since the meta-representational beliefs introduced by 
Leslie have a similar form to beliefs subject to a fictional operator. That said, there are 
important diﬀerences between the two, in particular the fact these sorts of representations 
can be formed at will in the case of pretence. This raises interesting questions about why, 
for example, someone can respond emotionally to something they voluntarily represent, 
an issue that does not arise when we reflect on our engagement with fiction. We do not 
have the space to discuss this matter further, but this is a good example of where 
separating out our theories of pretence and engagement with fiction can provide 
interesting avenues for future research. 
Conclusion 
By comparing fiction and pretence, we saw in section 5.1 that it looks like the counterpart 
to belief involved in our engagement with fiction may well be an involuntary counterpart, 
since it is supposed to be an automatic response to reading words on the page or seeing 
images on the screen, and so on. This gave us reason to question the uniformity 
assumption and to argue that justifying the involvement of a counterpart to belief in our 
engagement with fiction must be done separately from justifying the involvement of one 
in hypothetical reasoning or pretence. In light of this, and in line with my second and 
third principles about imaginary counterparts, we considered from sections 5.2 to 5.6 
whether constraints on belief that arise when thinking about our engagement with fiction 
suggest that beliefs cannot be the only cognitive attitude involved in our engagement 
with fiction, or whether puzzles arose if we maintained that beliefs are the only cognitive 
attitude associated with fiction. 
We saw that issues related to ontology, the fact fictions are weird, conceptual 
sophistication and discourse processing did not reveal any constraints on belief that give 
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us reason to think that beliefs about what is fictional will fail to do all the explanatory 
work when it comes to explaining our engagement with fiction. Indeed, when we 
considered issues related to sophistication, we saw, as we did in chapter 3, that we still 
require some sort of account of how distinct attitude approaches explain clustering. This 
suggests perhaps one way in which a distinct attitude is insuﬃcient for explaining our 
engagement with fiction. Furthermore, puzzles related to the fiction and non-fiction 
distinction, and why we respond emotionally to fictions, cannot be resolved solely by 
introducing belief-like imaginings, and are not rendered harder to solve by supposing that 
only beliefs are involved in our engagement with fiction. 
As such, we have found no reason to necessarily introduce a belief-like attitude into 
our account of how we engage with works of fiction, and so can reject the non-doxastic 
assumption in the context of fiction. That being said, this does not have to mean rejecting 
any link between imagination and fiction. This should instead point us towards 
developing an account of how we engage with fiction that looks beyond the mere 
propositional elements of our engagement. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
 
It is commonly argued that when reflecting on our engagement with fiction and in pre-
tence, we should embrace the uniformity and non-doxastic assumptions, according to 
which the same cognitive attitude is involved in both of these activities: an imaginative 
counterpart to belief. By marking a distinction between voluntary and involuntary coun-
terparts in chapter 1, we were able to challenge the first of these two assumptions, the 
uniformity assumption. In chapter 2, I suggested that if a belief-like counterpart is in-
volved in our engagement with fiction, it will have to be an involuntary counterpart, 
whereas if one is involved in pretence, it will have to be a voluntary counterpart. We 
further developed this challenge in chapter 5, by reflecting on the similarities and diﬀer-
ences between engaging with fiction and in pretence, and in doing so I argued that we 
have good reason to reject the uniformity assumption once we note the diﬀering explan-
atory demands of these two activities. 
We also challenged the second of these two assumptions, the non-doxastic assump-
tion, by arguing that a belief-like attitude is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for explaining 
our engagement with fiction and in pretence. We first questioned suﬃciency in chapter 
3, where we saw that introducing belief-like imaginings does not make sense of why our 
representations related to fiction and pretence exhibit clustering. In chapter 4, I argued 
that to explain pretence recognition and motivation we need to introduce meta-represen-
tational beliefs of the form ‘I PRETEND “p”’, since introducing belief-like imaginings is 
insuﬃcient for making sense of these two issues. I also argued that once we introduce 
these beliefs, belief-like imaginings are rendered unnecessary for explaining our engage-
ment in pretence. Finally, in chapter 5, I argued that beliefs subject to a fictional operator 
can explain the cognitive elements of our engagement with fiction, and that in light of 
this introducing a distinct belief-like attitude is also unnecessary in the context of our 
engagement with fiction.  
In challenging these two assumptions, we have also seen why distinct content based 
approaches can potentially oﬀer compelling accounts of how we engage with fiction and 
in pretence. I do not anticipate that I will have been able to convince every philosopher 
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to give up on belief-like imaginings when thinking about fiction and pretence, but I hope 
to have at least shown that further arguments are needed to justify the introduction of 
these sorts of imaginings, at least in the context of our engagement with fiction and in 
pretence.  
However, this leaves a residual question about whether the fact that I have defended 
distinct content accounts of how we engage with fiction and in pretence entails that I 
accept a version of the uniformity assumption. On the one hand, I have argued that both 
these activities involve the same cognitive attitude: belief. On the other, I have argued 
that the relevant beliefs have somewhat diﬀerent contents in each case. As such, I am 
concerned that it will be potentially misleading to count myself as adopting a version of 
the uniformity assumption, since this terminology risks failing to reflect the fact that I 
am arguing that the same attitude is involved in our engagement with fiction and in 
pretence, but diﬀerent contents. 
Finally, I would like to make some suggestions about potential directions for future 
research. It is important to remind ourselves that even if engaging with fiction and in 
pretence doesn’t involve belief-like imaginings, engaging in these activities might still 
involve some non-propositional varieties of imagination, such as objectual and sympa-
thetic imaginings. I also suspect that the creative imagination will play an important role 
in fiction-making, and perhaps also in pretence when it comes to generating novel behav-
iours. An interesting issue to pursue in future research is exactly what role these forms 
of imagination play in our engagement with fiction and in pretence.  
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